City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

CUNY Graduate Center

2-2017

Thresholds of Atrocity: Liberal Violence and the Politics of Moral
Vision
Kristofer J. Petersen-Overton
The Graduate Center, City University of New York

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1836
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

THRESHOLDS OF ATROCITY:
LIBERAL VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF MORAL VISION

by

KRISTOFER JENS PETERSEN-OVERTON

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York

2017

Copyright 2016

KRISTOFER JENS PETERSEN-OVERTON

All Rights Reserved

ii

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science
in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Professor Carol Gould
____________________
Date

_____________________________
Chair of the Examining Committee

Professor Alyson Cole
____________________
Date

_____________________________
Executive Officer

Professor Rosalind P. Petchesky
_____________________________
Supervisory Committee

Professor Uday S. Mehta
_____________________________
Supervisory Committee

CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

iii

ABSTRACT
THRESHOLDS OF ATROCITY:
LIBERAL VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF MORAL VISION
by
Kristofer Jens Petersen-Overton
Adviser: Professor Carol Gould
All political communities set normative limits to the acceptable use of force. A threshold
of atrocity indicates the point at which acceptable violence meets the boundaries of the
unacceptable. In liberal democratic states such norms are ostensibly set higher. Hence, there is a
theoretical threshold to the modern state’s ability to act in ways that violate norms it claims to
uphold. Paradoxically, thresholds of atrocity are almost never breached and unconscionable
violence occurs regularly. This study seeks to explain the persistence of extreme violence by
developing a theory of atrocity grounded in moral vision. Liberal democratic nation-states are
able to commit atrocities because they obscure these acts literally and metaphorically. Disguising
violence in liberal democratic nation-states is further facilitated by the bureaucratic dispersion of
responsibility characteristic of liberal nationalist ideology in particular, the conversion of liberal
ideals into national myths, the mediation of moral information via a compliant news media
system, and the adoption of technological means of violence that are inherently difficult to “see.”
This raises an inescapable conclusion with radical normative implications: a great deal of the
violence we presently tolerate as acceptable ought to instead be challenged as atrocious.
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I. LOOKING: At the Threshold of Atrocity
“It will be seen again and again how characteristic of the whole process that we call civilization is this movement of
segregation, this ‘hiding behind the scenes’ of what has become distasteful.”
Norbert Elias
“There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.”
Walter Benjamin

Unconscionable Violence
All political communities set normative limits to the acceptable use of force. While
human history is steeped in relentless mass slaughter, veritable orgies of sanguinary rage, some
acts of violence are thought to go too far. At best, transgressions of these limits are met with
widespread disapproval; at worst, revulsion, shock, and horror. The point at which acceptable
violence meets the boundaries of the unconscionable I call a threshold of atrocity. Organized
violence must always contend with the social reprobation passing beyond a threshold of atrocity
implies. No political community has ever sanctioned unrestrained bloodletting as an end unto
itself, not even the most warlike. While these unwritten social norms are informal, they have
nevertheless acted as constraints on the use of force in practice throughout human history.
To argue that violence is constrained by thresholds of atrocity might appear
counterintuitive. History is rife with examples of violence that appear unrestrained by
contemporary standards. One can scarcely ignore the apparent historical recurrence of what
Primo Levi called “useless violence,” i.e. violence that advances no discernible military
objectives and instead seems only to gratify sadistic impulses.1 No doubt, human communities
have upheld and justified shocking levels of brutality against their enemies. Moral philosophers
have occasionally concluded from the viciousness of human behavior that there cannot possibly
be objective moral standards on matters of violence or indeed on the nature of good and bad
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Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), chap. 5.
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itself. As one representative account puts it, “We learn that all kinds of horrible practices are in
this, that, or the other place, regarded as essential to virtue.”
We find that there is nothing, or next to nothing, which has always and everywhere been
regarded as morally good by all men. Where then is our universal morality? Can we, in
the face of all this evidence, deny that it is nothing but an empty dream?2
In the chapters that follow, I would like argue that there are indeed very good reasons for
denying that it is an empty dream.
Against the grisly record of history, we tend to think we know atrocities when we see
them, that we are able to intuitively separate atrocious acts from the merely bad and thereby
reserve for the perpetrators of those acts a special moral condemnation. Certainly, if we limit our
reflections to particularly egregious manifestations of human violence (especially from the
pacific serenity of our armchairs), moral judgment appears to be a deceptively straightforward
affair. Of course genocide is wrong! Of course torture should not be a tool of state policy! How
civilized we have become! We cannot fathom the torrents of blood spilled by our poor, ignorant
ancestors in virtually all pre-modern societies and we congratulate ourselves for the moral
progress this suggests. Yet, if one looks very closely into even the most gruesome historical
cases, a rough framework governing the use of force usually reveals itself, offering insight into
the toleration of acts that might, under very different circumstances, have instead been regarded
as aberrant and atrocious. What is more, these norms are not so very different from our own
shaky assumptions about the origins of violence and atrocity.
Thresholds of atrocity vary dramatically across time and space, but it is nevertheless
possible to identify patterns. For instance, while war-making has been a reliable adjunct to
human civilization over the broad span of its existence, war itself has been commonly viewed as
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an unfortunate byproduct of the human experience, if not outright condemned as a lamentable
evil. Where regulations governing the practice of warfare have been codified to a reasonable
degree, the general social prohibitions to which these standards give expression remain strikingly
similar across cases.3 This tells us something important—dare we say universal?—about
prevailing moral concerns.4 Still, the formal or informal constraints placed upon the practice of
warfare specifically are not the focus here. This study is instead concerned with the evolution of
moral norms that would classify some forms of violence as acceptable, even desirable, and
others as unjustifiable under any circumstances imaginable, i.e. atrocities.
The unjustifiable nature of atrocities versus war in general is a crucial distinction. Few
moral philosophers are prepared to argue that war is always unjust, but it would be difficult to
find anyone, even the most dedicated act-utilitarian, who believes the perpetration of atrocities
can ever be morally justifiable.5 From the Latin atrox, meaning heinous, cruel, or severe, the
very word atrocity implies excess by definition. An atrocity is that which cannot be justified. The
concept of justification of course relies on a consequentialist moral rubric; it looks to ends and
outcomes. To the extent that conventional violence helps achieve a good state of affairs, some
would argue it can be justified. “Violence,” as Arendt famously writes, “can be justifiable, but it
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On the moral prohibition against murder for example, see John Mikhail, “Is the Prohibition of Homicide
Universal? Evidence from Comparative Criminal Law,” Brooklyn Law Review 75, no. 2 (2009): 497–515.
4
For a useful look at the plausibility of universal moral norms from a range of philosophical traditions, see Gena
Outka and John P. Reeder, eds., The Prospects for a Common Morality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1993).
5
One influential account argues against the notion that atrocities are morally justifiable within an act-utilitarian
framework: “Where the tyrants who cause atrocities for the sake of Utopia are wrong is, surely, on the plain question
of fact, and on confusing probabilities with certainties. After all, one would have to be very sure that future
generations would be saved still greater misery before one embarked on such a tyrannical programme. … We can, in
fact, agree with the most violent denouncer of atrocities carried out in the name of Utopia without sacrificing our
act-utilitarian principles.” J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1973), 63–64. For a rule-utilitarian discussion of moral conduct in war, see R. B.
Brandt, “Utilitarianism and the Rules of War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 2 (Winter 1972): 145–65.
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will never be legitimate.”6 But what about forms of violence that are neither justifiable nor
legitimate? Surely this unspoken counterpart to Arendt’s maxim must be that which lies beyond
a threshold of atrocity. This study is interested first of all in what makes an atrocity atrocious
and, by extension, why atrocities persist despite apparently strong and persistent moral
prohibitions.
In this, the introductory chapter of my study, I have two aims. The first is to demonstrate
the existence of minimal norms governing the use of physical force throughout history. By doing
this, my claim that all political communities establish thresholds of atrocity should become
plausible. While it is virtually impossible to know for sure how certain forms of violence would
have been interpreted by our ancestors across all levels of society, one can learn much from
proto-legal standards set against some violent practices at different times and in different places.
At no time in human history has violence ever been unaccompanied by basic norms of
conduct. Rather, in case upon case, standards emerge that proscribe some forms and targets of
violence. Examples include the desecration or mutilation of corpses, killing those who lay down
their arms, killing women and children, killing noncombatant men, killing in violation of treaties,
killing clerics, the destruction of holy sites, and cannibalism, to name just a few of the most
commonly proscribed practices. Indeed, the concerns taken up by contemporary international
law are not so very different. While ancient and pre-modern norms were by no means uniformly
recognized or even enforced, their existence demonstrates that the myth of human prehistory as a
time of absolute and unhinged violence is just that, a myth.
The second aim of this chapter is to introduce the concept of a threshold of atrocity
developed in subsequent chapters. Adapting Norbert Elias’s work on thresholds of shame and
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repugnance, I argue that a threshold of atrocity can be stretched, perhaps indefinitely, by moving
practices out of sight—literally and metaphorically. Elias traces the emergence of European
social mores governing sexual behavior, bodily functions, and table manners as these practices
evolved according to what he calls the “civilizing process.” Thresholds of shame and repugnance
inevitably shift over time, rendering practices long tolerated suddenly unacceptable, impolite, or
simply uncivilized. By his account, many of these standards were instigated by courtly practices
that originally served to distinguish and underscore class associations along with their attendant
practices.
Following Elias’s lead, I emphasize literal and metaphorical vision as a key moral
component to a coherent theory of atrocity. Elias’s argument is often misread as one that draws
observations about qualitative changes in social practices, but the process he describes is far less
linear. More often, the changes he describes are of a superficial quality and leave the essential
core intact. Some social practices move out of sight, others cease, while still others carry on as
before under a different guise. His work helps us to understand not only how norms against
certain forms of violence arise, but also how the perpetrators of horrific violence are able to
disguise their behavior by circumventing the threshold, moving their unsavory activities beyond
phenomenological reach.

The Spectre of Melos
In 416 BCE, during the second phase of the Peloponnesian War, Athens committed an
act of atrocity that has since become legendary. While aggressively pursuing expansionist
designs beyond its immediate borders, the putative Athenian empire redoubled military efforts in
the Cyclades. When the residents of the island of Melos asked to retain formal neutrality in the
war, their appeals were rebuffed. Instead, Athens offered the islanders a chilling ultimatum:

5

submit or face annihilation. Thucydides famously restated the cruel and calculated position
expressed by Athens in response to Melian protestations:
[E]ach of us must exercise what power he really thinks he can, and we know and you
know that in the human realm, justice is enforced only among those who can be equally
constrained by it, and that those who have power use it, while the weak make
compromises.7
Faced with servitude or death, the Melians opted for the latter. True to their word, the Athenians
swiftly crushed the resistance, slaughtered all the men of military age they could capture, sold
the women and children into slavery, and repopulated the island with 500 colonists. Some have
described the ruthless episode as an early instance of genocide.8 Certainly, the might-makes-right
mentality expressed by the Athenians remains a favored illustration of cold-blooded power
politics, particularly among proponents of the realist school of international relations theory.9
How would the average citizen of Athens have perceived the slaughter at Melos?
Unwilling as ever to express his personal views of the events he recounts, Thucydides
nevertheless provides clues as to what he must have regarded as unusual behavior. Helen Law
writes that in his account of the sack of Mycalessus, during which Thracian forces allied with
Athens slaughtered and pillaged despite the city’s surrender, Thucydides “shows that such a
massacre of inhabitants and destruction of a city was not merely unusual but a unique instance
and distinctly barbarian rather than Greek.”10 The attack included the highly unusual killing of

7

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War 5.89. I rely on the following translation: Thucydides, The Peloponnesian
War, ed. Walter Blanco and Jennifer Tolbert Roberts, trans. Walter Blanco (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 227.
8
Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 65–73.
9
Michael Doyle, “Thucydidean Realism,” Review of International Studies 16, no. 3 (1990): 223–37; Michael T.
Clark, “Realism Ancient and Modern: Thucydides and International Relations,” PS: Political Science and Politics
26, no. 3 (1994): 491–94; Laurie M. Johnson Bagby, “The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations,”
International Organization 48, no. 1 (1994): 131–53.
10
Helen H. Law, “Atrocities in Greek Warfare,” The Classical Journal 15, no. 3 (1919): 142. Emphasis added.
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not only men but also women and children, the aged and infirm alike. Such brutality was
typically reserved only for revolting colonies. Neutrality was generally respected and there is
evidence that some were dismayed by Athens’ violation of this norm.
Euripides’s play The Trojan Women, produced shortly after the massacre at Melos, has
been widely interpreted as an allegorical critique of Athens’ proto-genocidal outburst.11 The play
centers on several Trojan women after their city is sacked, their husbands killed, and many
citizens taken as slaves. In one scene, Poseidon condemns excessive and wanton violence:
That mortal who sacks fallen cities is a fool
if he gives the temples and the tombs, the hallowed places
of the dead, to desolation. His own turn must come.12
Xenophon also offers a glimpse into popular perceptions of Athenian brutality. As Athens faced
defeat near the end of the war, he writes that citizens expressed fear over the retribution in store
for them over Melos specifically as well as other ravaged communities:
[D]uring that night no one slept, all mourning, not for the lost alone, but far more for
their own selves thinking that they would suffer such treatment as they had visited upon
the Melians, colonists of the Lacedaemonians, after reducing them by siege, and upon the
Histiaeans and Scionaeans and Toronaeans and Aeginetans and many other Greek
peoples.13
If they had not previously considered the moral implications of Athenian cruelty, defeat forced
Athenian citizens to fear the looming repercussions.
If we look to other cases besides the extraordinary brutality of the Peloponnesian War,
we find that conventional warfare does not seem to have been treated as a good unto itself in
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For a sophisticated account of The Trojan Women as a cypher for Euripides’ own political sensibilities, see N.T.
Croally, Euripidean Polemic: The Trojan Women and the Function of Tragedy (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1994).
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Euripides, The Trojan Women 95-97. See Euripides, “The Trojan Women,” in Greek Tragedies, ed. Mark Griffith
and Glenn W. Most, trans. Richmond Lattimore, Third edition, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).
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Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3-4. I rely on the following translation: Xenophon, Hellenica, vol. 1, Loeb Classical
Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 103–105.
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antiquity. This does not mean, however, that war was not widely perceived as useful for
achieving glories; it was. Greek society, including even Plato and Aristotle to some extent,
embraced warfare as the “essence of a civic militarist ideal.”14 Still, a recognition of potential
glories to be claimed within the norms of conventional warfare is not at all the same as
advocating war as an end in itself. For the Greeks, war could be justified only on the assumption
of worthy objectives. We see this in Herodotus, for example, when the victorious Persians ask
the captured Lydian King Croesus why he chose to attack them. He replies: “The god of the
Greeks encouraged me to fight you: the blame is his. No one is fool enough to choose war
instead of peace—in peace sons bury fathers, but in war fathers bury sons.”15 Though sometimes
necessary or inevitable, war still was not preferable to peace. As Zampaglione writes, “Although
they judged [war] a legitimate instrument for settling disputes between communities, the Greeks
were in no doubt that it was a painful necessity.”16
Even the bloody Homeric epics reflect this pacifist sentiment to a degree. While The Iliad
is, at heart, a story about vendetta and mass slaughter on a staggering scale, the “poem of
force”17 nevertheless contains occasional but emphatic anti-war messages. “At the very least,”
Creer argues, “[The Iliad is] an example of the sorrows and horrors of war, if not an outright
indictment of it and of the kingly powers which promote its being waged.”18 The Olympian gods,
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Doyne Dawson, The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1996), 161.
15
Herodotus, Histories 1.87. I rely on the following translation: Herodotus, The Histories, ed. John Marincola, trans.
Aubrey De Sélincourt (New York: Penguin, 2003).
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Gerardo Zampaglione, The Idea of Peace In Antiquity, trans. Richard Dunn (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1973), 18.
17
Simone Weil, “The Iliad, or the Poem of Force,” trans. Mary McCarthy, The Chicago Review 8, no. 2 (1965): 5–
30.
18
Tyler A. Creer, “Echoes of Peace: Anti-War Sentiment in the Iliad and Heike Monogatari and Its Manifestation in
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despite lending their assistance to various factions over the course of the Trojan War, all seem to
agree the war itself was regrettable. Zeus openly denounces his son, the war god Ares, for his
reckless pursuit of destruction for destruction’s sake: “You—I hate you most of all the Olympian
gods. Always dear to your heart strife, yes, and battles, the bloody grind of war.”19 No stranger
to conflict himself, Zeus remained nevertheless intolerant of war as an end.
Such moments are easy to overlook given the sheer abundance of carnage depicted in
Homer’s epic, instances of cruelty so disturbing they verge on psychopathy. When Menelaus is
prepared to spare the life of a Trojan soldier defeated on the battlefield, Agamemnon intervenes,
slays the man on the spot, and furthermore calls for what we would now call genocide:
Why such concern for enemies? I suppose you got
such tender loving care at home from the Trojans.
Ah would to god not one of them could escape
his sudden plunging death beneath our hands!
No baby boy still in his mother’s belly,
not even he escape—all Ilium blotted out,
no tears for their lives, no markers for their graves!20
These bellicose moments are nevertheless tempered by a clear recognition that war is a
lamentable enterprise. Menelaus, the only character with any meaningful stake in the war,
expresses his desire for a hasty end to the violence. To this, the Achaean and Trojan forces
respond with relief that the “agonies of war” would soon be at an end.21
The Homeric epics are obviously not strict historical accounts. We must consider them in
their artistic context, as legendary versions of events long past even in their own time. Legends
are prone to exaggeration and the historicity of the events Homer describes in The Iliad is
disputed. If the era of Homeric heroes witnessed even a small fraction of the violence depicted, it
19

Homer, Iliad 5.1030-1032. I rely on the following translation for this and all subsequent references: Homer, The
Iliad, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1990).
20
Homer, Iliad 6.66-70.
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Homer, Iliad 3.135-136.

9

is unclear how such bloodbaths would have been perceived by ordinary people—the peasant
masses struggling to survive as sanguinary fury engulfed their lives. While those who
participated in the warrior society may indeed have shared Agamemnon’s bloodthirsty rapture, it
is less obvious that his enthusiasm would have extended across all sectors of society, especially
among those who stood to suffer immensely from the prospect of war.
Already in The Iliad, there are clear indications of a desire to regulate bloodshed, to set
limits on organized brutality by separating acceptable violence from unacceptable violence. The
Odyssey goes further in this regard; the warriors agree to ban the use of poisoned arrows and
prisoners of war receive much better treatment, ransomed rather than executed. There are two
issues we must acknowledge, however: first, the general distaste for conventional war does not
rise to its absolute prohibition. War is thought to be necessary on occasion, e.g. wars of defense,
retaliation, survival, glory, etc. Second, notwithstanding the reluctant endorsement of war, some
violent practices are nonetheless thought to be unacceptable under any circumstances. Hence, the
early attempts to condemn some forms of violence as atrocious even in the midst of the already
unpleasant endeavor of war.
The impetus behind the second issue may have stemmed from moral, religious, or
instrumental objections, but it is here we find some of the very earliest attempts to set
prohibitions governing the use of force. Though we tend to think of antiquity as a period of “total
war,” devoid of any restraints on the practice of war-making, the reality was quite the opposite.
Bederman argues that “the enemy–foe distinction [in antiquity] tended to privilege public
combatants, and that that extended to deeply observed restraints on the conduct of hostilities.”22
Public war against a common foe was not, at least notionally, a license for the suspension
of the norms of human decency. Excesses, atrocities, and outrages were to be expected.
But that was very different from imagining that they were to be the norm in warfare.
22
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Even the Israelite tradition of compulsory war, pursued with the single-minded purpose
of exterminating the enemy without any restraints on the means or objectives of conflict,
gave way to something different over time. Greek and Roman practices, although by no
means uniform or civilized, showed the same progression.23
We should also acknowledge that wherever standards governing the use of force arise, they tend
to reflect the particular interests of the society (and especially the class) from which they emerge.
As already mentioned, the glorification of war depicted in Homer via Agamemnon reflects the
interests of a pre-Homeric warring aristocratic class, for whom war was widely perceived as a
path to honor and glory. Obvious limitations prevent us from knowing how this might have
differed from society at large. As Weeks points out, “the writing of history seldom includes
description of the feelings of common folk.”24
A large number of such hoi polloi were the people, after all, who made up the audiences
of performances staged in the huge outdoor theaters of ancient Greece and Rome.
Literate people, that tiny minority in ancient times, must also have been affected by what
they read from the pens of those few writers of the ‘‘intelligentsia,’’ who found killing in
war to be repugnant.25
The moments of hesitation concerning unrestrained brutality that do exist in later antiquity then
surely offer a glimpse into attitudes that must have been more in line with the concerns of wider
society. Moreover, the very existence of an “intelligentsia” reflects the shift in political power
away from Homeric warlords to the popular orientation we now associate with the rise of the
polis and especially the robust cultural life of Athenian society.
None of this is to say that popular attitudes necessarily translated into tangible constraints
on the use of force in practice. It is important to separate the existence of long term agreements
or formally recognized standards of conduct across the classical world—of which there were

23

Ibid., 248. Emphasis added.
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Ibid.
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none as far as we know—and a body of informal normative standards which did exist in various
forms. Violating these informal norms would have been justifiable cause for indignation. So
while none of the surviving evidence provides what we might identify as an early form of
international law, it does show that norms of behavior existed at all levels of Greek society, not
merely during war but in multiple areas of life. As they pertained to war specifically, these
standards were by the late fifth century BCE referred to as the koina nomina, or common
customs, of the Hellenes.26
Ober sums up what he believes represented “in descending order of formality” the most
important among these standards:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The state of war should be officially declared before commencing hostilities against
an appropriate foe; sworn treaties and alliances should be regarded as binding.
Hostilities are sometimes inappropriate: sacred truces, especially those declared for
the celebration of the Olympic games, should be observed.
Hostilities against certain persons and in certain places are inappropriate: the
inviolability of sacred places and persons under protection of the gods, especially
heralds and suppliants, should be respected.
Erecting a battlefield trophy indicates victory; such trophies should be respected.
After a battle it is right to return enemy dead when asked; to request the return of
one’s dead is tantamount to admitting defeat.
A battle is properly prefaced by a ritual challenge and acceptance of the challenge.
Prisoners of war should be offered for ransom rather than being summarily executed
or mutilated.
Punishment of surrendered opponents should be restrained.
War is an affair of warriors, thus noncombatants should not be primary targets of
attack.
Battles should be fought during usual (summer) campaign
Use of [non-standard] arms should be limited.
Pursuit of defeated and retreating opponents should be limited in duration.27

It appears that hundreds of years after the Homeric era, the standardization of war conduct was
already quite well-established. The role of religion in ancient Greece was an especially important
26
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factor underwriting the legitimacy of these norms, as is clearly reflected in the standards above
involving the desecration of temples, proper funerary practices and handling of corpses, the
sanctity of treaties, and the inviolability of heralds. Several of these standards seem merely to
facilitate practical matters that would have appealed to the warring classes but been largely
matters of indifference to civilians and peasants.
These standards reflect a general desire for fairness that is admittedly rare in Homer’s
epics, where there are no distinctions to be made between Greek and barbarian, no specified
warring season, and in which dirty tricks like the notorious Trojan horse are apparently valid
strategies. But would violation of these norms inspire mere indignation or would grievous
violations evoke great distress among warrior and civilian alike? How were minor transgressions
considered next to serious violations? It is difficult to know for sure but it is at least clear that
proto-humanitarian concerns were not a novel prospect for the Greeks. Nevertheless, these
standards offer a glimpse into only a very narrow sector of society and tell us little about the
average citizen, and still less the average woman or slave. Whatever the threshold of atrocity,
Ober argues that the koina nomina were largely respected in the practice of Greek warfare
between 700 and 450 BCE and then broke down during the Peloponnesian War with the
atrocities like the one at Melos. While the century immediately following the war experienced
the gradual erosion of these standards in practice, by no means should we assume that they
disappeared as normative ideals.
Similar “cultural regulations of violence” developed beyond Greece as well.28 Crowe
offers a comprehensive survey of atrocities in the pre-modern world with important
developments in norms of conduct beyond the Greeks, including the Assyrian, Egyptian,
28
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Hebrew, Persian, Indian, and Chinese civilizations. It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to
comprehensively recount every historical case, but several notable examples are worth
mentioning. In every case Crowe cites in the pre-modern world, norms governing the use of
force arose to set limits and restrain what was perceived as more extreme forms of violence.29
The Sumerian-Akkadian poem, the Epic of Gilgamesh suggests that war itself was
permissible only in self-defense or commanded by the gods but that once initiated, there were
virtually no restrictions on its prosecution. By some accounts, ancient Egypt’s imperialistic New
Kingdom avoided the summary execution of defeated enemies and instead encouraged
combatants to either cut off a limb or take them as slaves. The Hebrews, in a pattern that remains
constant across many societies, seem to have tolerated nearly unrestrained violence against
enemies, placing limits only on inter-Jewish violence. In Persia, Cyrus II the Great was
apparently regarded as a much more humane ruler than his contemporaries and immediate
predecessors, and there are numerous other examples.30
We should be wary of overstating the case. Antiquity was an undoubtedly bloody place
with forms of physical violence that would horrify us today. As far as we know, until the rise of
Christianity and the development of just war theory, no one with the means to do so raised major
objections to the horrors of war, whether defensive or aggressive. While the Romans introduced
the limited concept of humanitas, no equivalent notion existed in ancient Greek.31 A general
acceptance of war as a reality of life seems to have prevailed instead.
Nevertheless, the informal norms that did emerge in antiquity and elsewhere around the
world are the precursor to contemporary international law, and military practice has evolved on
29
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lines first established there. The basic technological innovations of war leading away from spears
and swords to guns and bombs has dramatically increased the distance between combatants.
Unmanned aerial vehicles are only the latest in a series of technological revolutions that have
dramatically altered the prosecution of military violence. In part because of these changes, many
would argue that there has been a gradual diminishing of human violence over the centuries,
both qualitative and quantitative, as many brutal practices have been recognized as objectively
immoral and unacceptable. At least until the horrors of the twentieth century unsettled this
optimistic view of moral progress, conventional wisdom seems to have regarded contemporary
human behavior as more “civilized” than that of our forebears. It is to this question we now turn.

Vision and the Civilizing Process
Recent empirical research seems to demonstrate that violence throughout history—
including mass atrocity—has declined over the centuries and plummeted with the emergence of
industrial capitalism and the rise the modern state. In a book that received a great deal of
attention outside the academy, Harvard neuroscientist Stephen Pinker argues “the artifices of
civilization have moved us in a noble direction.”32 Citizens of modern democratic nation-states,
he argues, are much less likely to suffer a violent death than were their pre-state tribal ancestors.
According to Pinker, “violence has declined over long stretches of time.”33 This salutary change
has ushered in not only a more peaceful world, but perhaps “the most peaceable era in our
species’ existence.”34 In his view, the average daily brutality of pre-modern times far exceeded
anything we see today, notwithstanding either the horrors of the prior century or the grisly
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content of our Twitter feeds. Before the modern state (and especially the liberal-democratic
state) imposed social order, human existence very much resembled a Hobbesian state of nature; a
great many lives ended violently. Because of its emphasis on the order-making power of the
modern Leviathan, we can call this a neo-Hobbesian argument.
While the numbers remain a matter of some dispute,35 let us assume Pinker is correct in
his basic claim that violence has declined. At least as a percentage of the population, perhaps it is
true that fewer people are brutally murdered by covetous neighbors today than during the Bronze
Age. Leaving aside the immense violence that has typically accompanied state-formation,
perhaps it also true that the modern state bears a great deal of responsibility for this change.
Perhaps it is even true, as Pinker argues strenuously, that the liberal-democratic state contributes
to the pacific changes he sees.36 Even if we concede all these points, Pinker’s argument remains
incomplete.
While the crude percentage of violent deaths may have plummeted, the numbers have not
and the technological potential for human aggression has dramatically increased—whether via
the lingering threat of total annihilation posed by the development of nuclear weapons or
weapons designed to “humanize” war like so-called smart bombs and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Moreover, some find the emphasis on statistics a crude rubric for measuring moral progress. As
the political theorist George Kateb writes in response to those who would celebrate a supposed
decline in violence on the basis of statistics alone, “such a concern for percentages rather than for
35
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absolute numbers is, in fact, part of the mentality that makes large-scale atrocities possible. The
failure to take seriously nothing but percentages shows a callousness that is part, though a
familiar part, of the story of humanly inflicted suffering all through time.”37 Scholarship that
attempts to reduce the complexities of human affairs to statistical analysis risks producing crude
conclusions. When considering the apparent exception to his argument presented by the horrors
of the twentieth century, Pinker writes that it would seem like a “monstrous disrespect to the
victims” to suggest their deaths were unfortunate result of a statistical aberration—yet he makes
precisely that claim just a few lines later.38 According to his argument, Nazism reflects a
statistical anomaly and would have remained a mere footnote in German history had Adolf Hitler
pursued art instead of politics.39
None of this is to say that Pinker is wrong to celebrate a decline in violence, just that the
decline he identifies appears significant in part because the definition of violence he uses. That
said, it is not particularly important to my argument whether or not Pinker is correct about
violence. While a number of compelling challenges have cast doubt on some of Pinker’s central
claims, my interest in his argument is rather different from the objections raised by these
critiques.40 In his eagerness to emphasize the decline in violence, Pinker implausibly denies that
Nazism represents anything more complicated than a strand of “counter-Enlightenment
utopianism.”41 Whereas Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Aimé Cesaire, Franz Fanon, Max
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Horkheimer, and others since have attempted to untangle the origins of Nazi ideology and its
troubling relationship to the Enlightenment, Pinker never once cites the relevant work.42 In an
endnote, he names Zgymunt Bauman, Michel Foucault, and Theodor Adorno43 and dismisses
their work as “ludicrous, if not obscene.”44 Pinker does, however, favorably cite one post-war
European social theorist. He describes the German sociologist Norbert Elias as “the greatest
thinker you have never heard of”45 and devotes an entire chapter of his book to applying Elias’s
ostensible insights to his own overarching claims about violence.46 Unfortunately, Pinker’s
analysis is predicated on a misreading of Elias’s work. While he portrays Elias as a neoHobbesian advocate for a powerful Leviathan, a more faithful reading reveals a deep
ambivalence, even opposition, to the positions Pinker attributes to him.
Norbert Elias’s masterpiece, The Civilizing Process, is a study in two volumes of the
evolution of European social mores.47 It documents, in short, the trend of moving practices
deemed unpleasant out of view, i.e. the civilizing process. Despite the connotations of the word
“civilization” in English, the process Elias describes has very little to do with the historically
imperialistic and racist use of the term. Instead, he argues that the very idea of civilization is
constructed via elaborate processes of social differentiation that establish boundaries of correct
and incorrect behavior—proper modes of conduct among social classes, genders, races, etc. The
civilizing process produces the gradual refinement of social norms governing behavior in
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relation to nudity, defecation and urination, table manners, blowing one’s nose, sexual relations,
and the slaughter of animals. As attitudes governing social norms shifted in the courts of
European nobility, modes of conduct formerly tolerated or even encouraged became impolite,
rude, boorish—in short, less “civilized.” Meanwhile, other forms of behavior moved in the
opposite direction and gained widespread acceptance.
Elias’s analysis helps explain a great deal about the emergence of technologies designed
to render unpleasant social practices invisible, or at least less visible. The evolution of violence
and its attendant technologies is of immediate interest to us for the purposes of this study,
especially insofar as those practices relate to state power. Changes in manners and courtly
practices, Elias argues, occurred alongside a shift away from private violence to a Weberian state
monopoly of violence. Insofar as Elias can be read as an advocate of centralized state power as a
solution to private violence, his theory at first appears to justify a broadly Hobbesian conclusion.
This is precisely how Steven Pinker deploys his work in the full chapter he devotes to the
civilizing process. Yet Elias himself was personally ambivalent about what the “civilizing
process” meant.
The changes instigated by the modern state, Elias insists, were often Janus-faced and the
emergence of proto-capitalist economics sometimes produced no more than superficial changes
in social practices. The reorganization of social activity, even when dramatic and revolutionary,
does not necessarily alter the thrust of that activity. Put differently, many of the transformations
Elias describes did not occur at the phenomenal level. Whether moving in or out of favor,
changes in the form of social practices do not fundamentally alter the core behavior to which the
practices in question are associated. Whether eating with a fork or shoveling food into one’s
mouth by hand, basic nourishment or gustatory pleasure remain the unaltered principal
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objectives. Yet the means by which these objectives were achieved (with the assistance of eating
utensils) were rendered less messy, according to shifting social standards. Elias concedes as
much when he points to concealment and distancing as the primary methods associated with the
civilizing process.48 Urination and defecation, as well as audible belching and passing of gas
were no longer to be tolerated in plain view and certainly not among people of quality. No one
imagines for a second that basic corporeal processes ceased, just that the appropriate sphere in
which these impulses should be indulged was transferred out of sight. “It will be seen again and
again,” Elias writes, “how characteristic of the whole process that we call civilization is this
movement of segregation, this ‘hiding behind the scenes’ of what has become distasteful.”49 In
other words, the changes associated with the civilizing process are often of form and not of
content. In using his work to argue the latter, Pinker mischaracterizes the thrust of Elias’
contribution.
Elias points to three factors at work in the civilizing process. They include first, a gradual
shift away from external social constraints imposed upon the individuals to a situation in which
individuals rely increasingly on self-restraint; second, the development of a social context in
which the constraints placed on spontaneous eruptions of emotional or behavioral expression
become more stable; third, an increasing sense of solidarity and identification between people in
a given society, across classes and other social divisions. In this way, the modern state achieves
internal pacification and a Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence. Elias’s recognition that
this process typically involves bloodshed as political rivals consolidate power anticipates Charles
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Tilly’s famous assertion that “war made states, and vice versa.”50 A significant factor in the shift
away from private violence can be found, Tilly argues, “in the increasing ability of state to
monitor, control, and monopolize the effective means of violence.”51
The complementary relationship between state centralization, military force, and protocapitalist economics produces the playing field in which Elias’s civilizing process occurs. Yet in
many cases, the violence displaced by the state merely changes hands. If the twentieth century is
any guide, there appears to be an enormous body of evidence that the transfer of violence from
private hands to state control does not necessarily reduce overall violence. Indeed, Tilly opens
the relevant chapter of his book by describing the twentieth century as the “most bellicose” in
history.52 Elias, himself a Jewish refugee who fled the rise of Nazism, struggled with the grim
realities of the camps and sought to explain the variables contributing to “decivilizing
processes.”53 His conclusion, absent in Pinker’s account, is that the civilizing process is not a
linear march to a neo-Hobbesian teleology. Rather, it is a process by which some practices,
though they may persist and even crescendo, are hidden away. If Elias is correct, the drive to
obscure might just as easily discourage unseemly practices in some cases as it might facilitate
them in others.
A better reading of Elias than Pinker manages to offer, one that takes into account the
centrality of visibility to the civilizing process, can be found in a study of industrial meat
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production by the political theorist Timothy Pachirat. In the course of his work, Elias moves
from manners to the slaughter and consumption of animals. He details the emergence of new
culinary practices aimed at de-fabricating animals so that smaller, less readily identifiable parts
would discourage consumers from drawing a clear mental connection between the animal’s flesh
on their fork and a formerly intact, living body. Animal rights activists frequently point out the
new words brought into use to further establish a mental distance between the living animal and
its flesh as food. Pig becomes pork, cow becomes beef. As the metamorphosis from animal to
commodity takes place, the act of eating is further alienated from the unpleasant sights and
sounds of the slaughterhouse. Considering the rise of industrial capitalism and our present world
of supermarket shelves stocked to the brim with a plenitude of shrink-wrapped animal parts,
Elias’s work is veritably prescient. Abattoirs have moved ever further out of sight—to the point
that the public is often legally prevented from filming or even viewing what goes on inside a
factory farm54—while cheap meat is more readily accessible than at any other time in human
history.
In this vein, Timothy Pachirat picks up where Elias left off. Working undercover as a day
laborer in an abattoir, he managed to observe what few today ever do: the killing and butchering
of cattle on an industrial scale. His research documents how the system of industrial slaughter is
enabled via mechanisms Norbert Elias identified in The Civilizing Process. Pachirat’s most
important insights come from his discussion of dispersed responsibility, an application he
acknowledges has implications for scholarly analysis in many other fields.55 Even as the remote
physical location of the abattoir itself allows for a carnivorous public to avoid the ethical
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questions attending the industrial production of meat as a commodity, the division of
responsibilities within the abattoir itself also disperses these questions even among the very
people engaged in the bloody labor. Pachirat’s normative project advocates a “politics of sight”
he hopes will counter the current state of affairs: invisible people working in invisible locations
abusing, slaughtering, and butchering invisible animals all to produce a visible shrink-wrapped
piece of food—a true commodity in the Marxian sense, possessing an existence alienated from
the social relations that produced it.
In total, Pachirat identifies 121 separate responsibilities within the abattoir he observed,
ranging from “spinal cord remover” (a self-explanatory task) to the “bung dropper,” responsible
for cutting the large intestines away from the anus. Only one person is responsible for the act of
killing itself, the “knocker,” who uses an air gun to drive a captive-steel bolt into the cows’
foreheads—one every twelve seconds. The isolation of these tasks, Pachirat argues by way of
Elias, encourages a distancing from the act of killing itself for everyone but the knocker, a
marginal job characterized by a high rate of turnover. Upon announcing his intention to work as
a knocker, Pachirat’s co-workers urge him against it.
“Man that will mess you up. Knockers have to see a psychologist or a psychiatrist or
whatever they’re called every three months.”
“Really? Why?”
“Because, man, that’s killing … that shit will fuck you up for real.”56
Clearly, for these workers, the division of labor in the abattoir itself obscures their own
participation in the same system that transforms living creatures into commodities and
establishes a moral hierarchy of tasks in which butchering dead meat is distinguished from
killing a live animal. “These zones [of confinement],” Pachirat writes “segregate the work of
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killing not only from the ordinary members of society but also at what might be expected to be
the most explicitly violent site of all: the kill floor.”57 One further illustration demonstrates the
profound visual component to such moral judgments. Pachirat opens his book by describing the
outpouring of public anger when, after several cattle escaped from a slaughterhouse holding pen
in Omaha, one was cornered by police and summarily shot to death.58 No similar outrage was
expressed for the cow’s originally intended fate, provided it occurs out of sight, behind abattoir
walls. One method of slaughter is acceptable; the other is not.

Thresholds of Atrocity
Timothy Pachirat is obviously writing about cattle, not humans, and the moral status of
eating animals remains unsettled and controversial59 (if not the means of procuring it).60 Still, his
sharp analysis of distancing, especially physical and linguistic, inevitably raises the specter of
Nazi atrocities and the mass murder of human beings in general. Whether the slaughter of
animals or of humans, moral distancing reduces our capacity for moral vision when the acts in
question are too unpleasant for plain sight.
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Hannah Arendt and Raul Hilberg were of course the first to reflect with any depth on the
moral problems posed by the role of bureaucratization in the Nazi holocaust.61 One particular
innovation stands out. In the early days of the Nazi genocide, German officers grew concerned
with the high rates of psychological distress among soldiers of the Einsatzgruppen. Execution by
firing squad was still the primary means of murdering prisoners at the time and the German army
was concerned—for the executioners. In bureaucratic terms, executions of this kind are laborintensive and psychologically traumatic for the executioners. “The execution of women and
children,” Saul Friedländer writes, “seemed to [Heinrich] Himmler to be too stressful for his
commando members; toxic gas was more promising.”62 Hence, the notorious method of
asphyxiating prisoners was developed as a solution to this dilemma, first in trucks with engine
exhaust, later in dedicated gas chambers with Zyklon-B gas, a pesticide.
The act of gassing, moreover, was divided into a series of individually minor tasks:
flipping a switch, opening a hatch, shutting a door, etc. Each of these seemingly minor actions
would be assigned to a different soldier and often to other prisoners themselves, thereby
significantly dispersing a perception of responsibility for the mass murder among a larger whole
in much the same way Pachirat describes in the abattoir. Just as the workers in Pachirat’s abattoir
refused to acknowledge the moral questions stemming from their own participation in a system
of killing, however small, so the average Nazi prison guard could not fathom why he or she
should be held to account for the genocide.63
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In his analysis of Elias, Burkitt sheds light on how the civilizing process might itself
contribute to innovations in the use of violence. He cites gruesome examples of medieval
European violence of a kind Michel Foucault would have described as “sovereign power”64
before claiming that exhibitions of actual spectacular violence are no longer possible today, in
part, because of changes associated with the civilizing process. Even Hitler, he writes, was
constrained by trends governing forms of violence subject to social approval or approbation.
Even a tyrant like Hitler could not display the power of the state that he commanded in
such a way. The Holocaust took place ‘behind the scenes’, in concentration camps mainly
outside of Germany, and their existence was never officially acknowledged. … As Elias
emphasizes, when something moves behind the scenes it corresponds to something that
people find distasteful or totally abhorrent; the knowledge of what has disappeared is not
completely erased, but continues to exist in the unconscious as knowledge that is denied
or repressed. It is darkly ambivalent to contemplate, but these aspects of the ‘civilizing’
process may have made it possible for the Holocaust to happen in the way that it did.65
Moreover, the physical isolation of mass slaughter of both animals and humans is complemented
by a kind of calculated semantic duplicity designed, as Orwell famously observed, “to make lies
sound truthful and murder respectable.”66 Cows are not slaughtered; they are processed. Pachirat
describes the abattoir as a place “where the linguistic leap from steer to steak, from heifer to
hamburger is enacted.”67 We see a similar form of distancing in Arendt’s chilling description of
the “language rules” adopted by the Nazis to obscure the grisly content of internal
correspondence. “The prescribed code names for killing” she writes, “were ‘final solution,’
‘evacuation’ (Aussiedlung), and ‘special treatment’ (Sonderbehandlung); deportation … received
the names of ‘resettlement’ (Umsiedlung) and ‘labor in the East’ (Arbeitseinsatz im Osten).”68
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The human capacity for ignoring the ethical consequences of participation in a larger
system, especially when responsibility for systemic outcomes can be imputed to those with
authority, reveals something very dark about ourselves. From the Milgram experiment on, the
field of social psychology has attempted to understand how “good” people go “bad,” but these
questions ultimately fall short. It is simply not the case that objectively “good” people go
objectively “bad,” but rather the shifting sands of social expectation express more or less
tolerance of some forms of violence than others.
In this vein, George Kateb argues that mass atrocities arise both from the hyperactive
imagination of those in power and the inactive imagination, or moral blindness, of those who
unthinkingly carry out their leaders’ aesthetic vision.
The initiators introduce the aesthetically compelling fictions and stories, redefinitions of
the world through new or rearranged categories, that seduce the susceptible, including
themselves. But the fanatical drive to realize what has been hyperactively imagined to
make actually present what has hitherto been absent, could not proceed unless the
initiators and leaders used their capacity, all the while, to make absent what is present.
The people they lead and the people they destroy must cease being people in their eyes,
must lose their humanity and become unreal or less real or caricatures of reality. On the
other hand, it helps that the followers, to be suitable instruments, must have an added
incentive to stay, in their own way, blind in what they do. This blindness, which is
always at one’s disposal, is guaranteed to turn lethal when the fanatically aesthetic
contagion has been spread by the initiators.69
The “added incentive” of which Kateb writes, is of course the confidence that the authority of
those in command renders independent moral judgment superfluous. A sufficient dispersion of
responsibility coupled with this inability or unwillingness to reflect very deeply upon the
consequences of one’s actions contributes to an ethical environment characterized by moral
blindness. It is, at root, not so very different from the Nuremberg defense offered up by the Nazi
génocidaires: “I was just following orders.”
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Just as Nazi Germany sought to disperse the sense of responsibility that was driving their
executioners to despair, all contemporary militaries—insofar as they must train their troops to
kill and die for a cause—have an interest in encouraging non-reflection. Nor is the phenomenon
limited to military endeavors. To the extent that contemporary private corporations engage in
ethically dubious behavior, managers also have an interest in maintaining a dispersion of
responsibility among their employees. When it supports and protects the actions in question, the
law can be a powerful force for discouraging ethical contemplation. In the aftermath of the
economic meltdown of 2008, for instance, Congress questioned executives from the major
banking firms who had been deeply involved in the derivatives market and the trading of creditdefault swaps. Against the protestations of the politicians, many executives argued that nothing
they had done was technically illegal. Ethics was another matter entirely. Patriotism and certain
forms of nationalism can have a similar effect when it comes to excusing forms of behavior
otherwise brought into question. “The nationalist,” Orwell quipped, “not only does not
disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity for not
even hearing about them.”70 Indeed, there are innumerable filters and other ideological
apparatuses through which we are capable of remaining blind to the morality of our actions.
Under such conditions, it takes immense effort and courage to seek moral clarity.

Overview

This opening chapter has followed a tortuous and fitful trajectory. It does not tell a linear
story about the evolution of social norms pertaining to violence, but it lays the conceptual
foundation for what follows. In the first half of the chapter, I claim that no political community
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has ever sanctioned unhinged violence as an end unto itself. Though history is rife with
massacres and bloody injustices, there have always been minimal norms and constraints placed
against some practices of violence in some circumstances. Even in the bloodiest epics of
antiquity, it is possible to observe that some forms of brutality went too far in the popular
consciousness of their audiences. This normative limit, the conceptual division between
acceptable and intolerable violence, is what I call a threshold of atrocity. That such thresholds
exist, however, does not in itself reveal anything about their specific moral character from one
cultural and historical context to another.
Given the fluid and changing nature of thresholds of atrocity, the second half of this
chapter looked to the work of Norbert Elias for insight into how they take shape. In the course of
this discussion, I point out some flaws in Steven Pinker’s highly influential but ultimately
misguided reading of Elias’s work. Despite the views Pinker and others ascribe to him, Elias
actually says much more about the changing manifestations of phenomena—especially their shift
out of sight—than about their cessation. The literal removal from sight of activities no longer
deemed acceptable for public display influences the metaphorical notion of moral vision.
Scholars have long argued that the human capacity to shirk moral responsibility contributes to
the persistence of atrocities. I argue that what Elias calls the civilizing process does not imply
moral progress. In many cases, it may actually obscure moral responsibility literally and
metaphorically by dispersing responsibility and thereby often facilitate the persistence of
unacceptable behavior, albeit in a palatable form.
Political theory has been proudly described as an “unapologetically mongrel subdiscipline,”71 lacking either dominant methods or a clearly identifiable mainstream mode of
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approach. Political theorists thrive at the intersection of traditional disciplinary boundaries and I
have happily taken up the tradition here. The following chapters engage with and critically assess
the work of a number of philosophers and social theorists from very different backgrounds and
schools of thought—among them Norbert Elias, Emmanuel Levinas, Iris Murdoch, Simone Weil,
Claudia Card, Hannah Arendt, Noam Chomsky, Niklas Luhmann, John Rawls, and Adam Smith.
I trespass, moreover, upon several different fields of study besides what might be considered
conventional political philosophy, including moral philosophy, media studies, and genocide
studies. Yet this project is not merely an agglomeration of loose variations upon the broad theme
of atrocity.
Sheldon Wolin argues that good political theory has often contained an “imaginative
element,”72 a normative project “influenced to a great extent by the problems agitating [the
theorist’s] society”73 and aimed at “lessening the gap between the possibilities grasped through
political imagination and the actualities of political existence.”74 Indeed, a strong normative
argument undergirds this study. In different ways, each chapter advances an underlying
normative claim: the concept of atrocity must be significantly expanded to include much more
than it does at present. This may sound like a simple proposal but, if taken seriously, it implies
dramatic social and political changes. Our thresholds of atrocity must change. Despite the strong
moral prohibitions against “atrocities,” we are too often able to justify or tolerate forms of
violence that should more accurately fall under that heading. This is wrong. Expanding
thresholds of atrocity then means radically reappraising the many forms of violence we currently
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excuse for various reasons, offering dedicated moral attention, and in many cases drawing
different moral conclusions.
At this point, it is customary to provide the reader with an overview of the argument
presented herein. Sadly, the subject of atrocity offers ample material for study, but it remains
surprisingly under-theorized. I have attempted to develop the concept in a way that touches upon
some of the most important components of the issue as I have come to understand them in the
course of my research. The first chapter has laid the groundwork for what follows by advancing
a notion of a threshold of atrocity, echoing Elias’s notion of thresholds of repugnance and shame,
the hypothetical point at which acceptable violence becomes unacceptable atrocity. The second
chapter contains an extended discussion of violence and moral vision, using the aestheticallyoriented philosophies of Emmanuel Levinas, Iris Murdoch, and Simone Weil to argue for an
ethics that locates morality in phenomenological experience. The face to face encounter of
Levinas and the act of attending in Murdoch and Weil work against the inclination to moral
blindness caused by internal self-love and external obfuscation.
The third chapter looks closely at the Nazi holocaust as a paradigm of atrocity and the
extent to which the symbols associated with Nazi atrocities are used as a mental rule of thumb
when assessing the relative depravity of other incidences of atrocity. In the course of the
discussion, I explore the triangulation of three concepts: atrocity, evil, and genocide. Atrocity, I
argue, must be understood as conceptually distinct from the latter. While the work of evil
revivalists like Claudia Card is compelling, her discussion of atrocity is underdeveloped. The
legal concept of genocide, moreover, is too confining to accommodate atrocities that have not
yet made an appearance.
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The fourth chapter considers the primary method by which most of us become aware of
actual atrocities in the world: the mass media. A comparative analysis of Niklas Luhmann’s
systems theory of the mass media and Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model
helps us to understand how the media define atrocity and thereby set up the conditions for moral
judgment. Applying Murdochian moral attention is rendered extremely difficult, though not
impossible, by virtue of the mediated nature of moral experience. While elements of both
approaches to the mass media contain useful insights, Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda
model is more useful both for a theory of atrocity grounded in vision and for the rather more
optimistic prospects of raising political challenges to the priorities expressed in the media.
Finally, the fifth chapter examines the moral distancing inherent to the politics of the
liberal-democratic nation state. While these states set ostensibly lower thresholds of atrocity and
thereby tolerate less violence than we might expect elsewhere, I argue that the ideological fusion
of liberalism and nationalism itself produces a form of identity in which state actions are
perceived as synchronous with the national—and moral—self. Liberal ideals are reduced to
national conceits, a phenomenon which discourages substantial moral reflection. So long as state
violence is manufactured in such a way so as not to explicitly disturb liberal principles, the
fusion of liberalism and nationalism actually creates an ideological space in which state violence
can occur behind the scenes without raising strong ethical concerns.
The fifth chapter concludes with a discussion of Adam’s Smith’s sentimentalist ethics
and the figure of the impartial spectator, which offers a possible method for pausing to consider
the influence of ideology in promoting one moral judgment above another. Even if the function
of national ideology proves insurmountable for many, Smith’s ethics emphasizes the
impossibility of rendering moral judgment through sheer imaginary effort and self-reflection. In
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this, his work complements a theory of atrocity grounded in vision by urging us to consider how
hypothetical others might “see” the matter at hand.
All the chapters herein retain a visual theme, e.g. the politics of sight, moral vision,
phenomenology of violence, etc. There are good reasons for this. First, while humans possess a
troubling capacity for excusing or ignoring great suffering, there is also reason to believe that
when faced with this suffering, stripped bare of any ideological rationale, humans also possess a
profound capacity for empathy. Literal vision or a lack thereof does not alone explain the
persistence of atrocities however, but it is a major component. A second reason for adopting the
visual theme is this: moral action requires moral vision. When we see, really see, the results of
extreme violence, the mind rebels against our feeble justificatory prejudices. Literal vision
expands our moral vision and, with a bit of moral effort, the visceral suffering of others
occasionally transcends ideology.
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II. ATTENDING: Vision and Violence in Levinas, Murdoch, and Weil
“The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is
unable to notice something — because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not
strike a man at all. — And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein
“We talk of the Turks and abhor the cannibals; but may not some of them go to heaven before some of us? We may
have civilized bodies and yet barbarous souls. We are blind to the real sights of this world; deaf to its voice; and
dead to its death.”
Herman Melville

The Beastly Century
The twentieth century brought with it the dismal realization that mass killing, exile, and
torture on an incomprehensible scale have become commonplace occurrences. The most
substantial material expansion of human welfare in world history occurred alongside the
pioneering of genocide, total war, ethnic cleansing, and totalitarianism.75 Scholars of vastly
disparate political and theoretical positions have described the twentieth century as “the most
bellicose in human history,”76 “the most murderous era so far recorded in human history,”77
“without question the bloodiest century in modern history, far more violent in relative as well as
absolute terms than any previous era.”78 Indeed, if one views as representative the 187 million
“killed or allowed to die by human decision” during the “short century,”79 the human capacity
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for inflicting suffering appears not only boundless but routine.80 When violence becomes routine,
it loses the power to shock. As Hobsbawm writes:
[W]hat has made things worse, what will undoubtedly make them worse in future, is that
steady dismantling of the defences which the civilization of the Enlightenment had
erected against barbarism … For the worst of it is that we have got used to the inhuman.
We have learned to tolerate the intolerable.81
Yet there are always limits to toleration. Despite the bleak statistics, it is encouraging that the
twentieth century is properly regarded today as a period of unremitting horror. Insofar as the
“beastly century”82 has anything meaningful to say at all about the latent capacity for human
cruelty, the ubiquitous cry of “never again” captures the attempt to normalize pious reflection on
the grotesque extremes of state-driven carnage. For Adorno and others, this was the only lesson
to be learned if it meant preventing future orgies of violence.83 However rudimentary, a
normative framework remains that helps us to distinguish between violence that can be tolerated
as acceptable under certain conditions and violence that cannot—must not—ever be tolerated.
All political communities discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate forms of
violence. How these categories are established varies widely, but they are grounded in social
norms and practical ethical systems. Most of us today for example are probably ethical
deontologists when it comes to genocide, mass rape, terrorism, and extreme forms of torture. We
regard such acts as unacceptable under any circumstances—brutal relics of an “uncivilized” or
80
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“barbaric” past.84 Yet if the carnage of the previous century represented a devastating rejoinder
to the liberal humanitarian belief in unceasing progress, it also led to the development of
international legal norms aimed at preventing future horrors.
In part because of its inceptive role in the development of international law, the Nazi
holocaust constitutes an especially powerful paradigm of atrocity against which state violence in
the West has since been judged. The details profoundly disturb us: the bureaucratic murder of
millions in a vast network of death camps, the crematoria, the gas chambers, the macabre
medical experimentation, the disposal of corpses reduced to a mere technical obstacle.85 Such
radical evil seems to defy comprehension and thus serves as a metonym for human inhumanity, a
rule of thumb for weighing the gravity of contemporary violence.86 The virtually universal
recognition that Nazi crimes passed beyond any standard of permissible violence strongly
suggests that there are limits to the state’s ability to act in ways that violate prevailing norms.
There are thresholds of atrocity beyond which paradigms of acceptable (legitimate) violence
become paradigms of unacceptable (illegitimate) atrocity. How does this happen? And is the
distinction between violence and atrocity conceptually meaningful?
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An atrocity, I argue, is an act or an accumulation of acts—directed by human agency,
individual or collective—determined to exceed minimally tolerable levels of violence by
nonparticipant observers for whom the violence in question is visible, i.e. phenomenologically
comprehensible. For the purposes of this study, I wish to concentrate on atrocity as these external
observers experience it first of all, and not how participants experience it. This definition of
atrocity upsets a number of approaches. First, it suggests that a great deal of violence we
presently tolerate or endorse is potentially atrocious. If the moral conditions I describe herein are
met, we are likely to revise our moral assumptions regarding currently unquestioned violent
practices. Second, a vision-based theory of atrocity avoids getting too much entangled in the
problem of evil, a secular version of which has experienced something of a renaissance since the
9/11 attacks and nearly always accompanies scholarly accounts of atrocity.
This chapter proceeds as follows. I first explore the concept of visibility in connection to
knowledge, which inevitably also raises the notion of blindness. The presence or absence of
vision, literal or metaphoric, has since Plato been recognized as a key element in acquiring
knowledge of truth; the notion is an apt one for helping us understand the willingness to endorse
or oppose violence. The centrality of “vision” in the Western tradition however does not
preclude the possibility of emphasizing a range of sensory experience. I explicitly endorse a
more expansive notion of moral vision, one that potentially includes literal vision as well as
sounds, smells, voice, texts, etc. Crucially, much of the world’s violence that would otherwise
register as atrocious is not recognized as such because efforts are taken to obscure and actively
control the representation of violence, thereby impeding phenomenological comprehensibility in
its myriad forms. After surveying the symbolic importance of vision/blindness to knowledge of
truth, I attempt to use the work of three aesthetically-oriented philosophers—Simone Weil, Iris
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Murdoch, and Emmanuel Levinas—to assess the possibility of deriving ethical norms from
phenomenological experience.
The final section adapts the Rawlsian original position to the permissibility of violence.
By applying such a heuristic, we are able to skirt the rationalizing impulse of nationalism,
religious doctrine, formal law, and other complex influences that ultimately serve to justify
violence in certain cases against certain people. A veil of ignorance attempts to discover, insofar
as possible, a normative basis for interpreting violence: a meta-historical, meta-cultural threshold
of atrocity. In doing so, it might be possible to better understand how rationalizing impulses
allow for the justification of extreme violence against some people but not others, i.e. the twopronged ability to recognize injustice against “us” while too often remaining blind to atrocities
committed against “them.”

Blindness and Vision
According to Norse legend, the god Odin gained his wisdom by plucking out one of his
eyes and casting it into Mimir’s Well beneath the world-tree Yggdrasil. Yet though he gained
wisdom, the loss of an eye left him dependent on two ravens to provide him with information
about the objective world. Huginn and Munnin—translated as “thought” and “mind”
respectively—loyally surveyed the world each day thereafter, returning to inform Odin of
temporal affairs.87 With his sacrifice Odin acquired vast theoretical wisdom while
simultaneously relinquishing his capacity for autonomous empirical observation. The surviving
accounts of the myth offer only a sketch of the story; nevertheless, it draws clear connections
between visibility, representation, and analytical knowledge. It is a charming parable about the
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nature of wisdom and its foundation in phenomenological experience. Without his ravens,
Odin’s wisdom is useless; on their own, the ravens have no capacity for critical thought.
Though Odin was never depicted as fully blind, the allegory still obtains as his partial
vision required supplementation. Partial or total blindness is a recurring theme in Western art,
literature, and philosophy. Literal blindness (like madness) was viewed by the Greeks as a
singularly supernatural phenomenon, caused either by the gods or through the intervention of
demons.88 As with Odin, the loss of literal vision bestowed metaphysical prescience. As
punishment for having viewed her nude form, Athena blinded Tiresias. For having transgressed a
boundary forbidden to mortals, obtaining knowledge beyond that accorded to his station, he was
forced to rely on nocturnal visions, bird songs, and other meta-visual cues to obtain knowledge
about the future.89 Apollodorus writes of Tiresias that in blinding him, Athena “cleansed his
ears” so he would be able to understand the birds and thereby acquire knowledge beyond that of
ordinary humans.90
Tiresias famously interacts with perhaps the single best-known blind figure of Greek
mythology, Oedipus, whose lack of metaphoric vision leads to his loss of literal vision. In the
Sophoclean version of the story, Oedipus accuses Tiresias of blindness of mind as well as vision.
To this Tiresias responds simply:
And mark me now—since thou hast scoffed at me
Even for my blindness—thou both hast thine eyes
And, seeing, seest not thy proper ill,
Nor where thou art, nor side by side with whom.91
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The purported author of the Illiad and the Odyssey himself is described in a Homeric hymn to
Apollo as a “blind man, dwelling on the rocky island of Chios.”92 Artistic depictions of Homer
typically emphasized his blindness and while Graziosi speculates that this may have stemmed in
part from a desire to cast Homer as closely related to the gods (hence gifted with special powers)
she generally concludes that the evidence strongly suggests the historical Homer was indeed
blind.93 If blindness expressed a connection with metaphysical knowledge, temporarily impairing
one’s senses might achieve a similar result. In this vein, the Pythian Oracle at Delphi inhaled
intoxicating fumes emitted from a fissure below the Apollonian temple, thereby stultifying her
physical senses to allow for the expression of cryptic divinations.94
The Bible similarly embraces the symbolism of blindness, but always as a handicap,
juxtaposed in opposition to knowledge of the truth—true vision. Both testaments are filled with
references to blindness, often suggesting divine influence, namely the experience of holy
revelation. The flash of light Saul encounters on the road to Damascus leaves him blind for three
days after which time he becomes Paul, Apostle of Christ.95 Saul had been traveling to Syria on a
mission to arrest Christians. Formerly blind to the truth of Christ’s divinity, his instant
conversion and rebirth as Paul captures the Christian God’s ability to channel power through
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even most unlikely forces, bestowing vision upon the metaphorical blind. Likewise, Christ’s
healing of the blind remains among the best known of his parables; the story plays a critical role
in establishing the legitimacy of his divinity. As Barasch explains, “So utterly utopian appeared
the healing of the blind that it was understood as a distinctive mark of the messianic age.”96
The notion of existence without literal sight, living in darkness as it were, was thought to
offer the closest experience of death in life. In the book of Isaiah, the prophet likens blindness to
a darkness from which true believers will be rescued by God: “And in that day shall the deaf
hear the words of the book, and the eyes of the blind shall see out of obscurity, and out of
darkness.”97 Knowledge of the truth, salvation itself, is set at odds with the notion of blindness
found in scripture. Describing utopia, Isaiah continues:
Then the eyes of the blind shall be
opened, and the ears of the deaf shall
be unstopped.
Then shall the lame man leap as an
hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing:
for in the wilderness shall waters break
out, and streams in the desert.98
God’s light is always framed in opposition to darkness, the void, Satan himself. The opening
lines in Genesis establish the separation of light from dark, good from evil, as the foundational
act upon which the rest of God’s creation is predicated:
In the beginning God created the
Heaven and the earth.
And the earth was without form,
and void; and darkness was upon
the face of the deep. And the Spirit of
God moved upon the face of the waters.
And God said, Let there be light:
and there was light.
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And God saw the light, that it was
Good: and God divided the light from the darkness.99
In his epistles to the Corinthians, Paul emphasizes the connection of light to knowledge: “For
God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the
light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.”100 Moreover, Christ
repeatedly either describes himself or his disciples as the “light of the world” or is described as
such by others.101 In Milton’s account of Samson’s torment at the hands of the Philistines, the
eponymous character loses his literal vision as a consequence of his failure to see the truth.
Samson understands his predicament as the separation from God’s light as he descends into the
darkness of blindness.102
O loss of sight, of thee I most complain!
Blind among enemies, O worse then chains,
Dungeon, or beggery, or decrepit age!
Light the prime work of God to me is extinct,
And all her various objects of delight
Annull’d, which might in part my grief have eas’d,
Inferiour to the vilest now become
Of man or worm; the vilest here excel me,
They creep, yet see, I dark in light expos’d
To daily fraud, contempt, abuse and wrong,
Within doors, or without, still as a fool,
In power of others, never in my own;
Scarce half I seem to live, dead more than half.
O dark, dark, dark, amid the blaze of noon,
Irrecoverably dark, total Eclipse
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Without hope of day!103
Perhaps the most memorable and explicitly political link between vision and
knowledge—a link seized upon by Christian theologians in late antiquity—is to be found in
Plato’s Republic.104 The famous allegory of the cave offers an account of knowledge strongly
rooted in the epistemological limitations of human vision and the difficulty inherent in
attempting to grasp the eternal Forms. Practical politics was for Plato a misguided and
potentially dangerous endeavor without a clear vision of what the good life entailed. Without
clear vision, we are condemned to live in a world of illusion, “vainly following distorted images
of reality and ceaselessly driven by irrational desires.”105
Blindness to the idea of things themselves becomes so strongly rooted in the cave’s
microcosm that when a single prisoner escapes, experiences the overwhelming brightness of the
sun, and then returns to relate the truth to his subterranean comrades, they murder him. In his
Phaedo, true knowledge of the world, i.e. knowledge of things to be found in the world and the
relationships between things, can only be uncovered through knowledge of the Forms. The
notion of equality is meaningless without first possessing an idea of Equality in the abstract, an
ideal against which the empirical world will always fall short. Yet knowledge of truth brings
with it the potential for danger; those incapable or unprepared to grasp truth might be consumed
by it if unwisely exposed. To avert this outcome, a properly organized society must present most
of its people with a “noble lie.” This lie, this myth, intentionally reproduces the prevailing
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conditions of the cave, essentially enforcing metaphorical blindness to the truth for those
incapable of handling it.
When Augustine adapts the Platonic theory of the Forms to a Christian context, the cave
becomes the warning of an unsaved soul. For Augustine, God is the light that illuminates the
world, the light of rationality.106 Only through God is true knowledge possible; indeed God’s
light is itself knowledge.
But distinct from objects is the light by which the soul is illumined, in order that it may
see and truly understand everything, either in itself or in the light. For the light is God
himself, whereas the soul is a creature; yet, since it is rational and intellectual, it is made
in his image. And when it tries to behold the Light, it trembles in its weakness and finds
itself unable to do so. Yet from this source comes all understanding it is able to attain.107
If vision is a precondition to knowledge, knowledge is a precondition to moral action. Evil, by
contrast, has no positive material existence and instead indicates an absence of God.
Given the diversity of traditions reviewed above, the relationship between
phenomenology and moral action may not be clear. This confusion is easily remedied if we
consider how moral choices are actually made. Every day each of us confronts countless moral
questions of greater or lesser importance; we assess the morally relevant variables and render
judgment. Our judgment informs subsequent action or, as the case may be, inaction. Unless we
are very unusual, witnessing extreme violence unfold before our eyes on the streets or on our
television sets generates an impression of horror.108 Informed to a sufficient degree via literal and
metaphoric vision, our moral intuition tells us that such violence is simply wrong. Whether this
impression of horror inspires us to act is another matter. For various reasons, we often surrender
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the capacity for moral vision. We choose not to see, or else simply to deny what it is that we see.
I would like to suggest that the initial encounter bears a closer resemblance to moral truth. It is
only after the initial encounter of the moral chronology that we apply a range of filters designed
to alter the content of what has been witnessed, to render our impressions comprehensible. The
following section explores the possibility of phenomenological comprehensibility in moral
encounters through a critical discussion of three thinkers who locate the key to moral action in an
expansive notion of vision.

Moral Attention
A fascinating contemporary adaptation of the Platonic notions of vision and truth is found
in the fiction and non-fiction of Iris Murdoch. For Murdoch, ego is the chief obstacle to “seeing”
others clearly. Combining Plato’s theory of the Forms with a Buddhist ethical outlook, Murdoch
establishes a remarkably consistent approach to knowledge using a handful of rich visual
metaphors: attention, perception, seeing, looking, and vision. Linking all these notions is a
metaphor for morality. She suggests that virtue lies between the dual process of aesthetic
perception and ego “unselfing.” Murdoch sought to challenge the emphasis on the will common
to Existentialist (especially Jean-Paul Sartre) and British moral philosophies (especially
linguistic philosophy) of the mid-twentieth century. Seeing is for Murdoch a fundamentally
moral practice because it establishes the empirical basis for moral choice. She offers a concise
account of her idiosyncratic neo-Platonism in “The Idea of Perfection,” one of three influential
pieces published together as The Sovereignty of Good in 1970:
I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of ‘see’ which implies
that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort. There is also of course
‘distorted vision’, and the word ‘reality’ here inevitably appears as a normative word. …
If we ignore the prior work of attention and notice only the emptiness of the moment of
choice we are likely to identify freedom with the outward movement since there is
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nothing else to identify it with. But if we consider what the work of attention is like, how
continuously it goes on, and how imperceptibly it builds up structures of value round
about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business
of choosing is already over.109
The importance of Murdoch’s philosophy to a theory of atrocity grounded in vision should be
self-evident from this passage. Only through seeing, i.e. not merely looking, but comprehending
the myriad salient and morally relevant factors at stake, is it possible to make an informed moral
choice. This also includes either tolerating violence as banal or opposing it as atrocious. The
notion of “distorted vision” is especially useful because it helps to explain why we often make
morally lamentable choices. Elsewhere, Murdoch writes of a “fog” or a “veil” that prevents us
from seeing reality. Such distorted vision is invariably a product of the human ego, a symptom of
insufficient “unselfing,” the process central to her vision of moral progress.
A wider notion of visibility encompasses not only aesthetic perception and
phenomenology but also the comprehensive conditions and context of the visible subject. This
wider notion then should not be limited to vision but potentially includes a range of sensory
experience, literal and metaphoric. This kind of “vision” sees not only the bloodied corpse, it
understands at least minimally the physical (the physiognomy of the human body, geographical
space), the cultural, and political contexts, etc. It is specifically not omniscience, but a kind of
intellectual humility which embraces the responsibility to know what we are talking about before
rendering moral judgment. But where do we gather the requisite moral knowledge? Aesthetic
perception alone is analogous to a photograph and, popular wisdom notwithstanding, a picture is
worth far fewer than a thousand words. While photographs do record a moment in time, we also
tend to see in a given image what we are intended to see, as understood by the photographer.
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“This sleight of hand,” Sontag observes, “allows photographs to be both objective record and
personal testimony, both a faithful copy or transcription of an actual moment of reality and an
interpretation of that reality …”110 Murdoch’s notion of vision extends beyond merely looking,
beyond a simple image, and encompasses a range of phenomenological experience. To this end,
she employs at various points the terms “looking,” “seeing,” “regarding,” “watching,”
“attending.”
Precisely how does one go about performing the moral work necessary to get at the truth?
The visual metaphor still obtains, though it is not merely by looking, i.e. unguided
phenomenological observation, but through concentrated and prolonged attention that advances
can be made. Murdoch borrows the notion of attention from the French philosopher and mystic
Simone Weil. Weil was concerned with the gravity of the temporal world, the mechanical
grounding of humanity in a universe of illusion. Gravity isolates us from others and confounds
our inherent desire to levitate towards grace—goodness and truth. In her original expression of
attention, Weil downplays the role of the will in making moral choices. “The will,” she writes,
“only controls a few movements of a few muscles, and these movements are associated with the
idea of the change of position of nearby objects. … Attention is something quite different.”111 It
would be absurd, Weil thinks, to imagine anyone capable of simply willing a good moral choice.
Attention is a project that ends, when taken seriously, as a kind of ascetic meditation, stripping
away the ego in search of something one can never entirely conceive. “Attention alone—that
attention which is so full that the ‘I’ disappears—is required of me. I have to deprive all that I
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call ‘I’ of the light of my attention and turn it on to that which cannot be conceived.”112
Crucially, attention allows for the “discrimination between the real and the illusory.”
In our sense perceptions, if we are not sure of what we see we change our position while
looking, and what is real becomes evident. In the inner-life, time takes the place of space.
With time we are altered, and, if as we change we keep our gaze directed towards the
same thing, in the end illusions are scattered and the real becomes visible.113
Weil has a concept of the Christian God in mind, which reverts to an abstract Platonic Goodness
once Murdoch gets ahold of it. Indeed, her basic moral rubric is deeply informed by the ongoing
acquisition of knowledge obtained through the process of attention, i.e. “a refined and honest
perception of what is really the case, a patient and just discernment and exploration of what
confronts one.”114
Murdoch admired Weil and her work enormously. “To read her,” Murdoch wrote, “is to
be reminded of a standard.”115 In her own formulation of attention, Murdoch centralizes
phenomenology, but emphasizes one important caveat: the type of knowledge obtained through
phenomenological experience can only ever be an improvement. It cannot offer comprehensive
moral understanding, the superhuman aspiration for perfection. Still, Murdoch insists that proper
attention ultimately reduces the number of possible choices available to us, thereby increasing
the likelihood of acting morally. As she writes, “if I attend properly I will have no choices and
this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at.”116 Indeed Murdoch stresses that this process occurs
most of the time anyway without us realizing, a million instantaneous decisions made over the
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span of a single day. Acting morally in her conception only becomes a conscious decision when
confronted with difficult cases.
Attention remains an extremely difficult task for humans to undertake, one further
complicated by our troubling tendency to allow convention first priority in moral judgments.
Weil broaches this theme when she writes “the people who stood motionless, from one to eight
o’clock in the morning for the sake of having an egg, would have found it very difficult to do so
in order to save a human life.”117 Murdoch acknowledges as much and, following Plato, locates
the attendant difficulties in the innate human tendency to selfishness: egoism. We are too much
infatuated with our own subjectivity; indeed, introspection always carries with it the risk of
blinding us to the salient moral concerns relevant to a choice at hand. Moral attention is
impossible when our vision is rendered blurry by selfishness. “Obsession, prejudice, envy,
anxiety, ignorance, greed, neurosis, and so on and so on veil reality. The defeat of illusion
requires moral effort.”118 Elsewhere she writes:
The enemies of art and of morals, the enemies that is of love, are the same: social
convention and neurosis. One may fail to see the individual because … we are ourselves
sunk in a social whole which we allow uncritically to determine our reactions, or because
we see each other exclusively as so determined. Or we may fail to see the individual
because we are completely enclosed in a fantasy world of our own into which we try to
draw things from outside, not grasping their reality and independence, making them into
dream objects of our own.119
In addition to her conventional philosophical work, Murdoch’s fiction is riddled with complex
characters of “distorted vision,” who build fantasy worlds of their own, blind to the truth of their
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actions and often (mis)understanding human relationships as mere extensions of ego.120 This
problem highlights the distinction Murdoch explores between “a morally-implicated visual term
connoting success in grasping moral reality, and a non-morally-implicated one.”121 Looking does
not yield the moral results that come with seeing or, better yet, attention.
Distorted vision inevitably leads to violations of the Kantian dictum against treating
people as means.122 We are too often caught up in ourselves, deluded by self-centeredness and
fantasy: “the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one
from seeing what is there outside one.”123 And yet Murdoch’s neo-Platonism also suggests that
goodness exerts a “magnetic pull,” drawing us naturally to a notion of perfection that can never
really be obtained. These two notions seem to be contradictory or in tension at the very least: on
the one hand, we are drawn to the light of the Sun, seeking clarity; on the other, we are selfcentered egoists, a stubborn fact that precludes knowledge of the Good and leaves us in the cave
of shadows and illusion. How is one ever to find the cave’s exit? In a world where nationalism is
apparently resurgent, where cosmopolitanism has extended no further than capitalist trade, and
the struggle against bloody intolerance appears historically constant, Murdoch is rather
pessimistic about the prospects for achieving moral clarity of vision. Attention demands moral
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effort which is, as it turns out, real effort. It takes an inconvenient amount of time and
determination to see the world as it is, without distortion.124 The draw of social convention in
various manifestations is a problem that absolutely must be challenged if distorted vision is to be
successfully overcome.
Too often the label of atrocity is used only to describe violence perpetrated against those
within our immediate political and social communities. By contrast, we are willing to ignore,
tolerate, or even sanction levels of violence against others we could never imagine visiting upon
ourselves. If we take Weil and Murdoch’s concerns seriously, this lamentable state of affairs is
the predictable result of our inability to “see” the consequences of violence. Self-love inhibits
moral attention and hence moral vision, thwarting action. The blindness to inconvenient truths
that results, whether deliberate or a byproduct of laziness, produces apathy and tends to
obliterate forms of empathy physical or social proximity might foster. Blurred by veils of
nationalism and other forms of parochial arrogance, our moral sense atrophies. If this process
can be reversed through focused moral attention, as Weil and Murdoch advocate, a question
follows: is it inevitable the effort will heighten or stir our moral sensitivity? Does
phenomenological comprehensibility enable us to recognize atrocity where once we saw only
acceptable violence? Perhaps it is doubtful that moral choice can ever be reduced to a single
option, but some dogmas can be overcome and some of the veils removed.
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Face To Face
To help advance a theory of atrocity grounded in vision, we turn now to a philosopher
strongly associated with the link between phenomenology and ethics, Emmanuel Levinas.125
Perhaps more than any other twentieth-century thinker, Levinas places the trauma of atrocity,
specifically the Nazi holocaust, at the center of his philosophy. A Lithuanian Jew who became a
naturalized French citizen, Levinas was called up for military service upon the German invasion
of France in 1940. His unit, however, was quickly routed and forced to surrender. Levinas waited
out the war in a German POW camp. While his wife and children were spared thanks to
assistance from friends, including that of Maurice Blanchot, much of his extended family was
murdered in the camps. Levinas rarely mentions the Nazi holocaust or the camps in his work, but
it remains the unacknowledged impetus behind his entire project. In one of the few explicit
examples, Levinas describes twentieth-century violence as unconstrained by traditional theodicy:
This is the century that in thirty years has known two world wars, the totalitarianisms of
right and left, Hitlerism and Stalinism, Hiroshima, the Gulag, and the genocides of
Auschwitz and Cambodia. This is the century that is drawing to a close in the obsessive
fear of the return of everything these barbaric names stood for: suffering and evil
inflicted deliberately, but in a manner no reason set limits to, in the exasperation of a
reason become political and detached from all ethics.
Among these events the Jewish people under the reign of Hitler seems to me the
paradigm of gratuitous human suffering, in which evil appears in its diabolical horror.
This is perhaps not a subjective feeling. The disproportion between suffering and every
theodicy was shown at Auschwitz with glaring, obvious clarity. Its possibility puts into
question the multimillennial traditional faith. Did not Nietzsche’s saying about the death
of God take on, in the extermination camps, the means of a quasi-empirical fact?126
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Elsewhere in his Talmudic writings, Levinas clarifies the conditions under which violence may
be appropriate, but warns against being sucked into the destructive unreason of war: “[B]orn of
human relations, violence remains at the edge of an abyss into which, at a certain moment,
everything can founder, including reason. We leave war to return to its ultimate source, which is
Auschwitz, and into which it risks reverting.”127 Most often, his use of the death camps is only
indirect, as if to specifically name the Nazi holocaust would be to grant a kind of historical
distinction to the atrocities Levinas did not believe was justified, and which served no moral
purpose. Auschwitz is nevertheless the threat lingering just below the surface of his philosophy.
How are we to orient ourselves morally in the world after Auschwitz?
Levinas centers his ethics on the relation between two subjectivities when they encounter
one another face to face. This apparently simple thought experiment obscures depths of profound
complexity, which Levinas goes on to explore at length in his Totality and Infinity.128 The
infinite obligation to the other that emerges from this encounter is grounded in a particular
philosophical assumption: it establishes an ethics prior to phenomenological knowledge, linked
not to empirical observation, but to the presence of what Levinas calls infinity, the precognitive
development of a thought that cannot yet think itself.129 The ethical is transcendent; it is “first
philosophy,” in his parlance—prior to ontology, prior to empirical observation, and issuing a
moral demand that can never be successfully fulfilled. In the face of the other these two
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subjectivities witness their infinite separateness, their alterity (alterité), which simultaneously
underscores their infinite co-dependence.
Whatever else Levinas may be proposing here and whatever the feasibility of responding
practically to the infinite demand, his phenomenology utilizes vision as a metaphor for moral
obligation.130 That is, we are not dealing with the conversion of light into electro-chemical
impulses, in itself a rather clumsy cognitive representation of the world; rather, Levinas has in
mind something much more in line with Weil and Murdoch’s conception of the Good. “[E]thics
is an optics,” he writes. “But it is a ‘vision’ without image, bereft of the synoptic and totalizing
objectifying virtues of vision, a relation of an intentionality of a wholly different type.”131 The
intersubjective emphasis of Levinasian phenomenology is “ethical” in the sense that we discover
our own particular subjectivity upon falling under the gaze of the other and this recognition
establishes obligation. Each step of the encounter is absolute and thus infinite: the alterity
established through the encounter is absolute; the passivity of the agent falling under the moral
command of the other is absolute; the other’s demand itself is absolute; and the responsibility to
respond is absolute. It is the absoluteness of this approach that compels Badiou to attribute to
Levinas “a kind of ethical radicalism”132 and for others like Rorty to dismiss his project entirely
as “a stumbling-block to effective political organization.”133
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The connection between metaphoric vision and ethics is well illustrated by the story of
Gyges of Lydia in Greek tradition, a story Levinas references. Gyges, a servant of king
Candaules, is asked to hide himself in the queen’s chambers so that he might secretly watch as
she undresses and confirm her unsurpassed beauty to the king. According to Herodotus’s account
of the story,134 Gyges offers initial resistance but eventually agrees to the plan, not wanting to
upset the king. He sneaks into the queen’s chamber, observes her in the nude, and is mesmerized
by her beauty just as the king predicted. For her part, the queen realizes she is being spied upon
but only chooses to confront Gyges about it after some time has passed, whereupon she demands
that he either kill Candaules or be killed himself by her guards for setting eyes on that which is
forbidden. “[Gyges] soon saw that he really was faced with the alternative, either of murdering
his master, or of being murdered himself.”135 Seeing no other way around it, Gyges chooses to
kill the king, marry the queen, and usurp the throne. Convinced that he has no choice in the
matter, Gyges comes to view the act of killing another as excusable, even permissible, under
such conditions.
In his rather more fantastical version of the story, Plato retains the central plot, with
Gyges killing the king and marrying the queen, but adds a famous twist.136 Gyges comes into
possession of a magical ring that allows him to become invisible and to commit his crime with
no risk of being caught. Plato introduces the ring to probe the nature of moral choice in a world
without consequences. While Herodotus’s version of the story hinges on a forbidden sight (the
queen’s nude form), Plato’s pivots on visibility in terms of liberation from social constraint. If
there were no consequences for acting unjustly, why should we act justly? Socrates asks whether
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it is better to suffer injustice than to inflict it and famously argues the former: it is indeed better
to suffer injustice than the alternative. This question plays a central role in Levinas’s work as
well. Levinas himself argues that his entire philosophy can be summed up by saying that “there
is something more important than my life, and that is the life of the other.”137 Plato’s Gyges is a
figure that can see without being seen, representative of a subjectivity living for itself, divorced
from social restraint or obligation. This radical individualism flirts with the dream of total
autonomy and the dangerous urges that come with this. “Gyges’ ring,” Levinas writes,
“symbolizes separation … Gyges is the very condition of man, the possibility of injustice and
radical egoism, the possibility of accepting the rules of the game, but cheating.”138 To refuse the
responsibility commanded by the other is ultimately to refuse infinity and transcendence; it is to
limit our moral potential and become worryingly self-centered. It is to become Gyges.
Like Weil and Murdoch, Levinas places vision at the center of his moral philosophy. All
three encourage us to strip away the egoistic tendencies, the moral distractions, that otherwise
impede our ability to recognize a notion of goodness or our responsibility to the other.
Levinasian ethics is not a movement closer to some kind of idealized truth, however. It is a
trembling moment before the moral height and absolute naked vulnerability of the other. As in
Weil, Levinas refuses to believe that morality is reducible to acts of consciousness or will
because obligation is established in the face to face encounter prior to action and is co-emergent
with subjective consciousness. We may of course refuse to act upon this obligation, but as Cohen
writes, the “responsibility to respond to the other … is, paradoxically, the unspoken first word
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prior to the first word spoken.”139 To reject the demand is to reject ourselves. “The will is free to
assume this responsibility [to and for the other] in whatever sense it likes; it is not free to refuse
this responsibility itself; it is not free to ignore the meaningful world into which the face of the
Other has introduced it.”140

Ego and the Original Position
In Weil and Murdoch, one question in particular nags at us: is it reasonable to expect new
morally relevant information to enter simply by force of will, through the act of attending? And
yet this a misguided question; if one attends as Weil and Murdoch would have it, the process is
not one of addition but subtraction—of the ego and its obstruction of moral vision, insofar as
possible. Perfect attention winds up sounding a lot like Rawls’ original position: a moral actor
stripped to its core, ignorant of its own socio-economic status, particular talents, physical
attributes, indeed any knowledge that might prejudice one’s preferred political outcomes. Like
Murdoch, Rawls takes human self-interestedness for granted and attempts to correct for
problems this might cause by applying the veil of ignorance. To the extent that one is able to
successfully eliminate the “I” via the unselfing process, moral attention bears a great deal in
common with the original position, but the comparison ends there. For while the unselfing
process is designed to get at the core of a moral dilemma by stripping away factors irrelevant to
judgment, it simultaneously implies a heightened sensitivity to the condition of others once the
clouds of egoism have been swept away. A Rawlsian veil of ignorance does not provide any such
moral information.
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Murdoch was strongly influenced by Buddhist thought, especially the notion of achieving
wisdom via a hollowing out of the concept of self. Her elaboration upon Weil’s work, reflects
the paradoxical nature of this ethical approach: only by unselfing and stripping away selfinformation are we able to gain knowledge of that which is external to us. Murdoch hoped to
provide readers with a practical way of thinking about ethics in their everyday lives. By contrast,
Rawls always stressed the “purely hypothetical” nature of the original position:
In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in
the traditional theory of the social contract. This position is not, of course, thought of as
an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is
understood as a purely hypothetical condition characterized so as to lead to a conception
of justice.141
Rawls is convinced that actors in the original position are likely to agree upon a relatively
egalitarian society, but he also believes they will likely tolerate minimal levels of inequality—
certainly much less than is actually the case in present society.
It might be possible to adapt the original position to the question of atrocity if we pose an
economy of violence as the central concern. How much and in what form will violence be
tolerated before the veil of ignorance is removed? If we ask this question, the original position
offers us a way to guess at which forms of violence are likely to be rejected as unacceptable
under any circumstances. It seems highly probable that actors in the original position would
tolerate minimal levels of violence, conceivably allowing for some kind of limited punitive
violence directed at those who transgress social norms—murderers, for example. Whatever the
forms of violence ultimately permitted in this reformulation of the original position, the
determination proceeds on the assumption that some crimes should be singled out for special
punishment. It is plausible to assume that, faced with the veil of ignorance, many of us would
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sanction violence in highly specific cases. Yet without knowing who among us is likely to
transgress social norms—and thereby find themselves subject to punitive violence once the veil
of ignorance is removed—levels of permissible violence would remain much lower than our
present society accepts as normal.
The veil of ignorance produces some interesting ideas when we put it to work with the
wider conception of vision discussed in this chapter. Pain, whatever the source, is an isolating
experience, limited to the physical confines of our own bodies. As Elaine Scarry argues, pain
always arouses at least some suspicion among those of us not experiencing it.142 Could it really
be so bad? We have no way of knowing for sure without subjecting ourselves to it. It is for this
reason Christopher Hitchens subjected himself to waterboarding in an effort to influence public
opinion against waterboarding as practiced against military detainees.143 It is for this reason also
that groups like Amnesty International seek to emphasize suffering through shocking visual
campaigns, attempting to render expressible in some detail the suffering of others. It is no
coincidence that such campaigns often feature children, commonly perceived as innocents
whatever the socio-political context, and thus less morally problematic.
A veil of ignorance obliterates irrelevant information that would otherwise exert an
unwarranted influence over individual moral judgment. Moral attention does the same—but only
for the self. Even as the unselfing process strives to minimize and ultimately subvert the
tendency to prioritize ourselves above others, it does this in order to heighten our sensitivity to
that which lies beyond the self. Susan Sontag offers a nationalist example of the moral influence
such information otherwise presents when she describes a photograph depicting a dead child,
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blown apart in a suicide bombing of a Jerusalem pizzeria. “To an Israeli Jew,” she writes, it is
“first of all a photograph of a Jewish child killed by a Palestinian suicide-bomber.”144 Likewise,
for the Palestinians, “a photograph of a child torn apart by a tank round in Gaza is first of all a
photograph of a Palestinian child killed by Israeli ordnance.”145 Such political context would
presumably be absent in the original position, just as it would be stripped away from someone
successfully attending to the problem of a child, any child, being torn apart. With moral
attention, our own relationship to the child is removed as much as possible so that a clear view of
the child’s death is not obscured by the clouds of egoism and rationalization. Clarity of moral
vision is possible only by transcending the parochial, selfish concerns that inform the arbitrary
ethical standards we set up on the basis of nationality, religion, race, and other morally irrelevant
associations underscoring those associations beyond the self.
Practically speaking, the horrors of violence are often recognized as atrocious too late,
only after it strikes. Moral vision is often acquired first by those who experience violence
firsthand, perhaps surviving atrocities like torture or perhaps speaking on behalf of a murdered
family member. In many cases, the trauma of experiencing violence is itself sufficient to itself
obliterate strongly held dogmas, converting the individual from a stalwart defender of torture
into its greatest opponent, and often establishing formerly unimaginable political alliances.146 I
have in mind the families of children killed in ways described by Sontag above. A common
source of suffering sometimes generates moral clarity of the kind Murdoch wishes for us to reach
without having to experience the trauma of losing a child. Ideally, we should be able to reach the
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conclusion that murdering children is wrong without having to experience it, but nationalism is a
remarkably adaptable form of egoism.
To conclude with a few observations on Levinas, it may seem odd to juxtapose the face
to face encounter with the neo-Platonic concept of attention found in Weil and Murdoch. Yet
each of these thinkers sets about to establish vision as a metaphor for morality, stymied by the
presence of ego. Though Levinas places the rise of subjective consciousness at a different
chronological point in relation to the crucial moment, he nevertheless argues that “man’s ethical
relation to the other is ultimately prior to his ontological relation to himself (egology) or to the
totality of things we call the world (cosmology).”147 That is, our obligation to the other
transcends whatever forms of egoism are later established through the inculcation of national and
other groupist tendencies.
For Weil’s version of Platonist Catholicism, egoism is the default mode of human nature,
a cosmological inevitability that can only truly be overcome in the afterlife. Murdoch’s
adaptation of this notion strikes a similar tone, with vision taking a central place in both
accounts, willing something that resembles the original position in reverse: imagining how we
might see the world once we have emancipated ourselves from particularist concerns. In Weil,
this could be taken to an extreme in which the “I” disappears altogether. While Murdoch does
not wish to abolish the ego with the same theological fervor one finds in Weil, she nevertheless
argues that pure attention is to effectively transcend oneself, to truly feel what the other feels.
Seeing is important, but seeing as a metaphor for vision must include as many of the senses as
possible if we are to achieve vision in the morally expansive sense she intends. When the
question at stake is violence, it is worth considering the experience for ourselves before choosing
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to sanction its use against others or else we should hesitate in the humility of our own ignorance.
In this way, the original position is helpful to imagine forms of violence that might pass beyond
a threshold of atrocity but because Rawls never intended the heuristic to be adapted in such a
way, its application for aiding practical moral judgment is undeniably limited. Moral attention is
more useful in this regard because the ignorance it places upon a moral agent in turn facilitates a
deep knowledge of the external world.
The original position also resonates in some respects with Levinasian ethics, which, as
we have seen, establishes a relationship prior to the development of subjective consciousness. It
is a relationship defined by absolute codependence, an infinite demand: the other asks not to be
killed and in this we realize our own desire not be killed. Indeed, we are less likely to tolerate
violence when the possibility arises of suffering violence ourselves. Especially because Levinas
places this experience prior to ontology, we can discuss violence without the morbid influence of
national or religious martyrdom. The banal violence so easily justified against others suddenly
becomes abhorrent once it is directed at our own bodies. Violence formerly treated as acceptable
becomes, in essence, atrocious. At risk of expressing it crudely, we might call it the “golden
rule” of atrocity. If atrocity is simply violence that is unacceptable under any circumstances,
violence that we could never sanction against ourselves, then in the absence of parochial filters
we will likely discover that much of the violence tolerated against official enemies, marginalized
populations, and others must be reclassified as atrocious.

62

III. SEEING: The Nazi Holocaust as a Paradigm of Atrocity
“There are no lessons to take from the Holocaust. And, perhaps, this is what’s terrible about the Holocaust.”
Yeshayahu Leibowitz
“[C]ontemplating the Holocaust is virtually cost-free: a few cheap tears.”
Peter Novick
“Men dressed in black, with leather boots and skull insignias, carrying out the large-scale and systematic murder of
millions of innocent, unarmed, naked civilians: What could be more evil?”
Roy F. Baumeister

This chapter continues to develop a theory of atrocity grounded in moral vision by
looking closely at the Nazi holocaust’s role in shaping our interpretation of what an atrocity
“looks” like. Insofar as the Nazi holocaust and its associated symbols serve as a metonym for
evil, I argue, the numerous horrors associated with the Nazi regime strongly color our
understanding of contemporary atrocities. Forms of violence that resemble Nazi crimes are more
easily identifiable as unacceptable than forms that do not. So while the universal repugnance
with which Nazi atrocities are today regarded should be acknowledged as an achievement for
moral education, we must also consider the ways it generates a blindness to forms of violence
that do not quite rise to the level of Auschwitz.
The chapter also addresses the triangulation of three powerful concepts that color
interpretation of the Nazi holocaust and its role in assessing other incidences of unconscionable
violence: atrocity, evil, and genocide. Atrocity, I argue, must be understood as conceptually
distinct. A secular notion of evil, while compelling, is ill-suited to explain why some forms of
violence qualify as atrocity while others do not. Finally, the crime of genocide is too confining in
scope to accommodate fruitful theoretical work capable of explaining forms of atrocity that do
not yet have a name.
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A Nazi Kind of Thing
US Army helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson, Jr. spotted bodies strewn across the
landscape as he and his two door-gunners navigated their Hiller OH-23 Raven through South
Vietnamese airspace on the morning of March 16, 1968. My Lai 4, US Army shorthand for one
of several hamlets within the village complex of Son My, was located in the especially contested
Quang Ngai province in South Vietnam. American soldiers of Charlie Company had been
airlifted to the area earlier that morning expecting to engage Viet Cong fighters and Thompson’s
crew was flying reconnaissance. Upon observing scores of fleeing and wounded villagers from
the air, they marked several locations with smoke signals and left the area briefly to refuel. By
the time they returned, many of the villagers they had seen fleeing lay dead. The crew signaled to
a group of American GIs standing near a young Vietnamese woman and, hovering above her,
attempted to alert the soldiers to her presence. “A few minutes later,” as Thompson later
described, “up walks a captain, steps up to her, nudges her with his foot, steps back and blows
her away.”148 Thompson and his crew found themselves in the middle of what would become the
most notorious atrocity committed by American soldiers in Vietnam: the My Lai Massacre.
During four hours of unremitting carnage, the soldiers of Charlie Company killed more
than five hundred unarmed villagers at a level of calculated brutality that far exceeds what one
might otherwise expect from soldiers acting on a combination of fear and confusion.149 Nick
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Turse describes the sadistic nature of the massacre in his recent history of American atrocities in
Vietnam:
[T]he men of the unit shot chickens as they scurried about, pigs as they bolted, and cows
and water buffalo lowing among the thatch-roof houses. They gunned down old men
sitting in their homes and children as they ran for cover. They tossed grenades into homes
without even bothering to look inside. An officer grabbed a woman by the hair and shot
her point-blank with a pistol. A woman who came out of her home with a baby in her
arms was shot down on the spot. As the tiny child hit the ground, another GI opened up
on the infant with his M-16 automatic rifle.150
The American soldiers faced no resistance from the villagers, many of whom had still been
preparing breakfast when they arrived;151 not a single gunshot was fired against them.152
Nevertheless, they carried out the assault in textbook military formation, kneeling and crouching
as if in a firefight with armed adversaries.153 After the first wave of killing, members of Charlie
Company raped women and young girls, burned houses to the ground, and soiled the village’s
drinking water with grenades and the corpse of a monk.
In the weeks leading up to the massacre, Charlie Company had suffered multiple
casualties as a result of Viet Cong mines, booby traps, and sniper fire. The night before, soldiers
had been told they would finally have a chance to directly engage a hitherto invisible enemy.
Whatever latent desire for revenge smoldered in the hearts of these men prior to the next day’s
bloody denouement, it was surely stoked by the briefing they received from Captain Ernest
Medina. “We lost a lot of guys,” Medina is reported to have said. “Now we’re gonna get our
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revenge. Everything goes.”154 They were to teach the villagers a lesson. When one GI asked if
that included killing women and children as well, Medina offered a chilling reply: “Kill
everything that moves.”155 It was Captain Medina who later executed the wounded village
woman as Hugh Thompson’s crew looked on in horror.
Recoiling at Medina’s murder of the young woman, Thompson landed his helicopter near
a drainage ditch along the village perimeter in which he had observed dozens of terrified
villagers huddled together. Several Gls were smoking nearby. Others were eating lunch.
Thompson found a sergeant among them and asked if the people in the ditch needed assistance.
The only way to help them, he was told, was to put them out of their misery. Thompson then
spoke with Lieutenant William Calley, who brusquely told him that it was none of his business
and that besides they were “just following orders.”156 Confused and frustrated, Thompson and
his crew took off again in their helicopter and within minutes, began to hear bursts of automatic
rifle fire. The realization that American soldiers were executing unarmed civilians casually and
apparently without moral constraint shocked Thompson:
During flying around we came across a ditch. It had bodies in it, a lot of them-women,
kids, old men. I remember a thought going through my mind: “How did these people get
in a ditch?” And I finally thought about the Nazis, I guess, and marching everybody
down into a ditch and blowing ‘em away. Here we are supposed to be the good guys in
the white hats. It upset me.157
The massacre reminded him of Nazi atrocities in Europe, of Jews and political prisoners being
rounded up by the Einsatzgruppen and made to dig their own graves before being shot. “What do
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you call it,” he asked, “when you march 100 or 200 people down in a ditch and line up on the
side with machine guns and start firing into it? Reminds me of another story that happened in
World War II, about the Nazis.”158 As he later told journalist Ron Ridenhour, “We’re the good
guys. We don’t do those kind of things.”159
Thompson spotted a group of villagers fleeing for safety in a bunker. With American GIs
in hot pursuit, he judged the civilians were unlikely to survive unless someone intervened. He
landed the helicopter on the road, thereby separating the villagers from their American pursuers,
radioed two nearby helicopter gunships for support and, through them, communicated to the
soldiers of Charlie Company that his gunners would open fire on anyone shooting at civilians.
The firing ceased. Thompson’s actions saved the lives of a handful of civilians. Of those in the
drainage ditch, they were able to save only a three-year-old boy, who had managed to go
unnoticed by his would-be executioners thanks to being completely covered in a grisly
camouflage of mud and blood. Nearly the entire village had been wiped out.
My Lai was just one of numerous atrocities committed by American soldiers during the
war and might have been forgotten were it not for a combination of factors that conspired against
official secrecy. Despite the US Army’s best efforts, rumors of the massacre eventually leaked to
the press and within a year, public outrage demanded an investigation. The existence of Ronald
L. Haeberle’s color photographs, subsequently published by major newspapers and television
networks, intensified the shock. Haeberle’s images depicted bundles of anonymous bodies piled
alongside the road, lifeless old men, women, and children. One shot captured an instant of pure
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terror in the faces of several women and girls literally seconds before machinegun fire mowed
them down.
The massacre at My Lai launched a national debate over responsibility for war atrocities.
Though several of the soldiers who participated in atrocities that day were later charged with
crimes, only Lieutenant Calley was convicted of killing twenty-two villagers and sentenced to
life imprisonment with hard labor.160 Yet for all the national debate, My Lai was not the
aberration American politicians and the military establishment claimed it was.
Oliver points out that “horrors were often routine”161 in Vietnam. “Whilst the atrocities in
Son My may have been exceptional in scale,” he writes, “the battlefield practices of the US
military exaggerated the ordinary viciousness of a civil war to such an extent that the boundaries
of ethical behaviour became obscure for many of those concerned.”162 Nick Turse has
meticulously documented the perpetration of numerous massacres and other atrocities by
American forces in Vietnam besides—and in some cases far exceeding—the events in My Lai.
In his view, “the real aberration was the unprecedented and unparalleled investigation and
exposure of My Lai. No other American atrocity committed during the war … was ever afforded
anything approaching the same attention.”163
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My Lai was made visible to the American public in a way other atrocities in Vietnam
simply were not. As a result, it became the episode upon which the justice of the war itself
ultimately hinged. An editorialist for the New York Times underscored the idea of visibility when
he described the American presence in Vietnam as “that of a hideous blind giant, skilled at
killing but unable to ‘see’ what he kills. My Lai now permits us to take a good look.”164 Indeed,
the justice of American military power itself came into question. Even among supporters of the
war, there was a strong sense that American violence had gone beyond the pale in this case.
The national moral concern over My Lai was short-lived, however. At the urging of the
media, the episode was eventually accommodated by an American public eager to reject the
burden such an atrocity implied. While media coverage of the Vietnam war is often hailed as a
glowing example of intrepid journalism in the service of democratic politics against corrupt and
unaccountable power, the reality was somewhat different. Hallin describes how the mass media
came to depict a version of the war and its objectives largely in line with official state policy:
[J]ournalists gave up the right to speak with a political voice of their own, and in turn
they were granted a regular right of access to the inner counsels of government … The
press was recognized as a sort of “fourth branch of government,” a part of the informal
constitution of the political system; and it in turn accepted certain standards of
“responsible” behavior. These standards involved not merely renouncing the right to
make partisan criticisms of political authority, but also granting to political authorities
certain positive rights of access to the news and accepting for the most part the language,
agenda, and perspectives of the political “establishment.”165
Establishment journalists, Hallin argues, were generally unwilling to question the Cold War
“national security” consensus, and instead acted as “‘responsible’ advocates for that
consensus.”166
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Before the massacre at My Lai became widely known in late 1969, details about other
massacres had periodically leaked to the press, but even media outlets associated with the
political Left were often unwilling to publish these accounts.167 Before My Lai, few seriously
entertained the argument that, as the philosopher Bertrand Russell and others had already
suggested as early as 1963, the Vietnam War was a “war of annihilation” and itself an
“atrocity.”168 By the late 1960s, however, the antiwar movement had advanced to such a point
that it became possible to find voices within the mainstream media willing to exploit the rare
moment and offer more critical coverage. This is precisely what happened in late 1969 when the
My Lai massacre was exposed.
It might be said that national discourse between roughly 1969-1971 straddled a threshold
of atrocity. To the extent that questions were raised about the morality of the American presence
in Vietnam, My Lai injected an unusual dose of critical analysis. Thresholds of atrocity only
loom when responsibility for a bad state of affairs appears to implicate the group as a whole and
to thereby call the desirability of membership into question. If responsibility can be imputed
elsewhere however, the threshold can be avoided. So while the outrage initially generated by the
revelations of the My Lai massacre did open a window for more critical analysis than might
otherwise have been the case, an emphasis on legality and the actions of individuals redirected
the question of responsibility. “[A]s the discursive status of the massacre shifted from allegation
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to certified crime, a number of media commentaries sought to preserve the protective cast around
the national self-image, asserting the aberrant nature of the events at My Lai (4) and, by
implication the excessive guilt of Medina, Calley and their men.”169
In this vein, Hallin argues that media coverage of My Lai was generally “cautious and
dispassionate,” preoccupied mainly with the legal complexities of Lieutenant Calley’s trial and
not the details of the massacre itself—which of course became an “alleged massacre” once
charges were filed.170 For the vast majority of mainstream commentators, the events at My Lai,
while lamentable, were by no means representative of either American values or of the war in
general. “[F]or much of the viewing public, My Lai was less an atrocity … than confirmation
that American morale was on the decline.”171 At worst, My Lai represented a moment of
irrational behavior on the part of several individuals; at best, craven scapegoating.172 Many
Americans simply did not believe the story.173
The issue of responsibility, collective or individual, is paramount in such cases. If the
atrocities really were systemic, a degree of guilt potentially lay with the nation as a whole, as
some had argued about ordinary Germans after the second world war.174 At a minimum, My Lai
eroded a veneer of American benevolence and carried the unsettling whiff of Nazi crimes. Hugh
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Thompson had intervened during the massacre precisely because the killing he witnessed that
day reminded him of Nazi atrocities and he was not alone in drawing the comparison; Europeans
compared the massacre to the German blitzkrieg and especially to the gratuitous Nazi killings of
Czech civilians at the village of Lidice in 1942. “But at Lidice,” the New York Times pointed out,
“the Nazis spared the women and children.”175 The Nation magazine similarly argued that if the
details of the My Lai massacre were true, “the Americans involved behaved with an on-the-spot
savagery that exceeded even that of the Germans at Liddice [sic] in World War II.”176
The revelations of My Lai, regardless of whether the comparisons to Nazi crimes were
taken seriously or not, nevertheless threatened to demolish the mythos of homespun benevolence
surrounding the American GI in the national imagination. In an interview with one of the central
participants in the massacre, veteran journalist Mike Wallace observed:
The thought that goes through your mind is, we’ve raised such a dickens about what the
Nazis did, or what the Japanese did, but particularly what the Nazis did in the second
world war, the brutalization and so forth, you know. It’s hard for a good many Americans
to understand that young, capable, American boys could line up old men, women and
children and babies and shoot them down in cold blood.177
Robert Rheault, the former commander of U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, expressed a similar
sentiment: “Some people think that the Japanese committed atrocities, that the Germans
committed atrocities, that the Russians committed atrocities, but that the Americans don’t
commit atrocities. Well, this just isn’t so. American troops are capable as any other of
committing atrocities.”178
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In the popular imagination, the Nazis represent pure evil. “In the twentieth century,”
Baumeister argues, “the most compelling and enduring image of evil is the Nazis. The Nazis
have replaced the red-skinned, pointy-tailed Satan as the prototype of evil.”179 In moral
philosophy as well the Nazis loom large. Noting a shift away from religious discourses of evil in
contemporary moral philosophy, Richard Bernstein notes “ever since we have become aware of
the full horrors of the Nazi period and the perverse cruelty of the Shoah, Auschwitz has come to
symbolize the most extreme evil of our time.”180 In correspondence with her mentor Karl Jaspers
regarding her recently published The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt wrote:
Evil has proved to be more radical than expected. In objective terms, modern crimes are
not provided for in the Ten Commandments. Or: the Western Tradition is suffering from
the preconception that the most evil things human beings can arise from the vice of
selfishness. Yet we know that the greatest evils or radical evil has nothing to do anymore
with such humanly understandable, sinful motives?181
Her appropriation of Kant’s notion of radical evil is directly inspired by the Nazi crimes—crimes
that “explode the limits of the law,” as she put it.182 Arendt warns that once a specific act has
made an appearance on the world stage, it remains with us “as a potentiality long after its
actuality has become a thing of the past.”183
The emphasis on the specific forms of violence associated with the actuality of Nazism,
real or perceived, constitutes a paradigm of atrocity. That is to say the Nazi holocaust,
understood as an event of transgressive violence par excellence, serves as a mental rule of
thumb, a moral shortcut for weighing the severity of violence in other contexts. The comparison
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with Nazi crimes may be more or less warranted, but even superficial resemblance carries strong
moral prohibitions. On the one hand, the universal disgust evoked by Nazi atrocities should be
recognized as a great success for moral education. At a minimum, Nazism surely represents the
darkness and cruelty, the sheer moral depravity of which our species is capable. But might it also
generate a blind spot?
Our sensitivity to the historically specific nature of Nazi crimes and its imagery—the death
camps, the gas chambers, the crematoria, the hellish piles of emaciated corpses—might leave us
less able to imagine other manifestations of transgressive violence, less able to consider future
atrocities “beside which Hitler’s gassing installations look like an evil child’s fumbling toys.”184
It is essentially for this reason: that the unprecedented, once it has appeared, may become
a precedent for the future, that all trials touching upon “crimes against humanity” must be
judged according to a standard that is today still an “ideal.”185
Insofar as violence resembles Nazi violence, it can be assigned an uncontroversial status as
atrocity. Even even when the comparison to Nazi violence is shallow or unwarranted it can still
carry a strong whiff of atrocity. While the U.S. presence in Vietnam took an enormous human
toll, it is not obvious that it sank to a program of calculated and systematic extermination, but a
direct comparison with Nazism is not required for the moral shortcut to obtain. A superficial
resemblance is often enough. It is at least partly for this reason that the killings at My Lai elicited
more concern and moral outrage than the millions of other civilian deaths caused by American
military engagement in Vietnam. My Lai resembled Nazi crimes, at least superficially; the others
did not—not obviously anyway. It is also for this reason that Hugh Thompson found the actions
of Charlie Company so blatantly objectionable, motivating him to take the drastic measure of

184
185

Ibid.
Ibid.

74

turning his guns on U.S. soldiers. As another member of Charlie Company later remarked, the
mass killings at My Lai were a “Nazi kind of thing.”186

Paradigms of Atrocity
During the American Revolutionary period, the use of the word “slavery” as a metaphor
for the colonial experience under British rule became popular among white anti-British
agitators.187 Later, the metaphor was adapted to emphasize the oppressive conditions experienced
by workers under early industrial capitalism—often derided as “white slavery” or “wage
slavery” by labor activists. The idea of abstract slavery rode the crest of the Western
philosophical tradition and was commonly invoked as a metaphor for absolute unfreedom,
notwithstanding the actual practice of chattel slavery.188 Lay discourses generally operate
according to a different set of objectives than do scholarly discourses, especially those aimed at
achieving political goals. Insofar as it pushed against the mind’s limits for understanding labor
conditions unsuitable for any (white) worker, adopting the slave analogy was politically
expedient.189 Similarly, genocide scholars today employ a language of identification and
intervention that rests strongly on the specificity of what Jonathan Glover calls the “distinctive
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Nazi darkness.”190 Yet what is treated as specific has been simultaneously adopted as a paradigm
for understanding genocide generally.
For having invoked the memories of Nazi atrocities in particular, the My Lai massacre
smacked of evil. The associations pointed out by critics of the massacre serve mainly to
emphasize its transgressive nature by establishing a mental connection with the “exotic evil”191
of Nazism. References to the Nazis in lay parlance are often deployed in this way, serving as a
kind of shorthand for pure evil. Tal observes as much in North American political discourse; the
use of the Nazi holocaust as a metonym for evil has predictable but interesting consequences.
“‘Hitler,’ ‘Jew,’ ‘Nazi,’ and ‘Holocaust’ imply floating chains of signifiers in the Barthesian
sense, each invoking a variety of signifieds.”192 In national politics, the specter of Nazism is used
to discredit political candidates and their ideas. “Nazi references,” Johnson argues, “are nearly
ubiquitous in American culture—appearing in film, literature, popular music, television, and
video games, political speeches and debates. The proliferation suggests a national definition:
Nazis are evil, and evil is Nazi.”193 This circular definition is sufficiently flexible for the many
uses to which the popular imagination deploys Nazi analogies.
So much for the popular discourse, but what does the Nazi holocaust offer scholars in
terms of comparative analysis, if anything? The answer to this question remains the subject of
some debate. Traditionally, the question has centered on the “uniqueness” or singularity of the
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Nazi holocaust and the potential for extrapolating from it more general lessons. The sensitivity of
the topic has unfortunately generated a great deal of confusion over what this actually entails. In
his anthology of perspectives on the uniqueness debate, Alan Rosenbaum writes that “the
Holocaust is in many crucial respects an unparalleled or singular event.” Nevertheless, “the
historical singularity of the Holocaust does not imply by that fact alone that it is ‘unique’ in some
significant sense.”194 It should go without saying that all historical events are to some extent
unprecedented, but ascribing to the Nazi holocaust absolute phenomenal uniqueness poses
obvious problems for social scientists. If a particular event is truly a case apart, how is the
scholar to proceed?
If [the Nazi holocaust] can’t be legitimately compared to any other historical process or
event, and it is indeed utterly unique, then it cannot be repeated in any form, and thus the
slogan ‘never again’—often uttered when attempts are made to draw lessons for the
present and future from these terrible events—is meaningless, since the ‘Final Solution’
has no relevance to anything else and no lessons to teach us in the present day.195
Incidentally, some have adopted this very position. The Israeli philosopher Yeshayahu
Leibowitz, for example, emphatically argues “there are no lessons to take from the Shoah. And,
perhaps, what is so terrible about the Shoah is that it has no lesson.”196
The uniqueness debate resurfaced with great popular interest as recently as 1996 upon the
publication of Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners.197 Goldhagen argues that
German anti-Semitism was indeed unique in both incidence and intensity, though his work was
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roundly dismissed by many prominent holocaust scholars, including Raul Hilberg who called it
“Totally wrong. Exceptionally wrong.”198 Though it periodically resurfaces in the popular
literature and in North American Jewish philosophy,199 the special singularity of the Nazi
holocaust is no longer a subject of much debate among mainstream genocide and holocaust
scholars. It is instead regarded as intellectually untenable and morally dubious to reserve a
special classification that would downplay, in effect if not intent, the catastrophes other groups
have suffered in holocausts of their own. Nor does a skepticism of the Nazi holocaust’s absolute
uniqueness in any way diminish or trivialize its horror.
The historiographical and methodological disputes over the Nazi holocaust as a subject of
scholarly analysis have produced some interesting contradictions. Senior editor of the Journal of
Genocide Research, Dirk Moses, has criticized “leading genocide scholars” for treating the Nazi
holocaust as what he calls a “paradigm of genocide” despite rejecting its uniqueness.200 Such
treatment, he argues, implies that the Nazi holocaust has compelling analytic value—but only
because it is the most genocidal of genocides, the genocide as it were. This is a common theme
in the literature. For example, Jonathan Glover writes that while there are “some common
patterns to be found” in comparative analysis with the Nazi holocaust, “this is not to deny that
the Nazi genocide has a terrible darkness all its own.”201 The international legal definition
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notwithstanding, Dirk Moses claims that the field of genocide studies has, “redefined [genocide]
as an ideologically-motivated and state-executed program of mass killing.”202 The emphasis
placed on these two variables (ideological motives and state direction) tends to eclipse the
“capacious definition” proffered by Raphael Lemkin when he coined the term “genocide.” I will
return to Lemkin and the expansive definition of genocide momentarily.
If mass killing remains the central act associated with genocide, the Nazi holocaust
remains the paradigmatic example. Nazi crimes are used as the measure against which the
severity of all atrocities can be analyzed and assessed. Melson claims this analytical reliance on
the Nazi holocaust on the part of genocide scholars is misleading and suggests that other
historical incidents, especially the Armenian genocide, may generate more fruitful comparative
analyses:
In the Holocaust, the victims were not a territorial group; the ideology was a variant of a
global racism and antisemitism, not nationalism; and the characteristic method of
destruction was the death camp. Indeed, in the contemporary world, only the Cambodian
genocide perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge bears a closer resemblance to the Holocaust
than to the Armenian Genocide.203
Whether or not the contemporary field of genocide studies remains faithful to Lemkin’s intent is
an ongoing debate, the contours of which cannot be adequately recounted here. Nor is it
particularly important to offer more than a sense of this debate for the task at hand. I am much
more interested in the normative implications that follow first from adopting the Nazi holocaust
as a paradigm of genocide; and second from conceiving of genocide as the worst of all
imaginable atrocities. What does it mean for a theory of atrocity grounded in vision that
genocide is perceived as the paradigmatic atrocity, the Nazi holocaust as the paradigmatic
202
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genocide, and the Nazis as the paradigmatic incarnation of evil?204
It is worth elaborating on my claim that the Nazi holocaust has become a paradigm of
atrocity by reviewing the operative terms. As explained in the previous chapters, I take atrocity
to mean violence perceived as having transgressed all social and political norms, i.e. lacking any
excuse or justification under any circumstances. For instance, a given political community might
tolerate a minimal degree of violence in the form of a basic internal security apparatus. The same
political community would likely reject the regular use of torture by such an apparatus and the
likelihood of a community tolerating such violence diminishes further once we apply the veil of
ignorance heuristic discussed earlier. Other cases of institutionalized violence will surely follow
a similar pattern: some coercion will likely be tolerated, but probably only within tightly
constrained boundaries. It is probable that a greater amount of violence will be permitted against
outsiders and less permitted against insiders. It seems very unlikely that any political community
could develop norms predicated on mass suffering of either insiders or outsiders without an
enormous amount of deception at work. Deception is certainly part of the story as the next
chapter will address, but for now I am interested in what we might expect from communities in
which violence is fully visible.
It is also necessary to explain just what I mean by paradigm of atrocity. Because I
employ a definition of atrocity that necessarily relies to a great extent on the imprecision of
interpretation, it is not possible to establish strict definitions; there are no convenient lines for
which one might declare “there lies a threshold of atrocity!” Still, the inability to “see” many
atrocities does not, in itself, disqualify those instances from correctly being ascribed such a
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status. For the purposes of this study, a paradigm of atrocity is simply an example of past
violence that has become ubiquitous and now serves as a powerful filter through which the
identification and interpretation of violence that falls beyond a threshold of atrocity takes place.
In the case of the Nazi holocaust, this is apparent not only in the scholarly literature but also in
the wider culture in such a way as to obscure forms of atrocity that do not closely resemble Nazi
crimes. One of the ways this manifests in political struggles is the understandable attempt by
victim groups to appropriate the term “holocaust” for their own suffering.205 Critics of this
practice argue that while it might be a politically expedient strategy for gaining political
recognition, sympathy, or reparations, it also reinforces the idea that an atrocity must be
sufficiently Nazi-like to warrant recognition. “Far from constituting a symbolic idiom that
empowers non-Jewish victims to win public recognition, the Holocaust occludes their
experiences by establishing an unattainable monumental threshold.”206
Within a moral taxonomy of atrocity, the narrow understanding of genocide-asAuschwitz all but guarantees that genocide is today understood to be the worst imaginable
atrocity, if not the central crime associated with the term, to the exclusion of other forms of
violence that also demand vociferous moral protest. This contributes to a blind spot when it
comes to recognizing atrocities that do not fit easily into the Nazi paradigm. Not all forms of
atrocity are genocidal and not all genocides look like Auschwitz. It should be possible to expand
our moral vision by heeding Arendt’s warning that future atrocities may appear very different
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than the paradigm established by the Nazi holocaust without (and one cannot stress this point
enough) diminishing the moral horror of Auschwitz a single iota.

Atrocity and Genocide
The twentieth century bore witness to astonishing levels of carnage, episodes of mass
killing among which the Nazi holocaust holds a prominent, if not preeminent, place in both the
cultural and scholarly imaginations. What is it about Nazi crimes in particular that stand out? A
crude tally of the millions murdered cannot alone explain it; the century experienced multiple
massacres, some of which resulted in greater numbers of gross death. Rummel offers an estimate
of 21.9 million lives ended by the Nazi regime. Yet this mind-boggling figure is dwarfed by two
more of what he calls the twentieth century’s “dekamegamurders”—the 35.23 and 61.9 million
deaths caused by the Chinese and Soviet gulag states respectively.207 In addition to these three
episodes of mass murder, Rummel also documents the killing of 10.2 million people in China by
Chiang Kai-shek’s quasi-fascist nationalist regime. To these four dekamegamurders, I would
suggest another example nowhere mentioned in his book: the colonial atrocities directed by
Belgium’s King Leopold II in the Congo Free State, which resulted in 8-15 million deaths.208
Looking at body counts is an unseemly business, especially when even one million dead, let
alone tens of millions, is already an incomprehensible figure. Clearly the numbers alone cannot
explain the Nazi holocaust’s status as a paradigm of genocide.
Instead of numbers, many dwell instead on Nazi racial ideology and the underlying,
symbolic meaning of Nazi violence. For instance, Emile Fackenheim, a major figure in the
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uniqueness debate, suggests that it was precisely because there was no rational economic or
political advantage to be gained by its implementation that sets the Final Solution apart. The
sheer single-mindedness of the Nazi extermination program, proponents of this view claim,
render it a very different phenomenon from the Chinese and Soviet episodes. Others claim that
Nazi genocide is regarded with special horror by Europeans precisely because Hitler marked the
return of colonial violence to the metropole. Aimé Cesaire mocked the irony of European
indignation over Nazi crimes which had, until then, “been applied only to non-European
peoples.”209 Indeed, many scholars now regard the German massacres between 1904-09 against
the Herero people as the century’s first genocide and a forerunner to the Nazi holocaust.210 The
symbolism of Nazi violence is surely part of the story. There is something undeniably chilling
about the extension of industrial bureaucratic efficiency to the business of mass murder, the way
in which the Nazis reduced the challenges of mass murder to mere technical problems to be
solved. It strikes us as profoundly cold-blooded, somehow even worse than conventional mass
murder—if there is such a thing.
Whatever the other contributing factors, the Nazi holocaust’s paradigmatic status is
informed at least in part by the evolution of the word “genocide” itself. None of the Nazi war
criminals put on trial at Nuremberg were charged with genocide because the term did not exist at
the time. It is a common misconception that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) was adopted by the United Nations in response
to the Nazi holocaust specifically. While it is true that the Final Solution contributed to the
animus behind passing the CPPCG, those drafting the Convention did not regard the Nazi
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holocaust as a paradigmatic case of genocide. Still less was it thought to be so by Raphael
Lemkin, the man who coined the term “genocide” itself. Though technological sophistication
made it easier for Hitler, Lemkin felt there was nothing inherently modern about the idea and
practice of genocide.211
Genocide is a special crime insofar as its prosecution under international law requires a
general intent for the underlying act itself (e.g. killing members of a group, forcibly transferring
children, etc.) as well as an ulterior intent to destroy the victim group via such action. For
instance, if one group is shown to have adulterated another group’s water supply with a chemical
substance that reduces fertility rates, it may be a criminal act, but it is not necessarily genocidal.
However, if it can be shown that the underlying act of tainting the water was implemented with
the ultimate goal of destroying the group, the crime then rises to genocide under international
law. No death camps are necessary for the legal definition to obtain.
While the popular understanding of genocide and indeed much of the scholarly treatment
of the subject relies on a definition that takes mass killing for granted, the crime of genocide
technically requires no killing at all.212 Lemkin’s original formulation included a number of
historical episodes of mass killing dating to the classical world which he regarded as genocidal in
nature, but his use of the term also encompassed an array of non-lethal activities, e.g. measures
taken to counter the biological reproduction of a victim group.213 Despite the direction Moses
and others claim genocide scholars have taken the field, the international legal definition of
genocide outlined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
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Genocide (CPPCG) clearly endorses Lemkin’s expanded notion. In addition to the prosecution of
physical violence against a targeted group, article two of the CPPCG also proscribes as genocidal
“measures intended to prevent births” and “[f]orcibly transferring children.” Forms of “paralethal” genocide remain controversial elements of the Convention’s definition and are often
treated by scholars as ancillary or even non-genocidal.214 They are too often semantically
trivialized as mere “cultural genocide”—and not genocide proper. The philosopher Claudia Card,
to whose work I will return shortly, criticizes the tendency of genocide scholars to downplay
non-lethal forms of genocide. As a corrective, she suggests placing Orlando Patterson’s concept
of “social death”215 at the center of genocide.
Putting social death at the center of genocide explains and clarifies the position,
controversial among genocide scholars, that genocidal acts are not necessarily homicidal.
Forcibly sterilizing the women or the men of a targeted group, or forcibly separating
children from their parents for re-education to assimilate them into another group, can be
genocidal in both aim and effect.216
Emphasizing social death, Card argues, renders the notion of “cultural genocide” redundant and
misleading. Her work implicitly suggests that non-lethal genocide is an entirely plausible
potentiality and, given the definition of genocide outlined in the Convention, it is difficult to
argue otherwise. Yet, non-lethal forms of genocide are either ignored or discussed only as
adjuncts to the primary phenomenon: mass killing.
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Because of the fairly loose legal definition of genocide outlined in the convention, it is
conceivable that charges of genocide might be leveled at governments for pursuing policies
aimed at destroying undesirable communities “in whole or in part” without resorting to mass
killing—as in the sterilization example proffered above. Yet the term “genocide” is rarely
invoked to describe such policies and is typically met with derision when it is. This disconnect
between the legal and colloquial definitions of genocide has very real consequences. To offer
one real-world example with which I am quite familiar, human rights groups have for years
accused Israel of pursuing policies aimed at diminishing the Palestinian presence in East
Jerusalem with the goal of maintaining a Jewish demographic advantage in the Old City, which
Israel conquered in 1967 and later annexed in contravention of international law. The Israeli
human rights group B’Tselem points to various methods the Israeli state has implemented to
advance this agenda:
•
•
•
•

Physically isolating East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, in part by building
the Separation Barrier;
Discriminating in land expropriation, planning and building, and demolition of houses;
Revoking residency and social benefits of Palestinians who stay abroad for at least seven
years, or who are unable to prove that their center of life is in Jerusalem;
Unfairly dividing the budget between the two parts of the city, with harmful effects to
infrastructure and services in East Jerusalem.217

While B’Tselem does not claim that such policies amount to genocide, they do claim the
measures are designed “to create a demographic and geographic situation that will thwart any
future attempt to challenge Israeli sovereignty over [Jerusalem].”218 Moreover, the restrictions
placed on the growth of Palestinian towns in the occupied West Bank stands in stark
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contradistinction to the vast resources devoted to expanding and codifying a strong IsraeliJewish presence over the occupied territories.
Whether or not these policies fulfill the legal definition of genocide is debatable and it is
important to stress that Israel is not unique in practicing this kind of demographic
micromanagement. China pursues similar efforts against the Uighurs in the Xinjiang region, as
does India against Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. Some scholars have leveled charges of
genocide against the United States and Canada for infringement on the rights of Native
Americans. However capacious the CPPCG definition of genocide, I am not personally
convinced that it is morally or strategically wise to place racist demographic management
alongside policies of mass killing. Whatever the merits of doing so whether the policies in
question actually fulfill the legal definition of genocide, it is enough to point out that the CPPCG
is sufficiently loose to include a range of non-murderous activities—so long as the ultimate
intent is the destruction “in whole or in part” of the victim community. The popular and
scholarly consensus notwithstanding, there is simply no good reason for us to think
contemporary genocides must resemble Nazi crimes in order for them to fulfill the CPPCG
definition.
While the legal definition of genocide is fairly loose, it is rarely invoked. Yet even the
current definition has its critics who feel the term narrows the scope of imaginable contexts in
which vast numbers of lives are destroyed. In an interesting essay, Vinay Lal challenges the
prevailing understanding of genocide specifically, arguing that the hidden practices of economic
liberalization, often promoted under the name of “development,” have caused untold death and
misery and might more accurately be described as a form of genocide. The disparate forms of
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violence that accompany “structural adjustment” policies, he claims, are allowed to without
producing much concern because market logic is assumed to be extra-political, even natural.
Lal’s inclusion of destructive economic policy obviously falls well outside the present
definition of genocide outlined in the CPPCG. Invoking the specter of Nazism, Lal questions
whether or not we need to reevaluate the terms of the discussion away from “camps” for fear of
missing genocides occurring under other guises.
Will it suffice to speak of genocide as the wilful elimination, in part or in whole, of
groups of people, whether conceived through the categories of nationality, religion,
ethnicity, gender, sexual preference or linguistic identity, and point to continuing
violence in the Sudan, Chechnya, the Chittagong Hill Tracts and elsewhere as instances
of genocide in our time, or do our times call for some radical rethinking of genocide?
Does our present understanding of genocide permit us to recognize the numerous forms,
institutions and sociocultural practices, many cast as benevolent interventions, through
which it might be practiced?219
While Lal’s article raises some interesting questions, he does not follow up on the ideas, leaving
that work to others. Certainly he is right to worry about markets obscuring intent and I agree that
the analytic focus on Nazi crimes has tended to restrict our ability to identify objectionable
violence in different quarters. I do not, however, understand the determination to label all forms
of extreme violence, hidden or otherwise, “genocide.”
Lal’s concerns simply cannot be addressed by expanding the legal definition. The crime
of genocide under international law is already sufficiently open to accommodate a range of
historical and present injustices that fall short of systematic extermination. Nevertheless, the
term is also too confining in its emphasis on groups for application in the diversity of cases Lal
suggests—nor is it clear what would be accomplished be expanding the legal definition beyond
recognition.
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The problem, rather, is one of politics; states are hesitant to use the word “genocide”
because of the positive action the word implies in the age of “responsibility to protect.” Instead
of expanding the definition of genocide then or abandoning the term altogether, I propose an
emphasis on the notion of atrocity and a willingness to keep an open mind when it comes to
manifestations of extreme violence. Prioritizing a discourse of atrocity leaves the door open for a
range of crimes, many of which we are not yet able to comprehend or predict. As Arendt writes
in her account of the Eichmann trial, part of the difficulty in prosecuting Nazi crimes was the
sheer scale and legal illegibility they suggested. Nothing like the “fabrication of corpses” in
factories of death had been seen before.220 The idea was simply unthinkable. What atrocities
might the future have in store for us?—horrors for which we do not yet have a name and which
may not easily conform to the legal definition of genocide?
The genocide-as-Auschwitz mindset has another complicating factor: its strategic use by
states to advance narrow interests. Peter Novick argues that while Nazi Germany was, in the
United States, regarded as the “apotheosis of human evil and depravity” during WWII, the Cold
War brought about the necessity of relocating public perceptions away from Germany and
towards the Soviet Union.221 This was achieved in part through the coining and proliferation of
the term “totalitarianism,” which was intended to identify points of similarity between the Nazi
and Communist regimes. Moreover, the widespread use of labor camps under both regimes
helped codify the comparison in the popular imagination. The camp, after all, remains one of the
most powerful symbols of Nazi atrocities. According to this argument, emphasizing the horrors
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of the Nazi genocide served to advance state security prerogatives by providing a useful
propaganda function.
Building on Novick’s work, Norman Finkelstein argues that the moral status of the Nazi
holocaust provided “the perfect weapon for deflecting criticism of Israel” over its brutalization of
the Palestinians following that country’s 1967 conquest and continuing occupation of the Gaza
Strip, the West Bank, and Golan Heights.222 According to Finkelstein, Israel’s policies vis-à-vis
the occupied Palestinian population are more easily excused and justified by an Israeli populace
convinced that it remains the victim of anti-Semitic oppression. Israeli politicians in the
immediate post-war era frequently drew comparisons between the Palestinians and the Nazis, as
if to suggest a direct ideological lineage.223
There are other problems with the genocide-as-Auschwitz approach. According to
Bloxham, the pervasive assumption that genocide must always resemble Auschwitz betrays a
Euro-centric set of priorities. Channeling Cesaire, Bloxham is especially concerned with the
refusal to consider what by modern standards must be regarded as genocidal colonial violence
inflicted on African peoples for centuries:
The truth is that most other genocides have been of insufficient interest to Western
intellectuals for them to ponder their metaphysical dimensions the way the Holocaust has
been pondered. Let me be clear: something of the dimensions of the final solution should
prompt huge and sustained philosophical self-reflection, but it is the ‘surprise’ that
registers in so much of the scholarship that is telling, since Europe had not only
witnessed other genocides, it had inflicted them on its colonial peripheries well before the
continent erupted at its own core in the twentieth century.224
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While the uniqueness debate has subsided, Bloxham sees it reemerging in new forms that fit
“into a long tradition of the West’s attempts to universalize its own values and uniqueness in the
totalistic sense it is meant must be a demand for universal significance.”225
The cultural and professional focus on the Nazi holocaust has virtually guaranteed an
awareness on the part of school children around the world of the latent potential for human
cruelty on a staggering scale. This is laudable, but I worry that the moral benefits that accrue
from acknowledging the Nazi holocaust as a paradigm of genocide are tempered by the broader
depiction of the Nazis as a paradigm of evil. Philosophers have attempted to revive the notion of
evil in recent years and to inject the term with meaningful secular content, it nevertheless retains
superhuman connotations. Evil is commonly perceived as absolutely-not-self. It implies a loss or
absence of humanity. Atrocity, by contrast, is very much a product of human agency and
innovation. But if evil is indeed something of which humans are capable, as some contemporary
moral philosophers would like to insist, how can we reconcile a theory of atrocity grounded in
moral vision with the powerful baggage evil inevitably brings to the discussion?

Atrocity and Evil
The scholarly literature on atrocity very often broaches the question of evil. What was
once reserved for the exclusive purview of theological dispute has come into vogue among
contemporary secular philosophers, partly in response to the immense suffering and violence that
characterized the twentieth century. To be sure, categorizing Nazi crimes as merely “wrong” or
“bad” strikes one as grossly inadequate. Nor does “very, very bad” quite capture it. Language
falters at the attempt to describe the sheer scale of the wrongdoing. A theory of atrocity is then
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immediately confronted by the question of scale and how to adequately differentiate between
different wrongs. This problem is directly relatable to the threshold of atrocity in that it explores
the basic distinction between that which is acceptable and that which transgresses all norms.
Within the realm of petty social transgressions or very small moral wrongs, the question may not
strike us as especially urgent, but when we extend the discussion to ongoing violence and
suffering in our world today, they take on special importance.
Despite the apparent urgency of the concept, atrocity is surprisingly under-theorized. In
one of the only accounts to treat atrocity in some depth, Claudia Card advances a secular theory
of evil centered on the suffering endured by victims of atrocity. She offers no definition of
atrocity as such but lists several “well-known kinds,” including “genocide, slavery, torture, rape
as a weapon of war, the saturation bombing of cities, biological and chemical warfare unleashing
viruses and gases, and the domestic terrorism of prolonged battery, stalking, and child abuse.”226
Card does not suggest that this is a comprehensive catalog of atrocities and it is plausible to
imagine that at least some of what she lists might even be morally justifiable under certain
conditions. Her use of atrocity as a concept serves mainly to advance a theory of evil and its
boundaries are duly subordinated to that task. Consequently, it is occasionally difficult to
understand precisely what she means by the idea. She uses the term only to offer examples of
“evils” that remain unassailable as evil. Card describes as “evil” harm that is:
(1) reasonably foreseeable (or appreciable) and (2) culpably inflicted (or tolerated,
aggravated, or maintained), and that (3) deprives, or seriously risks depriving, others of the
basics that are necessary to make a life possible and tolerable or decent (or to make a death
decent).227
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That which we commonly regard as atrocious fits each of these points, though part of her project
aims to suggest that other forms of behavior and institutions are either evils or potential evils,
though not necessarily atrocities (marriage, for instance).228
While at one point Card writes that her “own” list of atrocities would including “evils
done to animals”—thereby suggesting that others might not agree with this moral designation—
central to her argument is the assertion that atrocities are “uncontroversially evil.”229 This
resonates with the definition of atrocity presented in this study, i.e. violence that transgresses all
norms, assuming phenomenological comprehensibility. Moreover, Card specifically invokes
vision as a tool with which one is able to become aware of some atrocities and remain oblivious
to others: “Some [atrocities]” she writes, “are highly visible (bombings), others can be difficult
to detect (environmental poisoning).”230 This observation also resonates strongly with a theory of
atrocity grounded in vision, yet Card’s central argument proceeds in a different direction because
her interests lie not in defining atrocity but in explaining evil.
Card’s account of evil expressly includes atrocities as well as evil actions that do not
qualify as atrocities. This places her theory somewhat at odds with popular conceptions of evil in
which the term is reserved only for the worst imaginable acts.231 Card’s discussion of atrocity,
though underdeveloped, is of more interest to us here for how it relates to my own formulation of
the concept. She defends the utility of a secular notion of evil as a broad category of extreme
wrongdoing and proceeds to make her case by pointing to atrocities as uncontroversial
candidates for her definition of evil. In her view, atrocity describes a specific class of action
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whereas evil is a wider category that encompasses a spectrum of potential wrongdoing from
minor to severe. Card emphatically does not argue that atrocities are the only phenomena that
qualify as evil, just that atrocities seem to underscore whatever discernable qualities we might
identify in them as atrocious.
Card’s account raises an obvious question: why distinguish evils from ordinary wrongs at
all? “One reason,” Card argues “is to help set priorities when resources are limited for preventing
wrongs and repairing harms.”232 We can call this the instrumental argument: adopting the
language of evil lends urgency to the cause of alleviating more pressing forms of suffering.
Card’s interest in directing our attention to atrocities before lesser injustices is a laudable project
and I would make a similar claim about focusing on atrocity. Less clear is the need for a
discourse of evil to accomplish the task. Though I have concerns about a discourse of evil, they
are tangential to our present task and need not detain us. Nevertheless, some scholars do
strenuously object to reviving evil as a conceptual category within the field of moral philosophy.
Virginia Held wonders if a discourse of evil adds anything more substantial than
“rhetorical variety.”233
Certainly I think that people often act wrongly, even outrageously, that they commit
gross injustices through acts that are inexcusable. I think they often fail to respect others’
rights, or lack a decent regard for their own humanity or that of others. … But evil? It
seems to me that we can deal with all the relevant moral considerations without it.234
In this vein, Phillip Cole also argues that evil is too much entangled with a host of metaphysical
connotations for it to be of more use than it is the source of further confusion.235 By some
accounts, evil transcends human agency; evildoers are inhuman, otherworldly, possessed, or
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otherwise fixed in their dispositions. When the term is assigned to recognizably human actors, it
often reveals a rhetorical strategy aimed at blocking alternative moral judgments. Evil is not to
be questioned. This formulation of evil as absolutely-not-self is dangerous because it precludes
the possibility of moral progress. In its crudest iterations, the discourse of evil “forms part of an
ethical vocabulary that helps to brand political opponents as foes for eradication rather than
enemies to be checked.”236 Indeed, it is this form of evil the Nazis themselves used to justify the
mass murder of European Jews.237 Any attempt to derive useful analysis via the concept of evil
must adequately address these concerns. For her part, Card insists that such criticism is selfdefeating. “If the likelihood of the ideological abuse of a concept were sufficient reason to
abandon the concept, we should probably abandon all normative concepts, certainly ‘right’ and
‘wrong.’”238 There is no need to go this far of course, but a less sophisticated account of evil than
the one Card advances might generate conceptual confusion when conflated with other issues
pertaining to extreme violence.
Though Card is careful to avoid this pitfall, many scholarly attempts to explain mass
murder place the Nazi holocaust at the center of a discursive triangle involving three charged and
often poorly defined concepts: atrocity, genocide, and evil. Nazism is often the starting point for
anyone who looks closely at these three issues. The social psychologist James Waller, for
example, points out that the “substantial majority” of literature on genocide is “related to one
particular instance of genocide—the Holocaust.”239 As addressed earlier in this chapter, the Nazi
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holocaust is commonly understood as a paradigmatic case of genocide. In popular and scholarly
accounts, the Nazi genocide and its macabre symbolism are taken to represent the crime of
genocide tout court, notwithstanding the legal language of the CPPCG. In particular, the crimes
committed at Auschwitz and its attendant symbols have come to be metonyms for genocide.
When we think of genocide, we think of Auschwitz. Moreover, the connective tissue that helps
to establish the metonymy is very often a vague and imprecise notion of evil.
Genocide, moreover, is widely perceived as the worst imaginable atrocity and atrocities
are thought to be genocide only insofar as they resemble Nazi crimes. Both are commonly
described in superlative language and placed firmly at the peak of a hierarchy of crimes.
Genocide is “the absolute crime, the gravest form of crime against humanity.”240 The insistence
that genocide is not only the worst crime imaginable but the worst crime possible is very
common. Genocide, Adalian writes, “is the embodiment of evil in a world in which human
beings are mere particles and where the issues of life and death are subject to the arbitrary
decision of the wielders of power. Genocide, therefore, is that final tyranny. There is no zone
beyond it.”241 Observations of this kinds are ultimately normative claims about the hierarchy of
various atrocities (ones that place genocide and the Nazi holocaust in particular at the top) and
simultaneously claims about the impossibility of any atrocity surpassing genocide. When one
genocide scholar calls the Nazi holocaust “the most horrendous of all genocidal acts,”242 he is
simply reflecting a widely held view of the Nazi holocaust as a paradigm of genocide and, by
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implication, a paradigm of atrocity. Because atrocities are “uncontroversially evil,” Nazism and
its attendant symbols are deployed as metonyms for evil even as Auschwitz in particular is
deployed as a metonym for genocide.
The conflation of atrocity, genocide, and evil has resulted in an impoverished discourse
on atrocity in particular. Instead of recognizing atrocity as a distinctly broader category, it is too
often subsumed into discussion of genocide in general and the Nazi genocide in particular. This
logic flows in the opposite direction as well. As Bauer and many others point out, the Nazi
holocaust has become a “cultural code” in the West, one that “signifies the evil in human
society.”243 If Nazism is a metonym for evil, then atrocities are evil. “In the realm of mass
atrocities,” one genocide scholar writes, “genocide is conceptualized as the evil beyond all
others, the ultimate measure of all human rights violations.”244 While this might very well be the
case, it remains unclear just what the use of evil means in this kind of analysis.
Michael Humphrey offers an account of atrocity that departs from a reliance on evil.245
Instead, he emphasizes a notion of “body horror,” a term he borrows from the journalist John
Taylor, to describes a process by which power is built on spectacular suffering.246 With its
concentration on the corporeal features of atrocity, it is an analysis that rests heavily on the work
of Michel Foucault and Elaine Scarry, respectively.247 According to Humphrey’s argument,
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atrocity is transgressive violence that extends beyond the expectations of the victims, i.e. beyond
their comprehension and the comprehension of witnesses. It is inherently political violence
because “pain, through violence, is made a spectacle and projected as power.”248
Like Card, Humphrey locates the defining qualities of atrocity in its effects on the
victims, its world-destroying qualities. Whereas Card discusses atrocity only in the context of a
disquisition on evil, Humphrey prioritizes the concept of atrocity itself. “The central mechanism
of atrocity,” Humphrey writes, “is to threaten life by cruelly disfiguring human bodies.”249 It is a
fascinating and helpful study, yet despite the emphasis on atrocity, Humphrey has no clear sense
of how formerly conventional violence actually becomes atrocious.
While all violence threatens normative reality, atrocity—excessive violence—shakes the
very foundations of both self and social existence. Atrocity is a traumatising violence
because it leaves an unassimilable memory in the victim and exceeds cultural discourses
of law or morality which manage the circulation of everyday violence.250
But where does the gap between conventional violence and atrocity lie? At what point does
violence transgress the expectations of its victims, as Humphrey claims? If I expect you to
commit an atrocity, does that very expectation ontologically undermine the atrocity as atrocious?
The “excessive” in his definition of atrocity as “excessive violence” is never fully explained,
leaving us to speculate as to which forms of violence he would classify as atrocious. Just as Card
side-steps the matter of defining atrocity in any detail, Humphrey takes it for granted that we
know atrocities when we see them. I suspect we do, but to claim as much requires further
analysis left unexplored as to just what we see when we see atrocity. By contrast, a vision-based
theory of atrocity relies on clear moral vision. I have argued that an atrocity is an act or an
accumulation of acts determined to exceed minimally tolerable levels of violence by
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nonparticipant observers for whom the violence in question is phenomenologically
comprehensible.

A Touchstone of Victimization
The Nazi holocaust, Flanzbaum observes, has reached “cult-like status.”251 It has become
“a touchstone of victimization” and “a measuring stick against which all oppression is
compared.”252 The weight of this status informs both scholarly and popular discourses so that all
atrocities are to a greater or lesser extent measured against Nazi crimes, the paradigmatic atrocity
and informal referent for comprehending cruel violence. Insofar as this moral deference to Nazi
violence discourages its reemergence, it would be irresponsible to conclude that the phenomenon
is necessarily problematic in itself. The concerns expressed in this chapter instead question
whether a highly attuned sensitivity to Nazi-style violence in particular renders us less conscious
to atrocity in general when it appears under a very different guise.
Some readers may feel the observations and conclusions drawn herein trivialize the
memory of the victims. My purpose in this sub-section has been neither to diminish the moral
horror of the Nazi holocaust nor to suggest a kind of moral levelling that would place all
atrocities on equal footing and thereby cheapen the memory of them all. The Nazi holocaust
remains one of the most horrific episodes of atrocity in human history, a moral cataclysm of such
magnitude that we now associate it with the darkest potential of our species. That much is clear.
Instead, I have attempted to make the case that the status of the Nazi holocaust as a paradigm of
atrocity in both popular and scholarly discourses raises conceptual concerns that should not be
ignored by scholars as well as challenges to clear moral vision that must be taken into account.
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Atrocities usually take us by surprise. If we look too hard for signs of Auschwitz, we just might
miss other, less obvious atrocities, a few of which are currently being committed in our name.
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IV. VIEWING: Atrocity in the Mass Media
“No one has ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms.”
Hannah Arendt

While the foregoing chapters have attempted to theorize a concept of atrocity and draw
conclusions about how we recognize transgressive violence, we must now turn to the primary
vehicle by which most us are made aware of atrocity: the mass media in its various forms. In the
interest of clarifying terms, by mass media I refer to print, broadcast, and digital technologies by
which the transmission of information about the world occurs. In particular, the two approaches
discussed in this chapter address primarily the news media.
Unless the issues involve us directly as participants, the mass media provide the
informational content necessary for the interpretation and comprehension of the world. Indeed,
our reliance on the mass media for an accurate representation of reality increases with the literal
and metaphoric remoteness of our lives from that reality. For a theory of atrocity grounded in
phenomenological experience, the importance of the mass media in constructing a particular
vision of reality cannot be overstated. Because the representation of extreme violence is quite
literally a mediated experience, the mass media play a critical role in determining which forms of
violence may be tolerated and which may or must be condemned. In short, the mass media
influence our perception of violence by defining what atrocity is to begin with. For a theory of
atrocity grounded in vision, the mediation of phenomenological experience bears enormous
moral consequences. While a substantial literature exists on the mass media’s role in shaping and
informing public opinion, this chapter looks at how the depiction of violence and atrocity
enhances or impoverishes our capacity for moral vision.253
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In their propaganda model (PM) of the media, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman
argue that media companies are guided by a set of structural constraints that shape the production
of news content at multiple levels.254 Because media profits derive from advertising revenue, the
PM predicts that the vision of the world produced by the mass media will, in general, reflect the
interests of political and economic elites. By emphasizing institutional analysis, their work has
the virtue of avoiding facile explanations that rely too much on the potential for manipulation on
the part of individuals. Chomsky and Herman provide compelling empirical data to support their
theory and, though it is often ignored by media scholars and absent from many mainstream
textbooks, the PM has never been seriously challenged.255 It remains a powerful theory of how
knowledge is produced in contemporary capitalist democracies.256
The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann advances a rather different position.257 Though
he would agree with Chomsky and Herman that the mass media depict a reality necessarily less
complicated than the actual conditions of our world, he argues against a “distortion” model of
the media and explicitly attempts to transcend what he regards as simplistic, cause-oriented
explanations. Luhmann insists that the mass media, like all social systems, is closed and immune
to external influence—including the economic and political systems. Though Luhmann’s work
offers insight into the reproduction of institutional priorities within the mass media itself, his
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“radical anti-humanism” inevitably leads him to a position that denies the possibility for political
agency and, by extension, any meaningful resistance. Moreover, like Chomsky and Herman,
Luhmann does believe the media play a role in reproducing social norms and ideology, but
whereas the PM makes an argument about how these priorities develop and the interests they
reflect, Luhmann never explains which norms rise to the surface, which ideas are deemed “fit to
print,” and which are not. Nor does he seem to care much about the matter because truth in his
formulation is always contingent and subjective.
This chapter begins with a summary look at how several prominent thinkers in the
Western tradition have characterized the relationship of knowledge and politics in general. It is a
relationship that strikes at the heart of this study for the mass media’s influence in developing
moral positions entails an epistemological question about the foundations of ethical knowledge
in general. For a theory of atrocity grounded in vision, knowledge is paramount. It extends the
breadth of moral perception and dramatically shapes our ability to render moral judgment.
Having established this connection to knowledge as transmitted via the mass media, I then
review the two aforementioned theories before closing with some thoughts on the construction of
atrocity.

Knowledge and Politics
The intimate but uneasy relationship of knowledge and politics has its roots in the very
origins of Western political philosophy. It troubled Plato, who dreamed of escaping the cave of
illusions and attaining objective truth, distinct from the sophistry and base opinion he viewed as
so destructive. In the Gorgias, Plato contrasts the form of dialogue—the proper form for
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philosophical endeavor—against mere rhetoric, the tool of the politician and demagogue.258 The
former aspires to true knowledge while the latter is content with opinion. No worthy political
order can last long on such an unstable foundation as opinion, which leave it vulnerable to the
petty conflicts of political opportunists or else the unpredictable vagaries of popular whim.
Though he eschewed his teacher’s theory of the forms, Aristotle felt that because the masses
were too busy toiling for a living, they were unable to spend the time necessary to develop
knowledge of politics and thus had no business participating in properly political activity as full
citizens. Neither of the ancient masters had any love for democracy in its classical form, but the
question of knowledge was as central to this disdain as it was to the wider implications of their
respective political philosophies.
Plato’s metaphysics placed knowledge beyond the realm of human experience. Only
those with a talent for obtaining insight into the eternal forms stood even a slight chance. For the
vast majority of humanity, true knowledge lies forever out of reach. The influence of this notion
on early Christian theology was profound, with divine Providence easily supplanting the eternal
forms as the wellspring of truth. Later political philosophers brought the question of knowledge
back to earth from its extra-terrestrial abodes in Platonic and Neo-Platonic accounts. With more
or less forcefulness and for rather different reasons, both Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò
Machiavelli rejected the unquestioned authority of the church and its monopoly on virtue. In a
move that would have appalled Plato, they instead reduced political knowledge to a kind of
practical know-how. Political knowledge was true only insofar as it was demonstrably
effective—whether in the power of a Leviathan-state to enforce a legal system or else in the
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readiness of a Prince to get his hands dirty and maintain a grip on power. In De Cive, Hobbes
insists upon a tension between scientific reason and rhetorical “eloquence”259 in a way that
recalls Plato’s banishing of the poets from the Republic to prevent the misguided manipulation
of emotion through the arts.260 For Hobbes, reason constitutes disinterested and logical inquiry,
while eloquence seeks to persuade on the force of the speaker’s personal charms, though he does
suggest in his conclusion to Leviathan that the apparent opposition may be reconciled:
[I]n all deliberations, and in all pleadings, the faculty of solid reasoning is necessary …
[Y]et if there be not powerfull eloquence, which procureth attention and consent, the
effect of reason will be little. But these are contrary faculties; the former being grounded
upon principles of truth; the other upon opinions already received, true, or false; and
upon the passions and interests of men, which are different and mutable.261
Thus, Hobbes insists that any truthful insight gained through the application of scientific rigor,
whether in politics or in other spheres, is likely to fall upon deaf ears without eloquent
mediation.262
Machiavelli was less committed to scientific or metaphysical truth as a political end; in
relation to the interests of power, truth was subordinate. Fortune commands much in the fate of
men, but a Prince well-prepared with the knowledge of great men will be able to adapt to shifting
tides. A Machiavellian theory of knowledge begins and ends with the preservation of power:
But as to a prince’s mental activity, he ought to read history and give attention therein to
the actions of great men, observe how they have conducted themselves in wartime, study
the causes of their victories and defeats so that he can avoid the second and imitate the
first. Above all he acts as some excellent men in the past have done: they have chosen to
imitate some predecessor who has been praised and honored, and have constantly
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kept his deeds and actions before them. So it is said that Alexander the Great imitated
Achilles; Caesar, Alexander; Scipio, Cyrus.263
Machiavelli is totally unconcerned with the knowledge of the masses. If they possessed any great
potential, it would surely manifest as practical political power. If not, they remain among the
mindless hordes, relevant to the world of politics only insofar as they can be manipulated for or
against a cause. Certainly, the Prince should not be constrained by a frivolous allegiance to the
truth. Insofar as it aligns with higher objectives, truth may often be a prudent ally. When the
opposite is true, however, lying becomes a useful recourse. “And if, to be sure,” Machiavelli
writes, “sometimes you need to conceal a fact with words, do it in such a way that it does not
become known or, if it does become known, that you have a quick and ready defense.”264 We
will shortly return to the role of lying.
From Plato through modernity, one repeatedly encounters the belief that the masses are
little more than mindless drones, slaves to appetites over which they have little control, neither
willing nor capable of obtaining knowledge in any meaningful sense. This view undergirds the
distaste for democracy in the Western tradition from antiquity up to the bourgeois revolutions of
the 19th century. With the compelling exception of Jefferson, the founders of the United States
were not democrats in either philosophy or practice.265 Yet, the depth of philosophical debate
surrounding the Articles of Confederation and especially the counter-revolutionary instincts of
the Constitution propounded by its Federalist supporters, occurred at a level virtually
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unparalleled in history. Madison and Hamilton’s picture of humanity was strongly Hobbesian,
colored by a profound pessimism regarding humanity’s less appealing aspects. Even Jefferson
and Paine, the most radical among them, frequently invoked this dark side of humanity and
grudgingly felt it justified the establishment of government as a “necessary evil.”266 This much
has often been noted, but less attention is typically given to the role of political knowledge in the
founders’ vision. Madison’s view is representative of the founders’ general disdain for the
political sensibilities of common people when he writes in Federalist #49:
The reason of man, like man himself is timid and cautious, when left alone; and acquires
firmness and confidence, in proportion to the number with which it is associated. … In a
nation of philosophers, this consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the
laws, would be sufficiently inculcated by an enlightened reason. But a nation of
philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by
Plato.267
Knowledge in this view is reduced, once again, to mere opinion competing in a marketplace of
equally valid rivals. The founders certainly did not believe that knowledge had much relevance
to liberty, for which questions of truth posed a real threat. Rather, Madison’s embryonic theory
of pluralism located justice in a balance of competing political forces or “factions,” a view
memorably distilled in Federalist #51: “ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”268
In beginning with the individual and defining liberty strictly as the freedom to own
property and engage in trade, liberalism elided questions of truth. Whereas classic political
philosophy had hitherto praised order and social concord above all, liberalism transformed
discord into a pragmatic tool of governance. The common refrain that liberalism seeks a society
governed by the rule of law and not by the rule of men is, at root, a deeply pessimistic
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assessment of the possibility of political knowledge—or at least that attaining such knowledge
has any practical political influence—but it is a predictable outcome of nearly unbroken denial
spanning two millennia of a capacity for knowledge among the masses. Hamilton was likely the
only one of the founders who grasped the full implications of the 1789 Constitution, particularly
its displacement of truth onto the law.269 The Constitution’s creation of the judiciary and
especially its codification of economic matters all but guaranteed that questions of wealth and
inequality would be restricted to legal quarrels confined within carefully drawn boundaries. Law
became a substitute for the open-ended search for truth and if liberty was synonymous with the
freedom to own property, then political knowledge centrally became a matter of the law. Small
wonder why so many American statespersons past and present have been lawyers by profession
or why someone like Louis Hartz argued that the “law has flourished on the corpse of
philosophy, for the settlement of the ultimate moral question is the end of speculation upon it.”270
Whatever else may be the case, the Constitution was emphatically not born of democratic
intentions. As the historian Richard Hofstadter points out, quite the opposite was true. “It is
ironical,” he writes, “that the Constitution, which Americans venerate so deeply, is based on a
political theory that at one crucial point stands in direct antithesis to the mainstream of American
democratic faith.”
Modern American folklore assumes that democracy and liberty are all but identical, and
when democratic writers take the trouble to make the distinction, they usually assume
that democracy is necessary to liberty. But the Founding Fathers thought that the liberty
with which they were most concerned was menaced by democracy. In their minds liberty
was linked not to democracy but to property.271
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Moreover, the masses must be prevented from disturbing the order of affairs by remaining
passive observers, while the real decisions are handled by others. This instinct is aptly distilled
by John Jay’s well-known maxim: “Those who own the country ought to govern it.”272
Knowledge among the masses was largely irrelevant so long as it did not adversely weigh upon
state affairs—and many checks were implemented to guarantee as much.273
Liberalism has a strange relationship with political knowledge. It at once places no
demands upon the individual to acquire knowledge of any kind, and yet simultaneously
predicates a notion of consent upon a minimal foundation of political knowledge. The Italian
legal philosopher Norberto Bobbio points out that this expectation frequently crashes on the
rocks of political ignorance in really existing liberal democracies—ignorance brought about
through a failure of the education system. “[T]he most well-established democracies,” he writes,
“are impotent before the phenomenon of increasing political apathy.”274 Less optimistic critics
would argue that ignorance, at least on issues of political importance, is not an aberrant outcome
but rather deliberately built into the system as a structural constraint against popular power.
Nevertheless, public education has been a handmaiden to democratic reform throughout modern
history; activists and revolutionaries have frequently demanded its universal implementation as a
first step towards greater political freedom.275 Where such transitions have been later overturned
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as the result of a military coup or other intervention, universal education has usually been
abolished in short order.
For liberals and their enemies on the political right, education is presumed to open a door
to political agency. Yet the dearth of political knowledge in practice seems to all but guarantee a
demos less qualified to make important decisions. This realization seems to thrust the entire
democratic project into disarray by shaking its philosophical justification: that the people are not
only capable of ruling, but that popular rule is preferable to political alternatives. Witness the
periodic waves of pious concern on the part of intellectuals regarding the supposed “crisis of
democracy.”276 The proliferation of books on the purported inadequacy of voters’ political
knowledge has become something of a minor industry within the field of political science to the
point that the desirability of the universal franchise itself has come under scrutiny in more
pessimistic accounts.277
Political scientists continue to study the consequences for democratic politics stemming
from voter alienation in liberal democracies as well as widespread ignorance of the most
elementary issues in contemporary public affairs. The dilemma is this: liberalism in its existing
democratic form derives legitimacy from an abstract public, while the real flesh-and-blood
individuals that compose public remain, for the most part, isolated from the halls of power and
ignorant of much that occurs there. When the public is encouraged to participate (during
elections, for example), elites seek to influence public opinion with simplified and emotionally
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compelling cues rather than serious and considered discussion. “Race, ethnicity, and religion are
the simplest, most easily deployed,” writes Charles Arthur Willard. “They are usually mingled
with nationalism.”278 Nationalist ideology, particularly in its liberal variant, is a topic taken up in
the next chapter. For now, we turn to the mass media and its powerful role in defining violence
and atrocity.

Manufacturing Consent
With the rise of mass democracy and the gradual expansion of the franchise to all sectors
of the population, the relationship of knowledge to politics finally broke its privileged fetters and
took on a special importance. Politics ostensibly became the province of all and so efforts to
constrain, mold, and control knowledge necessarily expanded to include the new source of
liberal democratic legitimacy: the public.279 This newfound importance of an abstract public
gave birth to the field of public opinion and its concomitant, public relations.280
If the vagaries of public opinion could be harnessed or at least pushed in a certain
direction, guided toward predetermined conclusions, such a power would have far-reaching
implications in areas well beyond the traditional purview of practical politics. Some were
particularly quick in recognizing this potential. The so-called “father of public relations” Edward
Bernays was a nephew of Sigmund Freud and consciously applied his uncle’s work to
commercial endeavors. He famously employed cutting edge research in social psychology in his
work on generating desires through advertising.281 The use of psychology to generate consumer
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demand remains a hallmark of the advertising industry. But potential for the “manufacture of
consent,” was not limited to petty commercialism; Walter Lippmann felt it would revolutionize
politics:
The significant revolution of modern times is not industrial or economic or political, but
the revolution taking place in the art of creating consent among the governed. … Within
the life of the new generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become a selfconscious art and a regular organ of popular government. None of us begins to
understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge of
how to create consent will alter every political premise.282
If Edward Bernays is recognized as the father of PR, Lippmann is recognized as his political
counterpart in the development of public opinion as a field of study and analysis.
Lippmann felt democracy should take a backseat to liberalism. He was concerned with
what he saw as a misplaced faith in a “false conception of public opinion” and especially the
unwarranted optimism as to its democratic political function espoused by “apologists of
democracy.” In his view, the public was ignorant of political affairs and that correcting for the
inadequacy was both futile and unnecessary. “No progress,” he writes, “can be made toward this
unattainable ideal.”283 It was necessary instead to prod and push public opinion toward
objectives deemed necessary by a class of qualified experts and political technocrats. He felt the
only possible role that public opinion might play in American politics was the potential it
suggested as a mobilized force to deploy against demagogues and opportunists who sought to
overthrow American government. Lippmann’s view fits well with a procedural, shallow notion
of democracy, but cannot be reconciled with a deeper understanding that would emphasize
participation. Indeed, public participation is precisely what Lippmann hoped to avoid.
A false ideal of democracy can lead only to disillusionment and to meddlesome tyranny.
If democracy cannot direct affairs, then a philosophy that expects it to direct them will
282
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encourage the impossible; they will fail, but that will interfere outrageously with the
productive liberties of the individual. The public must be put in its place, so that it may
exercise its own powers, but no less and perhaps even more, so that each of us may live
free of the trampling and the roar of a bewildered herd.284
Liberals like Lippmann and Bernays liked to emphasize that public opinion was both fickle and
slow to change. It could occasionally be harnessed (in times of war for example) but was not
easily restrained once having served an instrumental purpose. In generating these impulses and
emotions among the masses, the media had developed what Lippmann called “a technic of
propaganda which was, until the totalitarian states put their minds to it, the most effective in all
history.”285
Any discussion of knowledge inevitably pivots on a question of authenticity and
ultimately of truth. Without delving too deeply into questions of epistemological curiosity, a
claim to knowledge is simultaneously a claim to truth. As Arendt argues, any such claim carries
with it a kind of violence; it insists upon itself, precluding debate, and thereby adopts an antipolitical stance.286 Unless we wish to disconnect political activity from the affairs of the world,
however, information is required. Before moving on to a discussion of two important theories of
the mass media, it is worth briefly considering the normative function of the mass media for
democratic practice.

Democracy and the Media
It is commonly observed that the mass media play a crucial role in a healthy democracy.
For a political system that places an emphasis on consent, the importance of accurate and wide-
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ranging knowledge is paramount. The essence of democracy is popular sovereignty. For the sake
of simplicity, we can say that the basis of democratic politics centers on popular power oriented
around a commitment to political equality and individual liberty; Thomas Christiano argues that
these ideals set a “minimal conception of democracy in modern societies.”287
For popular sovereignty to fulfill its promise, access to political knowledge is required.
Montesquieu complained that secrecy in power was anathema to liberty and Locke’s support for
press freedom grew out of his insistence on freedom of expression generally.288 The American
inheritors of this political philosophy, though skeptical of democracy, felt sufficiently passionate
about the matter to include special protection for the press in the first amendment to the
Constitution.289 Liberals generally ascribe to the mass media an informational as well as
watchdog function, a prerequisite to effective political agency. Yet empirical studies of media
and public opinion present a dilemma for democratic theory: again and again, research reveals
the public’s deep ignorance of political matters, an ignorance that produces unexpected political
outcomes. Gilens argues, for example, that political ignorance “leads many Americans to hold
political views different from those they would hold otherwise.”290
Several conclusions might stem from this realization, each of which is well-represented
in the social scientific literature. If we are to understand the normative function of the media, it is
worth briefly reviewing three broad conclusions. First, we may come to believe that democratic
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theory, with its insistence on popular rule, is completely misguided. That is to say, the blunt fact
of entrenched political ignorance may lead us to doubt the average person’s willingness or ability
to acquire information let alone process it. By extension, we might lose faith in the public’s
capacity for developing reasoned political positions and question democracy’s normative basis.
According to this view, the outcomes of democratic politics are essentially random, subject to
popular whim, and lacking a clear sense of public good. We can take virtually the whole of
Western political thought up until the Enlightenment as representative of this first conclusion.
A second, less pessimistic view might argue that while the vast majority of citizens do
keep their distance from formal politics, the opinions of informed elites filter through and make
all the difference when it comes to policy outcomes. In this view, democracies are actually
thinly-veiled oligarchies guided by an informed and vocal minority.
A third view argues that deep knowledge is unnecessary for the free development of
sophisticated political sensibilities. People may not be aware of a political issue in great depth
but they are nevertheless capable of forming reasoned political opinions through the use of a
heuristic method. Those dubbed “low-information voters” by Samuel Popkin appeal to friends or
family members whose opinions they respect or else look for a range of other informal clues,
which might also include a trusted news source. This third view allows us to retain some
confidence in the demos, ignorance notwithstanding.291 Yet all three of these conclusions take it
for granted that the news media successfully carry out their job. The possibility remains that the
news media do not provide accurate information or that the representation of reality they depict
is one structurally inclined to emphasize particular interests while deemphasizing or ignoring
others.
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Often the news may be accurate and fair, but may not reflect society’s real issues. …
What may be said to be “true” at any given time may be an arbitrary cultural construction
and an ideology, a systematic distortion of reality to protect the interests of the
powerful.292
If this is the case, then one cannot foreclose the possibility that popular ignorance or incomplete
knowledge on certain issues is itself a byproduct of the media system.
Media scholars frequently discuss three broad methods by which the mass media
influence the interpretation of information by their audiences: framing, agenda setting, and
priming.293 Framing describes the media’s presentation of an event, i.e. how its form, content,
and general character might exert an influence on the interpretation of the event in question.
Which cues are established? Which experts are called in to comment? How are conflicts
presented? What terminology is presumed to apply? Are there implicit value judgments
pertaining to a “good” or “bad” actor in the story? Framing undermines the argument that
journalists can ever really attain objectivity. Rather, it suggests that everything from the
organization of a story’s presentation to the connotations and vocabulary invoked to discuss
certain ideas invariably presents an implicit perspective.294
The second power, agenda setting, simply acknowledges that even if the media do not tell
the public what to think, they do tell us what to think about. Gatekeepers within the news media
ultimately decide which stories are newsworthy and which are not. Moreover, they establish a
hierarchy among stories from the headlines on down. These decisions are reinforced within the
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hierarchy of media institutions themselves, so that smaller newspapers look to respected dailies
like the New York Times and Washington Post for cues on what we should be reading about.
Finally, priming refers to the method by which the media promote interest in a particular
subject via ancillary stories that provide tools for interpretation of later coverage. For example,
in media coverage leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, the Fox news
network was criticized for repeatedly showing images of the destruction from the 9/11 terror
attacks just prior to coverage of the impending war. Some argued that such a pairing “primed”
audiences to draw a spurious connections between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, thereby
facilitating the manufacture of consent for the invasion.295 Another example of priming might
include stories about advanced weapons technology. Such coverage would seem to glamorize, or
at least normalize, military culture by “priming” audiences to admire American military
endeavors. Taken together, these three functions offer insight into how the public responds to the
news media and how the media exert control over not only of what is considered important, but
also over the parameters of the discussion.
There is a great deal more that could be said about news reception, but for now we must
shift to an analysis of news content. How are news stories chosen for coverage? The question
takes on a special moral urgency when the stories involve violence and atrocity. Indeed, the very
notion of atrocity relies on media representations of violence along a spectrum of “good” and
“bad.” The following sub-sections look at two theories of the mass media, and though they reach
quite different conclusions about the political options available to us, each offers insight into the
process by which the news comes to be news and hence how violence comes to be atrocity.
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The Propaganda Model
Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman offer a compelling account of the mass media in
their book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media.296 They present a
Propaganda Model (PM) of the media which postulates and explores five filters through which
media content is judged “fit to print”—as the New York Times puts it in the well-known tagline.
They argue that the media are instruments of power used to “mobilize support for the special
interests that dominate the state and private activity.”297 As the authors insist, theirs is a “guided
free market” analysis of the media, i.e. one that looks at the institutional and structural influence
on media content within capitalist democracies. They argue that class interests have “multilevel
effects on mass-media interests and choices,”298 which encourage a perspective of the world
heavily informed by these constraints. According to their argument, media bias does not fall
comfortably into the simple liberal/conservative dichotomy around which so much in American
politics revolves. Instead, their depiction of world events tends to reflect the interests of capital
and of the state. The five filters of which they write are:
(1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the
dominant mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass
media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by government, business,
and “experts” funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (4)
“flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) “anti-communism” as a national
religion and control mechanism.299
The first filter emphasizes the consequences stemming from the considerable influence of large
private companies over media content and the degree to which they share common interests with
other sources of elite power. “The dominant media,” they write, “are quite large businesses; they
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are controlled by very wealthy people or by managers who are subject to sharp constraints by
owners and other profit-oriented forces; and they are closely interlocked, and have important
common interests, with other major corporations, banks, and government.”300 With the
deregulation of media ownership restrictions in the United States since the 1980s, this
phenomenon has become even more sharp; 90% of all media is controlled by six companies.301
The second filter acknowledges the influence coming from the profit-seeking behavior in
which most media ventures need to engage in order to maintain basic economic viability. For
much of the mass media, this means selling audiences to advertisers and providing content that
will not disrupt this interchange. Chomsky and Herman predict that advertisers will generally
want “to avoid programs with serious complexities and disturbing controversies that interfere
with the ‘buying mood.’”302 In practice, this implies a good deal of indirect private power over
the media. Advertisers are unlikely to sanction stories critical of corporate practices “such as the
problem of environmental degradation, the workings of the military-industrial complex, or
corporate support of and benefits from Third World tyrannies.”303
The third filter underscores the symbiotic relationship between formal political power
and the media elite. Politicians and their various agencies ingratiate themselves to the media by
facilitating the production of media content. They provide press releases, grant access,
orchestrate photo opportunities, control leaks, etc. Likewise, a critical or oppositional perspective
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on the media’s part risks being met with a denial of access.304 So the media rely, to a great
extent, on the very sources of which we expect them to express a healthy dose of skepticism.
Because of their services, continuous contact on the beat, and mutual dependency, the
powerful can use personal relationships, threats, and rewards to further influence and
coerce the media. The media may feel obligated to carry extremely dubious stories and
mute criticism in order not to offend their sources and disturb a close relationship. It is
very difficult to call authorities on whom one depends for daily news liars, even if they
tell whoppers. Critical sources may be avoided not only because of their lesser
availability and higher cost of establishing credibility, but also because the primary
sources may be offended and may even threaten the media using them.305
The fourth filter, “flak,” refers to the pressure brought to bear on the mass media by dominant
elites when reporting deviates from accepted standards. As Chomsky and Herman describe it,
this encourages self-censorship as media organizations learn which stories are likely to draw the
ire of powerful interests. This filter usually manifests in decisions about which stories not to
print in anticipation of the backlash that might result from news that unsettles widely held views.
Since the end of the Cold War, the final filter (anti-communism) seems a bit dated, but
not if we simply think of it as “the dominant ideology,” as Klaehn suggests.306 In this way, the
filter refers to the readiness of mass media organizations to produce content that emphasizes the
moral correctness of state actions in contrast to the moral degradation of official enemies. This
filter serves to normalize the status quo, to discourage ideologies that would challenge its
hegemony, and mobilize the public in opposition to tangible threats to this objective. During the
Cold War, this filter had a much clearer political division on which to focus its attention; in the
United States, the filter is discernable in the media’s targeting enemy or quasi-enemy states like
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Iran for negative coverage with more frequency than for official ally states like Saudi Arabia.
The former explicitly rejects American global hegemony, the latter is a close regional ally.
Each of these filters interacts with the others, though the complexities such interaction
might produce is not probed very deeply in their book. Chomsky and Herman are not particularly
interested in showing how media content influences public opinion and action, but they take this
for granted. Indeed, it is a reasonable assumption given the ample evidence confirming it.

Functional Differentiation
Though he produced some 60 books and 400 articles, the German social theorist Niklas
Luhmann does not enjoy quite the same reputation in the United States that he does in Europe.
Much of the reputational imbalance is explained by the theoretical disputes within the field of
sociology that divide the American and European professions. Luhmann is best known for his
attack on Parsonian sociology through the development of social systems theory and his esoteric
application of these ideas to religion, art, politics, economics—and the mass media. As new
translations of his work have become available in recent years, Luhmann’s ideas have found a
new audience, securing his legacy as a remarkably insightful thinker. Here, I wish to give a brief
overview of Luhmann’s social systems theory as it applies to his work on the mass media
specifically. I argue that while his work complements Chomksy and Herman’s in important
ways, he downplays the importance of the media’s influence on popular views regarding the
differentiated reality he describes so well. Luhmann’s work explains a great deal about the
internal operational logic of the mass media, understood as a self-contained or autopoietic social
system, but it does little to address the urgent normative concerns over accuracy when it comes
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to the substance of the news content it generates. Luhmann, who denies the existence of public
opinion and the desirability of meaningful democracy, would likely agree.
In short, social systems theory is an inadequate framework because the premises upon
which it is based are so deeply pessimistic about the possibility of substantial political change.
Luhmann appears to adopt a troubling apathy with regard to reality that verges on extreme
relativism. The consequences in untethering his theory so completely from events on the ground
leads him to posit less agency than even his post-modern counterparts might ascribe to the
individual subject. Ultimately, the consequences of his stance for a theory of atrocity, insofar as
he denies the possibility of affirmative political action typically implied by labelling an act of
violence atrocious, are incalculable and dangerous.
Though he developed social systems theory as a response to Talcott Parsons’s belief that
social systems interact, the “radical anti-humanism” of Luhmann’s work poses challenges
elsewhere. In particular, social systems theory pushes against the Marxist theory of society,
which Luhmann felt overly emphasizes the role of economics and thereby reduces the whole
(society) to one of its parts (the economic system).307 Against Parsons and Marx, Luhmann
argues that social systems are “closed” to external influence from other systems, though
occasional “irritation” may generate an illusion of the opposite. Social systems are defined by
autopoiesis, a biological term we can simplify for the sake of brevity to mean something like an
internal self-operating logic which produces a result external to itself. Like a single-celled
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organism, autopoiesis implies that social systems reproduce themselves by “us[ing] their own
output as input.”308
According to this view, economics is one among many social systems that do not interact
and, by extension, cannot exert dominance one over the other. Non-interaction and nondomination are central to Luhmann’s theory. Economics is as readily capable of influencing
politics as vice versa. Likewise, the mass media may influence politics but the reverse is also
true—and the structural differentiation between the systems prevents undue influence or
dominance that would result in qualitative change. In other words, the mass media (a distinct and
self-contained social system) is neither above nor below politics (another social system). All
social systems coexist on equal footing. There is, at most, occasional overlapping of phenomena
between systems.
If we reduce Luhmann’s social theory to its barest essentials, I think the following
summary is fair: nearly all contemporary political and social theorists are living in the past,
insofar as they draw on the humanist heritage of the Western political tradition. Whereas premodern society (Luhmann has feudalism in mind) was once “stratified” along hierarchical lines,
modern society has since evolved and is now defined by “functional differentiation” between
highly complex social systems and a concomitant decentering of power. In Luhmann’s view, a
dogmatic anthropocentrism pervades Western political thought from Plato through the
Enlightenment and is fundamentally ill-suited to explain a “society without top and without
centre; a society that evolves but cannot control itself.”309 Though Luhmann’s defenders insist
that his theory was primarily diagnostic and not prescriptive, there are clear normative tenets
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embedded within his political philosophy, namely the futility of human agency in seeking to
change the political system.
We have to come to terms, once and for all, with a society without human happiness and,
of course, without taste, without solidarity, without similarity of living conditions. It
makes no sense to insist on these aspirations, to revitalize or to supplement the list by
renewing old names such as civil society or community. This can only mean dreaming up
new utopias and generating new disappointments in the narrow span of political
possibilities. These desirabilities serve as a central phantom that seems to guarantee the
unity of the system. But one cannot introduce the unity of the system into the system. We
may well recognize the hardships and the injustice of stratification, but this is no longer
the main problem of society. For its scheme of difference and identity is no longer
framed by stratificatory (or hierarchical) differentiation. Stratification would mean that
we could know the addresses of influential people and the ropes, and that we would be
able to change the structure of society by appealing to reason, by critique, by reforming
institutions, or by revolution. But this has become more than doubtful.310
Whether from the political right or left, traditionally conceived, efforts to influence politics are
inevitably frustrated or accommodated, leaving the systemic core intact. This rather bleak
assessment forms the background against which we must judge Luhmann’s explanation of
knowledge generation and its political context via the mass media.
For Luhmann, actually-existing democracy is necessarily symbolic because there is no
such thing as “the people.” Even if there were, this social construct would have no bearing on the
political system, which operates as a distinct social system according to the “functional
differentiation” Luhmann posits. Echoing Brecht’s satirical remark, Luhmann writes, “As in the
18th century, the people is only a construct by which political theory accomplishes closure. Or
put differently: Who would notice it if there would be no people at all?”311
Through the lens of social systems theory, politics occurs with or without the input of an
electorate, which is really more of an audience. Though people obviously do vote, the ones who
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exercise meaningful control over policies are politicians—and it is likewise politicians who
ultimately decide whether to remain faithful to the majority or not. Moreover, even politicians
are limited in the scope of their actions, which remain inevitably confined to the autopoietic
system in which they embedded. Politics may exert limited influence on the mass media (e.g.
issuing broadcast licenses, regulating content), but the mass media also influence politics (e.g.
giving political candidates airtime, exposing political scandals) and the same can be said of all
social systems, including the economy.

Beyond Distortion
In contrast to the other social systems explored in Luhmann’s work (religion, art, law,
etc.), the mass media constitute a comparatively new system and the implications of its
technological expansion continue to manifest themselves. Luhmann writes that the mass media
“includes all those institutions of society which make use of copying technologies to disseminate
communication.”312 By communication, Luhmann has in mind a one-way process only:
information flowing from a source to a receiver. To count as mass media communications, he
insists that “no interaction among those co-present can take place between sender and
receivers.”313 Luhmann’s definition clearly does not make room for social media, which has
become ubiquitous since his death, nor does it consider the related rise of so-called “fake news,”
a contemporary variant of yellow journalism.314 With its emphasis on interaction between users,
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the emergence of Web 2.0 and social media in general has dismantled the traditional wall
between news producers and news consumers. Still, for Luhmann, the traditional media content
we consume is generated beyond us and is characterized by no further interaction. All closed
systems are governed by a specific code, a simple binary that governs the internal logic of the
system. Without a code, Luhmann argues, a social system would be unable to distinguish its own
reality from that of its immediate environment; it would be unable to attain closure and systemic
differentiation. According to Luhmann, the news media’s code is information/noninformation.315 Information is that which is “known to be known about.”316 Non-information is
anything that is not developed into a news story and neither printed nor broadcast.
Luhmann points out an apparent paradox concerning the acceptance of the mass media by
the public. On the one hand, the public is deeply skeptical over the veracity of content and there
exist widespread suspicions that elements of a news story are being intentionally left out, spun,
or otherwise distorted. Indeed, a recent poll suggests that at least 60% of Americans claim not to
trust the media “very much” or “at all.”317 On the other hand, the public is also reliant upon the
media for a picture of reality, however limited, without which they would have little notion.
Though Luhmann seeks to explain the behavior and function of all forms of mass media, it is his
discussion of the news media that detains us here. Though he readily concedes the media play a
powerful role in reproducing social norms, Luhmann is completely unconcerned with the
accuracy of the media’s content. As he writes, “The question is not: how do the mass media
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distort reality through the manner of their representation?” Such a question, he claims,
“presuppose[s] an ontological, available, objectively accessible reality that can be known without
resort to construction.”318
Instead of asking if the mass media is faithfully representing an objective reality, the very
possibility of which he finds absurd, Luhmann seeks to understand what kind of reality the
media creates. To this end, he argues that the following “selectors” play a role in determining
news media content:319 (1) surprise, unexpected breaks from an accepted state of normalcy; (2)
conflict on issues that lend themselves to easily identifiable positions of opposition; (3) an
obsession with quantities, numbers, and statistics for their own sake; (4) issues of local
relevance, which tend to more easily gain newsworthy status; (5) norm violations, legal as well
as moral; (6) norm violations accompanied by moral judgments; (7) an emphasis on individual
actors and cause-effect relationships; (8) topicality and the creation of identifiable news subjects
with set discursive parameters; (9) the expression of opinions and commentary by figures
deemed newsworthy; (10) and finally, a recursive interaction of each of the foregoing selectors.
It is not my purpose here to assess each of the selectors Luhmann identifies. Instead, it is
primarily those that deal with the media’s norm-setting and moral functions that demand
attention because they speak directly to the classification of violence as atrocious—or not.

Mediated Realities
As Chomsky and Herman’s book was published before Luhmann’s own work on the
media, one wonders what he might have made of the propaganda model. Chomsky and Herman
cannot easily be ignored by Luhmannians who simply deny the possibility that the economy, as
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one self-contained social system, can ever exert influence over another, the mass media. While
there is no evidence that Luhmann himself was familiar with Manufacturing Consent or the
propaganda model, his references to theories of the media that seek to root out “distortion” and
“manipulation” suggest that he was at least minimally familiar with the broad currents of
nominally Marxist media analysis when he made his own limited foray into the field.
Unfortunately—and Luhmann is not quite as guilty of this as his followers—his characterization
of a theoretical approach that imputes the manipulation of news content to individuals is a straw
man argument insofar as the characterization is intended to include the propaganda model.
Hans-Georg Moeller, a scholar who has done a great deal to make Luhmann accessible to
political theorists, challenges the propaganda model on Luhmannian grounds. He argues that
Chomsky and Herman reduce media analysis “to the ethical errors of some certain human
beings.”320 Perhaps there is some facile research that focuses on the role of sinister individuals
within the media organizations themselves, conniving puppet-masters pulling the wool over our
collective eyes, but this approach has absolutely nothing to do with the propaganda model.
Though Moeller describes Manufacturing Consent as an “exemplary” study, he incorrectly
characterizes the argument presented there as one dwelling on the manipulation of media content
“by more or less evil forces.”321 Social systems theory, Moeller argues, “tries to go further [than
the propaganda model and theories like it] by attempting to explain the phenomena they describe
with concepts that go beyond ‘simple’ one-way manipulation.”322 Luhmann may or may not
succeed in this, but Moeller’s argument is predicated entirely on a mischaracterization of the
propaganda model, which does not impute responsibility to individual actors, evil or otherwise.
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As Chomsky himself explains, “[T]his is not a theory of … evil people. It is a study of the
institutional structure of the media system which has almost nothing to do with the individuals
who are in it.”323
The fact that corporations, in their usual behavior—say General Motors—try to
maximize profit, is not a criticism of the C.E.O. of General Motors. It’s a comment about
the institutions and the way they function and in fact the legal system, even the legal
system in which they function, also the market system. So there’s absolutely nothing to
do with evil individuals. Change the names, it will come out the same. It’s an institutional
critique.324
The point is apparently lost on Moeller, who implies that Chomsky and Herman are engaged in
the scholarly equivalent of conspiracy theory.
Moeller’s attack does not end there. He further insists that Chomsky and Herman cling
misguidedly to an objective reality that could be revealed if only there was a way to stop the
manipulation.
According to this theory pattern, we would be presented with the real view of reality if
only we could get rid of these evil manipulators. If we had truly democratic and liberated
mass media, manipulation would disappear, and only then would we be able to finally see
the world as it is.325
In fact, Chomsky and Herman concede that the media generate a version of reality—one that
tends to reflect the interests of political and economic elites and not the interests of workers or
marginalized populations, for example.
Despite what Moeller thinks Luhmann would challenge in the propaganda model, the
argument is quite agnostic on the issue of pure objective reality. Nowhere do Chomsky and
Herman claim the representation of media reality is mere illusion. Rather than an indictment of
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the media’s ability to represent an accurate reality, their critique centers on coverage i.e. the
prioritization of some issues above others. To characterize the propaganda model as doggedly
obsessed with “the real view of reality” is not only false, but the assumptions upon which it rests
would seem to undermine the foundational premises of virtually all scholarship. Luhmann
certainly argues that the entire history of Western political and social philosophy is misguided in
its basic humanist assumptions, but Moeller’s Luhmann seems to detach the question of reality
entirely from any concern with accuracy.
The question of reality leads Luhmann to adopt some unsettling positions which should
become apparent by way of contrast. One can only imagine how differently Chomsky and
Herman might predict the reporting on a particular matter in contrast with Luhmann. Take the
recent bombing of a hospital by American forces in Afghanistan that killed at least 30 people and
injured at least as many. The PM might plausibly predict that American press coverage would
characterize the incident as unfortunate but accidental and certainly not intentional.
Investigations will likely be supported by the liberal intelligentsia as a means of demonstrating
“American values” and ensuring that war is guided by the rule of law. It might further predict
that while the United States has bombed hospitals in the past, this case is more newsworthy
because it killed a large number of well-connected Europeans working for a respected nongovernmental organization, Médecins Sans Frontières.
Finally, headlines covering the bombing will tend to obscure U.S. culpability and the
matter will probably fall more quickly out of the headlines than similar forms of violence
committed by official enemies.326 “A propaganda system,” Chomsky and Herman argue, “will
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consistently portray people abused in enemy states as worthy victims, whereas those treated with
equal or greater severity by its own government or clients will be unworthy.”327 In short, the
propaganda model predicts that the mass media will set the discursive parameters within which
the violence in question may be discussed in the mainstream and whether it is to be tolerated,
praised, or condemned. The normative goals or at least the potential challenges that might be
raised to counter the deficiencies outlined in the PM are undetermined, though Chomsky and
Herman write optimistically of community media initiatives. Most importantly, they leave open
the possibility of challenging the mass media’s definition of acceptable and unacceptable
violence—the possibility for developing a moral compass free from the influence of elite
agendas.
With Luhmann, by contrast, there is no such possibility of intervention nor is there any
reason to think the media has any agenda besides self-reproduction. Certainly, it matters little to
his theory how the media report such an incident because the mass media social system has no
direct attachment to the events or indeed to other social systems. If the bombing does become
newsworthy “information” based on the rather arbitrary criteria Luhmann suggests, the
differentiated reality it portrays is a distinct phenomenon from the charred corpses on the ground
and should not be judged in terms of its accuracy/inaccuracy.
Even if one were able to claim that the news media grossly misrepresented the incident,
Luhmann insists that human actors are virtually powerless to do anything to influence the media
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or indeed any other social system. The very best effort human actors might be able to muster
would be to establish a rival media institution dedicated to challenging the prevailing narrative—
but it would become just one more reality among realities. Alternatively, they may take up the
issue within the political social system (to investigate the bombing for example), but it remains
to be seen if a change in the political system will result in real change on the ground. Because
social systems operate autopoietically, they cannot be steered by activists or by anyone else—
and it is moreover impossible to predict what the outcomes within one differentiated social
system will have on others in the future. Luhmann expresses his bleak conclusion in detached
diagnostic language, but as mentioned earlier, there are clear normative conclusions one can
draw from his theory, most immediately the idea that political activism is almost always futile.
Moeller’s final Luhmannian challenge suggests the propaganda model is flawed because
it “forgets about itself.”328 Luhmann, he argues, remains willfully conscious of his own
participation in the media system as well as the seemingly paradoxical reliance on the media
system for the very facts he uses to guide his analysis, while Chomsky and Herman do not.
“Unlike Chomsky [and Herman],” Moeller claims, “Luhmann does not want to ignore the fact
that his own observations must necessarily have a systemic ‘location.’”329 Yet Moeller is again
incorrect to suggest that Chomsky and Herman fail in this. They argue vociferously that the
propaganda model predicts a poor reception of their work. It then came as no surprise when it
was virtually ignored by mainstream scholars and left largely unreviewed in the professional
literature.330 So much for Moeller’s critique, which remains the only Luhmannian attack
launched against the propaganda model to my knowledge.
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Certainly the propaganda model has its limitations, but those pointed out by Moeller are
not among them.331 In contrast to Moeller’s Luhmannian critique of the propaganda model, there
are major weaknesses and inconsistencies in Luhmann’s analysis of the media. Luhmann at once
argues that the media play a role in developing social norms and attitudes, yet denies that
anything called “public opinion” exists. He also fails to explain the process by which some
norms and attitudes are advanced in the media while others are not. This may be politically
unproblematic so long as the issues in question concern nothing more serious than frivolous
coverage of sports and celebrity news for instance. But when it concerns violence or other
matters of material consequence, Luhmann’s assessment is paralyzing at best and pathological at
worst.
So Moeller is essentially correct to argue that the propaganda model is theoretically
inimical to social systems theory. Though he vastly overstates the case in calling the propaganda
model a theory of “liberation”—i.e. one that suffers from “the Old European illusion that the
mass media (and politics) are not a communication system but actually ‘made’ by people and
that they could be ‘democratic’”332—he is nevertheless correct to point out that Chomsky and
Herman’s theory retains a sense of political agency that Luhmann does not. But the most
difficult obstacle to overcome in this regard has to do with Luhmann’s rather arbitrary
designation of the media system as a social system functionally differentiated from all others
and, by extension, subordinate to no objectives beyond its own.
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Even if one were willing to acknowledge Luhmann’s insight into social systems theory
generally, we might still disagree with his designation of the media as a system on par with all
others. To put it bluntly, it is simply not plausible that the media are free to influence capitalism
to the degree that capitalism is in a position influence the media—precisely because the media
institutions are themselves capitalist enterprises. Whereas Chomsky and Herman claim media
content is strongly informed by the structural constraints of capitalism, Luhmann argues that the
economic system is a separate social system and exerts just as much influence on the media as
the media exerts upon it. Luhmann’s insistence upon non-domination of one social system upon
others apparently makes little of the fact that modern media institution are themselves capitalist
enterprises. Using Luhmann’s own terminology against him, one might argue that the media’s
“code” is not information/non-information but profit/loss. If so, there is perhaps a strong
argument to be made elsewhere that Luhmann’s analysis could more accurately describe the
media as a sub-system of the economic social system, a form of business among other
businesses, and one that just happens to engage in matters of some political consequence.

Defining Atrocity
Moral judgment requires information. When information is mediated, we are
automatically talking about an experience quite different from witnessing an event firsthand. If,
as Sontag writes, “the very notion of atrocity … is associated with the expectation of
photographic evidence,” the mass media occupy a position of power not simply because the
images they broadcast are often assumed to speak for themselves, but because the media
organizations themselves determine precisely which images will be broadcast and which will
not. The power of the mass media is the power to define both the conditions of moral judgment
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as well as its object. Of the two theories of news media discussed above, Chomsky and
Herman’s is by far the more useful for scholars interested in predicting news content, including
how violence will be depicted and whether it will be depicted at all.
Given the connection between popular opinion and the mass media demonstrated by
empirical research, it is reasonable to assume this influence extends also to the public’s
acceptance or rejection of state violence.333 Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model predicts
that the victims of violence carried out by official enemies will be emphasized and generally
characterized by its unacceptable nature in the mass media. By contrast, the victims of violence
carried out by the media’s home country will either be downplayed or ignored altogether. While
the PM remains agnostic about the power of the people to initiate policy change, it predicts a
connection between the acceptance or rejection of certain forms of violence depending on the
actor perpetrating that violence. In short, the PM is strongly consonant with a theory of atrocity
based on vision.
By contrast, Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory of the mass media is explicitly
unconcerned with the depiction of reality. Whatever the merits some have found in his theory
applied elsewhere, it is simply implausible that the mass media, as a separate social system,
shares equal status in terms of mutual influence with the economic system. Because Chomsky
and Herman acknowledge that media institutions are themselves private companies constrained
by the structural incentives this status implies, they offer an account that is able to explain a great
deal more than Luhmann. By contrast, Luhmann denies the role of incentives originating in the
economic system as having any meaningful influence on media content, which he argues is
instead a closed and self-regulating system, guided by an internal logic.
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V. OVERLOOKING: Liberal-Nationalism and Invisible Violence
“[E]very one gives the title of barbarism to everything that is not in use in his own country.”
Michel de Montaigne

The foregoing chapters have addressed various facets of a theory of atrocity grounded in
moral vision. This chapter extends that discussion by looking at the shape violence takes in
liberal-democratic nation-states, given the presumption of a lower threshold of atrocity in such
societies. I argue that 1) nationalism’s default self-regard grants liberal-democratic nation-states
the benefit of the doubt when it comes to managing the interpretation of state violence because
the constitutive elements of nationalism in these societies are tied to the institutions of state
power; 2) nationalism tends to reduce liberal ideals to slogans which displace a meaningful sense
of responsibility for bad states of affairs. The outcome of the curious ideological synthesis of
liberal-nationalism is not necessarily less state violence, but rather violence of a kind that passes
undetected by large numbers of people. Moreover, if it is detected, the violence in question is
believed to be of a sort more humane than that of others, thereby averting the possibility of
crossing beyond the threshold of atrocity. Finally, 3) Adam Smith’s moral philosophy
emphasizes the impossibility of judging the moral content of one’s own actions and offers a
possible way out of the conundrum by invoking a hypothetical spectator—an idea considered
here in relation to the foregoing discussion of Murdoch and Levinas.

Mere Description
Upon entering office in 2009, US President Barack Obama pledged to release “a
substantial number” of photographs documenting the abuse of detainees that had taken place at
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Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison in the early years of the US-led occupation.334 Revelations of sexual
abuse, torture, rape, sodomy, and homicide at the prison only added fuel to the wider national
debate over the so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” adopted by the Bush
administration following the 9/11 attacks.335 As one of his first acts of office, Obama signed an
executive order banning some of the more extreme practices and vowed before Congress that the
“United States of America does not torture.”336 Notwithstanding the Bush administration’s
embrace of torture, the abuse at Abu Ghraib clearly went far beyond the practices approved by
the so-called torture memos and Obama was initially receptive to further investigation.337 At the
time he entered office, 279 photographs depicting the abuse at Abu Ghraib and other American
military prisons had already been made public, among them the iconic hooded figure. The exact
number of photographs yet to be released remains unclear but estimates run in excess of 2,100.
When the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) requested the release of 44 previously
unreleased photographs, the White House initially welcomed the action in the interest of
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transparency. Yet only a few months later the President abruptly reversed his position—no
further photographic evidence connected to the Abu Ghraib scandal or similar episodes of abuse
at other American prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan would be released. Moreover, the White
House shelved an effort by the Justice Department to pursue a criminal investigation into torture
under the Bush administration. According to the President, it was time to “move forward”;338 the
release of these photographs, he reasoned, would only serve to “inflame anti-American opinion
and … put our troops in greater danger.”339 In an attempt to allay concerns raised by this aboutface, Obama insisted that the photographs in question were “not particularly sensational.”340 This
was a very different tone from that of Major General Anthony Taguba, head of the 2004 military
investigation into the Abu Ghraib scandal. Taguba claimed to have personally viewed images
depicting “torture, abuse, rape and every indecency” against detainees in American custody.341
This came on the heels of 2007 interview with Seymour Hersh for the New Yorker magazine in
which Taguba claimed to have viewed “a video of a male American soldier in uniform
sodomizing a female detainee.”342 When pressed specifically on the question of rape, both the
Pentagon and White House offered a decidedly vague statement denying the very existence of
the photographs “in question.”343 While Major General Taguba continues to insist that rape
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occurred at Abu Ghraib, he agreed with the President that no further photographic evidence
should be released. In his judgment, “the mere description of these pictures is horrendous
enough. Take my word for it.”344
In a campaign spearheaded by the ACLU, transparency advocates have continued to push
for the release of all photographs. Congress voted for opacity in 2009, passing a statute granting
the Secretary of Defense the power to conceal images for up to three years if their release might
place American lives at risk. Erstwhile Secretary of Defense Robert Gates immediately invoked
this power to suppress all 2,000+ images and his successor Leon Panetta did the same in 2012.345
In March 2015, a federal judge from the U.S. District Court in Manhattan ordered the release of
the images in their entirety, prompting an immediate appeal from the Obama administration on
grounds of national security, which began oral argument in mid-January 2016. In February 2016,
the Pentagon released 198 photographs.346 Though most of the recently released images appear
fairly innocuous, they were not accompanied with captions or context, making it impossible to
know exactly what they depict.347
It is at first perplexing that Abu Ghraib specifically should have inspired the scandal it
did, given the scope of American violence in the immediate post-9/11 period. To be sure, the
abuse at Abu Ghraib is objectively upsetting. “Never before,” insisted the journalist Philip
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Gourevitch, “had such primal dungeon scenes been so baldly captured on camera,”348 but by the
time Obama entered office, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques by American
intelligence agencies was both well-documented and widely known. Waterboarding, a form of
torture dating to the Spanish Inquisition, had been adopted by CIA and used to interrogate terror
suspects at covert “black sites” around the globe. In addition to the overwhelming evidence
gathered by NGOs and journalists documenting patterns of routine abuse at American military
detention facilities, approximately 100 detainees have died in US custody, including 34
suspected or confirmed homicides and at least eight others who were literally “tortured to
death.”349
Since 2004, when Seymour Hersh broke the Abu Ghraib scandal in the pages of The New
Yorker, details have slowly continued to emerge. In late 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee
torture report revealed that waterboarding was used to a far greater extent than previously
thought and describes other disturbing techniques, including “rectal rehydration” or forced
feeding through the anus, an “horrific and humiliating procedure”350 more accurately described
as rape.351 Upon entering office, President Obama swept away some of the most egregious
practices implemented under George W. Bush and barred the CIA’s use of “black sites.”352 And
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while Americans have seemingly become much more tolerant of torture in the decade since the
scandal broke, it is Abu Ghraib and not the CIA’s more damning record that remains the
preeminent example of American abuse during this dark chapter of American history.353 Why?
The primary distinction between Abu Ghraib and the CIA interrogation program quite
clearly has to do with official sanction and not the severity abuse. While the mistreatment of
detainees depicted in the Abu Ghraib photographs so far released is unquestionably despicable, it
nevertheless remains arguably less severe than many of the techniques approved for CIA use,
which resulted in numerous deaths. Several of the Abu Ghraib photographs depict American
military personnel posing in crude attempts at humor with the dead body of Manadel el-Jamadi
but his death, subsequently ruled a homicide by military investigators, occurred in CIA
custody.354 Because of this and other detainee deaths as well as the conspicuous parallels to
officially-sanctioned practices, the Bush administration appeared conflicted in its response to
Abu Ghraib. When President Bush commented at all on the images’ content, he denied that
anything depicted there amounted to torture and instead emphasized vocabulary like “abuse” or
“humiliation.”355 Whatever he called it, the President was slow to condemn the abuse and when
he did, it was expressed mainly as a security concern, i.e. it stoked the flames of anti-
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Americanism, put soldiers’ lives at greater risk, and tarnished the nation’s reputation. Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, testifying before Congress, said “There are a lot more photographs
and videos that exist. … If these are released to the public, obviously, it’s going to make matters
worse.”356 This approach suggests that the images themselves were more of a problem for the
government than the practices they recorded. To date, the only Americans held liable for charges
relating to torture are eleven low-level soldiers involved in the abuse at Abu Ghraib prison.357
Though Human Rights Watch and other groups argue that criminal charges should be
brought against those directly implicated in the Bush administration’s wider enhanced
interrogation techniques, including “assault, sexual abuse, war crimes and murder, as well as
conspiracy to commit some of these crimes,”358 no prosecution has ever been brought, nor do
such prosecutions appear likely. Ken Davis, a former military police officer whose early
complaints about the abuse at Abu Ghraib to his commanding officers were ignored, expresses
resentment over this fact in Rory Kennedy’s award-winning documentary, Ghosts of Abu
Ghraib:
Has anybody been brought to trial for [Manadel el-Jamadi’s death]? No, but [Charles]
Graner and Sabrina [Harman] were charged with those pictures. That to me is ridiculous.
‘We won’t charge the murderer, even though it’s ruled a homicide, but we’ll charge you
for taking pictures and exposing that a murder happened here.’ … [Charles] Graner and
the 372nd MP company embarrassed the army. With pictures. And the army got them
back.359
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Abu Ghraib was a problem mainly because the photographs existed at all. While the details of
officially-sanctioned CIA interrogation practices were rendered benign through the use of sterile
bureaucratic prose, pictures shock even when the violence they depict is objectively less severe.
Modern torturers have dispensed with crude methods, and have instead devised
techniques that remain either palatable or invisible to the general public. The political scientist
Darius Rejali calls these forms of torture “clean” (as opposed to “scarring”). While “clean”
techniques do cause immense physical suffering and often irreversible psychological damage,
they are perceived as less physically violent because they leave no visible scars.360 In print,
“forced standing” reads like a minor inconvenience; “sensory deprivation” like a game of hideand-seek; “rough handling” like a fraternal wrestling match; “stress positions” like a particularly
intense session of yoga. This language intentionally masks the trauma such techniques actually
inflict. The CIA was extremely careful to avoid any perception of excess, even as it engaged in
severe forms of physical and psychological abuse. By contrast, the Abu Ghraib pictures made
visible forms of abuse of an especially sexual nature (enforced nudity, simulated fellatio,
touching of genitals, bestiality, etc.) that push strongly against social norms and thereby violate
what I have called in earlier chapters a threshold of atrocity.
The truly transgressive nature of the Abu Ghraib scandal then has less to do with the
abuse it revealed than with the complications it posed and still poses for American national
identity and its constitutive myths. Jasbir Puar points out that the homosexual and
sadomasochistic content of the images evoked a special outrage because they challenged the
“multicultural hetero-normativity intrinsic to U.S. patriotism.”361
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It may well be that these responses [of outrage] by westerners reveal what we might
deem the worst form of torture—that is, sexual torture and humiliation rather than
extreme pain—more than any comprehension of the experiences of those tortured.362
Insecurities about sex, especially gay sex, say a great deal about where a threshold of atrocity is
likely to be located in the United States today and, by extension, which methods of violence
must absolutely be avoided if invisibility is the goal. Moreover, because sexual acts are imbued
with deep cultural fascination and “burdened with an excess of significance,”363 as Gayle Rubin
argues, they are subject to what she calls the “fallacy of misplaced scale.”364
Sexual violence generates a special revulsion in the hierarchy of imagined misdeeds, out of
proportion even with forms of abuse that result in severe physical pain. In the case of Abu
Ghraib, the revulsion was deepened by deviations from hetero-normative sexuality, including
homosexual, sadomasochistic, and bestial content.365 That these acts were performed by
members of the armed forces, a traditional bastion of patriotic sentiment and national reverence,
deepened the revulsion still further. Indeed, polls confirm that while Americans have grown
more supportive of torture in general, they are nevertheless roundly appalled by abuse of a
sexual nature.366
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As foregoing chapters have discussed at length, visibility is a central component to a
theory of atrocity and photography, a consummately visual medium, exerts tremendous
emotional power.367 In principle, the sexual abuse at Abu Ghraib was “clean” torture; the scars it
left were psychological, not physical. Were it not for the photographic record, the suffering and
humiliation conducted at Abu Ghraib would command much less power that it does. This is
perhaps why the allegations of rape at Abu Ghraib have been so underreported. No visual
evidence has yet come forward and without documented proof of torture, the inaccessibility of
pain proves a massive obstacle to moral vision.
“To have great pain,” Elaine Scarry writes, “is to have certainty; to hear that another
person has pain is to have doubt.”368 Because suffering is inherently subjective, the Murdochian
call to attention faces tremendous resistance when it comes to judging the suffering of another.
This point is also well-acknowledged by the practitioners of “clean” torture themselves, insofar
as their intention is to render torture invisible.
[T]hough there is ordinarily no language for pain, under the pressure of the desire to
eliminate pain, an at least fragmentary means of verbalization is available both to those
who are themselves in pain and to those who wish to speak on behalf of others. … [But]
this verbal sign is so inherently unstable that when not carefully controlled … it can have
different effects and can even be intentionally enlisted for the opposite purposes, invoked
not to coax pain into visibility but to push it into further invisibility, invoked not to assist
in the elimination of pain but to assist in its infliction …369
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Through its spectacular display of abuse—especially sexual abuse—Abu Ghraib made visible
that which was intended to remain invisible. By contrast, no photographic evidence has come
forward documenting the C.I.A.’s use of enhanced interrogation techniques and the video
evidence that once existed was deliberately destroyed by the agency.370 All we have are the
textual descriptions which, however detailed, inevitably fall short for the purposes of
Murdochian moral vision.
Images and video command a moral authority that “mere description,” as General Taguba
put it,” simply does not. Still, even if we had bundles of photographic evidence, it is doubtful
crude visibility alone would be enough to command Murdochian moral attention when the
perpetrator of violence is oneself. We must wade through other compelling factors that influence
and frame our moral vision, especially when considering that dramatically expanded sense of
self: the nation. Visibility takes us only part of the moral distance and, though cliché insists
otherwise, photographs never do speak for themselves. Nationalists typically cast aspersions on
evidence that would undermine their central dogmas. “To photographic corroboration of the
atrocities committed by one’s own side,” Susan Sontag writes, “the standard response is that the
pictures are a fabrication, that no such atrocity ever took place … or that yes, it happened and it
was the other side who did it, to themselves.”371
To these fraught explanations offered up by the nationalist, I would suggest another:
“yes, it happened—but ‘they’ do worse to ‘us.’” Reciprocation is often a moral crutch against
which all kinds of atrocity can be justified, when perceived as less barbaric than methods
employed by the enemy. Both sides in any war maim and murder. This much is acknowledged,
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but because “our” cause is perceived as just and our methods humane, no great introspection
follows from this insight. Yet when American soldiers are seen to have behaved in ways that
violate deeply felt social norms without evidence of reciprocation on the enemy’s behalf, a
threshold of atrocity approaches. With Abu Ghraib the state was eventually able to avoid passing
beyond such a threshold by arguing that the abuse that occurred there was a result of a few “bad
apples,” and did “not reflect,” as President Bush put it, “the nature of the American people.
That’s not the way we do things in America.”372 It might even be argued that adopting a
principled stance against the Abu Ghraib abuse and swiftly punishing those involved actually
served to reinforce American nationalism by emphasizing moral superiority a “nation of laws”
held in relation to its barbaric enemies. In this way, liberal-nationalism provides powerful
insulation against even the most damning evidence.

Biopower and Nationalism
Michael Foucault’s analysis of racism and biopower might shed some light on our
present task. His interest in racism stems from a more general concern with how war has
ostensibly come to be the preeminent paradigm of social organization. In his view, racism is a
product of biopower’s obsession with the health of populations vis-à-vis their sensitivity to
degenerate elements. That is, racism emerges in part as an instrumental tool of state power; as a
means to justify sovereign violence against anyone deemed not to belong. Foucault makes it
clear that his use of the term racism bears little in common with either “the ordinary racism that
takes the traditional form of mutual contempt or hatred between races” or “the racism that can be
seen as a sort of ideological operation that allows States, or a class, to displace the hostility that
372
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is directed toward [them] … onto a mythical adversary.”373 It is a use of the term “racism” that
transcends superficial biological distinctions because, to a large extent, society defines its
degenerates according to arbitrary criteria, which may or may not be dictated biologically.
Because of the expanded notion of racism he employs, Foucault’s conclusions lend themselves
easily to nationalism.
The crux of Foucault’s argument is that modern biopower optimizes life by regulating it
at the level of populations. Racism is the “precondition that makes killing acceptable”374 for the
benefit of racial health; it is “primarily a way of introducing a break in the domain of life that is
under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.”375 This “break” has
two functions: first, it creates clear hierarchies within a population between those who belong
and those who do not. Second, it establishes a positive relation between the eradication of bad,
undesirable, or degenerate elements and the welfare of the dominant population. For Foucault,
these functions operate as normalizing mechanisms to the extent that any deviation from
established norms of behavior is conceptualized in racist terms. Whereas the subjects of power
had formerly found themselves in constant, albeit suppressed, conflict with the sovereign, this
conflict now turns inward.376 At this point, biopower reveals its limits and state racism emerges,
i.e. “racism that society will direct against itself” in a process of “permanent purification.”377
Giorgio Agamben famously concludes from the foregoing analysis that the purifying
logic of modern society is inseparable from that which produced Auschwitz.378 While this may
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be true in a very general sense, I am not convinced we need to frame it quite so starkly. Instead, I
would simply observe that Foucault’s idiosyncratic analysis of racism resembles what is more
commonly recognized as a strand of conventional nationalism. The health and life in question is
of course that of national society. While sovereign authority had formerly expressed itself
through the right to take life or to let live, Foucault’s analysis of biopower introduced the
inverse: the right to make live and let die. In a nationalist context, deaths inflicted as a result of
national purity are mere side-effects, or as Puar observes, “a form of collateral damage in the
pursuit of life.”379 Nor must the project of enhancing national health necessarily take on an
explicitly aggressive form. It is usually enough to simply establish a binary of
inclusion/exclusion via the law, which, as Massad observes “enacts not identity but difference
tout court.”380
The national state then determines who is and who is not a member. It creates juridical
subjects and imposes legal categories of “us” and “them” to reinforce this distinction, which in
turn sets the basic conditions for the prosecution and justification of violence. “Wars,” Foucault
claims, “are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged
on behalf of the existence of everyone … It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and
race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be
killed.”381 For killing to remain palatable, i.e. within the bounds of acceptable violence, it must
be framed as a safeguard of the nation. Hence “the most murderous [states] are also, of necessity,
the most racist.”382 Degenerate lives become not only expendable but also necessary in their
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expendability. This relationship between one’s identity and the power of the state to uphold or to
deny that identity is the quintessential symptom of the modern nation-state—one that has a
profound influence on the perception of atrocity. As Butler writes, “certain lives are not
considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized; they fit no frame for the human, and their
dehumanization occurs first, at this level. This level then gives rise to a physical violence which
is already at work in the culture.”383 Yet while a proliferation of conventional violence may well
attend the emergence of biopower, how can we account for more extreme and shocking
manifestations?
The emphasis Foucault places on biopower, while fascinating, nevertheless leaves him
unable to account for incidences of state violence characterized by a desire to maximize
suffering, i.e. not simply to kill on the way to enhancing national health, but to kill for the sake of
killing and torture for the sake of torturing. Achille Mbembe offers a useful corrective here,
pushing Foucault’s insights in more fruitful directions by questioning if the notion of biopower is
“sufficient to account for the contemporary ways in which the political under the guise of war, or
resistance or of the fight against terror makes the murder of its enemy the primary objective?”384
Instead of understanding death as a hidden byproduct of biopower’s drive for life, Mbembe
places death in the foreground of his analysis. Invoking what he calls necropolitics, a slight twist
on Agamben’s “bare life,” he attempts to account for the creation of “death worlds” in which
“vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living
dead.”385
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Both biopolitics and necropolitics present totalizing visions of state violence. Each
explains the phenomenon in terms that conform to an overarching logic of either maximizing the
health of the nation or maximizing the suffering of enemies. Though Mbembe’s work is rather
more useful for considering the concept of atrocity insofar as it centralizes death, it nevertheless
remains a mystery why the creation of “death worlds” he posits would not in itself generate great
unease among large numbers of people. While the victim group is terrorized and oppressed, the
profound nature of the violence exacted upon them is likely to stir unease even among the
perpetrators unless it occurs in secret. Admittedly, neither Foucault nor Mbembe is particularly
concerned with how the members of a given society might themselves rationalize state violence.
While there is a tacit assumption in their work that, whatever its form, state violence is typically
undertaken quietly beyond the purview of public scrutiny, they do not explain why this should be
the case. Missing from their analyses is a clear understanding of the form responsibility for
violence and atrocity takes in nationalist societies.

Dispersing Responsibility
The ability to make sense of rampant inconsistencies and patent historical falsehoods is
arguably one of nationalism’s most powerful assets. This poses some challenges when it comes
to a philosophical approach to responsibility in a national context. Nationalism is in the first
place capable of generating the conditions of its acceptance among large numbers of people by
appealing to the kinds of self-glorifying conceits that frequently arise among groups of any size.
When hegemonic, nationalism is also able to frame the interpretation of past, present, and future
deeds insofar as they are perceived as collective efforts. This is true regardless of whether one
adheres to an instrumentalist view of nationalism, which claims the phenomenon arises as a
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cypher for manufacturing consent in the service of elite interests, or whether one believes
nationalism arises organically, according to aleatory and unpredictable reasons.386
Once it gains currency, nationalism reproduces itself according to a self-justifying
framework; it is a tautology at root, one that derives legitimation on the basis of its very
existence. For the purposes of this chapter, I shall adopt a broadly constructivist account of
nationalism. The nation is a social construct, an “imagined community” in Anderson’s
terminology.387 Gellner summarizes the scholarly consensus on the matter in his account:
Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though longdelayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing
cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates preexisting cultures: that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one.
Those who are its historical agents know not what they do, but that is another matter.388
Nationalism is the belief that a given nation must control political power in a territory uniquely
associated with it. Nationalism’s central political objective is to secure the congruity of state and
nation. The reasons for nationalism’s historical emergence do not concern me here, nor does any
one approach fundamentally alter the thrust of my argument. Finally, a constructivist account of
nationalism should not be taken to deny the phenomenon’s persistent emotional and political
relevance.
Nationalism, moreover, masks its origins and obscures the logical absurdities it
propounds as essential and eternal. A common example of this is found in the many strands of
386
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nationalism that fuse contemporary monotheistic practice with a romanticized history of
paganism. This assembling and reassembling of disparate pre-existing as well as fabricated
cultural elements means that nationalism “must be regarded as both construct and process.”389
As Gellner points out, nationalism’s “historical agents” have a rather different view on
the matter. Especially in countries populated by communities able to trace their biological
lineage several generations into the past, nationalism is easily perceived as eternal. An evidence
for this timelessness is easily bridged by fabricated histories of collective glories and suffering
stretching back to the dawn of time. In this way, the nation connects its contemporary adherents
to events long past. As Renan reminds us, national solidarity is facilitated by the capacity to
forget past divisions and rivalries between pre-national groups.390 Similarly, David Miller
describes the nation as “a community that, because it stretches back and forward across the
generations, is not one that the present generation can renounce.”391 Moreover, nations are
frequently described in decidedly corporeal terms, as biological organisms that possess a clear
past, present and future; a physical disposition that can be injured or become sick; a personality
with the capacity to take offense and hold grudges; a will; and other such characteristics.
Nationalism connects people to a project with ramifications well beyond their parochial
existences and offers every member of the nation the possibility of meaningful participation. In
most cases, this participation requires very little actual effort. Instead, individuals are able to
share in the vicarious deeds of their co-nationals through no greater connection than shared
national affiliation. “As a result, those who take their national belonging seriously can
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meaningfully say things like ‘we have been injured,’ ‘we won the war,’ ‘we lost our country,’
‘we gained our independence,’ ‘we made the desert bloom,’ or ‘we shall prevail sooner or
later.’”392 This collectivizing sentiment is what Anderson has in mind when he describes the
notion of “horizontal comradeship.”393 At the heart of this comradeship lies a vague notion of
responsibility.
Part of nationalism’s steady and wildly successful proliferation around the globe since
the French Revolution is the void it fills for a world no longer bound by the divine. In place of
religious immanence, nationalists take pride in sports victories, military heroics, scientific
discovery—all without having participated directly in the achievement of these glories. Yet the
eager acceptance of vicarious responsibility invariably flows in one direction. As Abdel-Nour
has pointed out, though nationalists are often willing to accept derivative responsibility for the
successes of their co-nationals, their enthusiasm for shared responsibility rapidly diminishes
when it comes to recognized misdeeds.394 National malfeasance must be ignored whenever
possible or else subjected to such interpretive contortions as to wedge it back firmly within the
boundaries of acceptable national behavior. Killing is wrong, but killing in defense of the eternal
patrie is not merely acceptable, but necessary and honorable.
It is with the unpalatable that this study is particularly concerned—the maimed, mangled,
and mortified bodies produced by states and so easily justified by nationalists. It requires no
marked creativity to discern the motives underlying the nationalist will to appropriate greatness.
Less comprehensible, however, is the ease with which nationalists are able to ignore or excuse
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morally abhorrent actions. Mass atrocities, when rendered visible, are nevertheless typically
obscured by characterizing the enemy as subhuman—as “animals walking about in human
form.”395 This mental process transforms what should be objectively understood as violations of
a basic moral prohibition against killing into instances of indifference or even collective pride.
Not merely killing, but inflicting suffering becomes a source of vicarious pride when undertaken
by our national brethren against the enemy. This kind of rationale is, however, not usually
necessary as the perpetrators of extreme violence are careful to keep it away from public
scrutiny. Ignorance of atrocities more often precludes the nationalist impulse to justify the
unjustifiable.
The burden of collective moral responsibility for state actions arguably increases to the
degree a state can be said to legitimately represent the views and desires of the nation itself.
Indeed, one of the core outcomes of nationalism even in its earliest manifestations has been to
simultaneously simplify and to render apparent an organic connection between the state and the
people. The argument, moreover, applies to all nation-states. Though their governments may
differ in structure and form, the governing authority in every nation-state at least attempts to
derive legitimacy through an appeal to the nation. Abdel-Nour is correct when he argues that
insofar as individuals partake of vicarious pride for perceived national glories, a degree of moral
responsibility for the nation’s misdeeds should also obtain. However, the degree to which a
population feels compelled to accept authoritarian state actions as consonant with national ideals
is often tenuous, which complicates the picture. Any inquiry into collective responsibility for
state actions must confront the basic question of the synchronicity nation and state. A recent
example demonstrates precisely what I mean by this.
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Before his ignominious fall from power in 2011, Hosni Mubarak, like his predecessor,
ruled Egypt with a curious form of nationalist imagery that de-emphasized pan-Arab sentiment
and stressed a distinct Egyptian identity. To the extent that Mubarak’s regime engaged in
behavior that resonated within and across nationalist circles, the regime won applause from these
quarters. But when he tortured, disappeared, and murdered political enemies, nationalists were
under no illusions that such behavior constituted anything more virtuous than the unpleasant
byproducts of a Machiavellian power struggle. The lofty ideals upon which the nationalist vision
of Egypt rested necessarily transcended the temporal politics of Mubarak’s regime, which few
Egyptians would have honestly described as a government worthy of their admiration.396 The
ability to reject a regime’s actions as dissonant with national ideals is a curious advantage quite
unique to authoritarian nation-states, where nationalists are under no pressure either to view state
actions as an embodiment of their vision or to accept vicarious responsibility for those actions.
Moreover, to carry the Egyptian example just a bit further, when the Arab Spring came to Egypt
so dramatically at Tahrir Square, the movement to bring about Mubarak’s ouster took an
explicitly nationalist tone. For instance, not only was Tahrir Square the traditional site of protests
throughout Egypt’s modern history, it also prominently features a statue of Omar Makram, the
leader of the nationalist opposition to Napoleon’s colonial inroads. Mubarak’s decision to crack
down on the protests removed any lingering doubts as to his nationalist legitimacy.
Though baffling to outside observers, the military’s initial willingness to stand by the
demonstrators and to oppose police violence lent the army great credibility as the true
embodiment of the national will. By contrast, Mubarak was denounced as sharply at odds with
this will. As Eva Bellin explains, “Using lethal force against civilians threatens to undermine the
396
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image of the military as defender of the nation, especially if the crowds are representative of the
‘nation’ and cannot be dismissed as distinctly ‘other’ along class, sectarian, or ethnic lines.”397
The nationalist lines drawn between army and state helped temporarily patch over the social
cleavages within Egyptian society that later contributed to the revolution’s stagnation and
cooptation.398
Nationalism thrives on the selective use (cynics might call it an abuse) of history.399 It
draws upon a real or imagined cultural legacy and from it creates a set of myths that both justify
and extend its influence. Strict adherence to objective reality is subordinate to the social
functions such myths serve. As Eric Hobsbawm wrote apropos of nationalism and the
responsibilities of the historian, “Nationalism requires too much belief in what is patently not
so.”400 While nationalist authoritarian regimes do make use of national myths, their ability to do
so is hobbled by the shallow and often incidental nature of the connection. So when the state
behaves in a way that is widely perceived a deviation from or directly antagonistic to national
myths, a little old-fashioned repression is all that is needed to swiftly contain any discontent.
By contrast, brute force is not usually a viable option for liberal-democratic nation-states,
where national identity is molded by ideals widely perceived as synchronous with state power.
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Once inflected with liberalism and the trappings of democratic governance, nationalism implies a
much more linear relationship between the individual and the state than what one tends to find
under authoritarian regimes. In such cases, where nationalism has been effectively harnessed by
state institutions and where democratic governance inculcates a belief that state policy is driven
by the will of the people, the liberal ideals that undergird the state’s legitimacy simultaneously
serve to define its national myths as well. Democracy, liberalism, and their attendant ideals—
justice, equality, toleration—form the core principles upon which national identity flourishes in
such states. In short, whereas nationalism in authoritarian nation-states remains detached from
the echelons of formal power, liberal-democratic nation-states realize the fullest alignment of
nation and state.
With sufficient time to stabilize and gain legitimacy, the formal institutions of democratic
governance exert tremendous power over national identity. Likewise, the particular
manifestation of these institutions is in turn shaped by the pre-existing elements of national
identity. There is what Beissinger calls a “recursive element” to the relationship between myths
of nation, national mobilization, and state power, each informing and justifying the other.401 To
echo Tilly’s maxim on war-making and state formation, nationalism makes the law and the law
makes nationalism. Some observers have noted the importance of the Declaration of
Independence and especially the Constitution for a uniquely American sense of national identity.
What has been called a “civil religion” simply describes the material codification of American
national identity.402
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When democracy is perceived as a central component of the national mythos,
democracy’s physical embodiment, its worldly existence, becomes quasi-sacred. In the United
States, this includes the various monuments to American democracy that span the Washington
Mall and so many battlefields, heroes, martyrs, and devils recorded in the history books. The
government itself, the very pinnacle of state power, represents the apotheosis of national ideals,
albeit within highly constrained parameters that render the range of political action predictable
and largely powerless to enact major change. Republican or Democrat, the notion of responsible
citizenship articulated by everyone from the caretakers of primary education to the gatekeepers
of the intelligentsia implies and expects adherence to either one main party or the other.
Alternative political options are simply not taken seriously.
Even today, at a time when large number of Americans have come to believe that
meaningful change is impossible or at least extremely difficult to enact via conventional means,
an alternative to the two-party cartel appears equally unthinkable. At the limits of the political
spectrum lie two sides of one coin insofar as the strategies they pursue retain a common
nationalist premise. On one side, we find a liberal-left whose oppositional force, when it
emerges, is distilled in the nationalist slogan “protest is patriotic;”403 at the other, a reactionary
right that has elevated the Constitutional framers to demi-god status, and which deploys their
decontextualized words in the hope of resurrecting a lapsed golden age of American history.
These oppositional forces may each at different times and for quite different reasons
oppose particular policies or politicians. They may excoriate Washington “politics as usual” and
denounce the current occupant of the Oval Office as a traitor, but the basic legitimacy of the
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political system almost always survives intact. The synchronization of national identity and
formal politics in liberal-democratic nation-states guarantees as much. Any political ideology
that fundamentally questions or rejects the basic premises of American-style democracy appears
nonsensical, even “un-American.” It is a powerful symbiosis underscored by Louis Hartz, who
used a less explicit but no less ideological notion—the “American way of life”—to describe the
embedded Lockean liberalism at work.
There has never been a “liberal movement” or a real “liberal party” in America: we have
only had the American Way of Life, a nationalist articulation of Locke which usually
does not know that Locke himself is involved. … Ironically, “liberalism” is a stranger in
the land of its greatest fulfillment.404
If Hartz is correct, then American identity is inextricably tied to a deep respect for the
institutions of state power. For while other nations are able to draw on real and perceived
histories that span millennia, the United States simply cannot mine the same field of legitimacy
without extensive historical fabrication. Instead of a timeless history then, national identity in the
Untied States is grounded in a civil ethos, a strand of Lockean liberalism Hartz pegs as the
American Way of Life. For our purposes here we can simply observe that insofar as uncritical
acceptance of core state institutions is an implied condition of membership, American identity is
shaped and reshaped mainly through its relation to state power. No analysis of American state
violence is complete without confronting this basic insight.
While the foregoing discussion centers on the American case, and while synchronization
of state and nation may be more advanced there than it is elsewhere, national identity is
nonetheless similarly tied to state power in other liberal democracies. The more perfect the
connection, the more legitimacy the state enjoys in the eyes of its national subjects. The opposite
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is true as well; the less perfect the connection, the less legitimacy the state enjoys and the greater
the potential for a nationalist movement to emerge that challenges the state’s claims to national
representation. As Breuilly argues in his classic account of nationalism, “Only when the existing
state is held to have different boundaries from those of the nation are political oppositions liable
to go beyond political justifications to arguments that explicitly appeal to cultural identity.”405
This is as true for a nation conceived on ethno-linguistic grounds as it is for the strand of civic
nationalism described here. It is important to emphasize that the verifiable existence of
democratic state institutions is less important for this kind of civic nationalism than the belief
that these institutions do exist and operate legitimately.
An ethics grounded in moral vision depends greatly on the acceptance or refusal of
responsibility. In regimes where the relationship between individual and state is not facilitated by
the connective tissue of nationalism, responsibility is generally refused. By contrast, in states that
cultivate a strong connection between individual and state, we should expect to see a readiness to
accept moral responsibility for state actions. Yet this is not usually the case when it comes to
misdeeds. Thus, it would at first appear that even the liberal-democratic connection is too weak
to establish moral responsibility—but this is too hasty a conclusion. The reality is rather more
complicated. What at first appears to be a conscious refusal to accept a bad state of affairs is
nothing of the kind. Instead, the liberal-democratic nationalist impulse to refuse moral
responsibility for the nation’s misdeeds stems from an unwillingness to concede any misdeeds at
all. That is to say the question is not whether or not to accept responsibility; the question is
whether or not anything wrong was done to begin with and nationalism scrupulously avoids selfincrimination. It attempts to reverse the meaning of “bad” whenever possible, even to the point

405

John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993), 365.

161

of absurdity, through willful ignorance or political denialism. If the nation is synonymous with
all things beneficent and the state is perceived not only as legitimate executor of the nation’s will
but its highest embodiment, then state behavior deviating from this myth faces serious
intellectual dissonance.
Some dissonance can be accommodated and may take the form of a partisan political
battle over the nation’s proper identity. As an example, we might look to protest movements that
have sought to argue for reform along nationalist grounds, from Martin Luther King, Jr.’s dream
that “one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed”406 to the common
liberal refrain “not in our name,” both of which seek to legitimize political movements by
suggesting the nation is not living up to professed ideals.407
In the same way, conservative activists have expressed their opposition to policies
advocated by the Obama administration by invoking explicitly nationalist arguments, ranging
from bizarre denials of his birth certificate’s validity to more common objections to a “big”
government out of step with the founders’ vision.408
From one Presidential administration to the next, government policies always ruffle the
feathers of those who oppose them, but rarely do these skirmishes rise to a level that forces
citizens to reassess their national identity altogether. In this way, minor political dissonance can
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be accommodated within the accepted boundaries of mainstream politics. If the government
enforces policies that seriously contradict what someone happens to think is the proper role and
destiny of the American nation, it is surely because feckless elites have run amok and not
because there is anything fundamentally wrong with the system itself. To reach the latter
conclusion, one must have already come to believe that the state is no longer the true executor of
the nation’s will. And for this to occur, the misdeeds in question must be so bad, so inexcusable,
that no amount of convincing will tame the crisis. Herein lies the particular form a threshold of
atrocity must take if it is to penetrate the ideological fetters of liberal-nationalism. The following
subsection looks at the morally blinding consequences that result from liberal-nationalism’s
conversion of liberal ideals into national conceits.

Liberal Ideals, National Conceits
Nationalism is often a benign force, one that unifies and encourages solidarity across
social divides. It need not manifest the racist and xenophobic tendencies we associate with its
more extreme forms. Whatever its shape however, nationalism remains one of most ideologically
potent forces of our time, capable of subordinating and subsuming competitors. When
nationalism comes into contact with liberalism for example, the former tends to absorb the latter.
Whereas nationalism and democracy are inherently limited visions of human society, marked by
an inside and an outside, liberalism aspires to the universal. The nation is for those who belong
to the nation; democracy is for the demos; liberalism is for all humanity.
Nationalism transforms liberal universal ideals into national particularist conceits. A
belief that one adheres to liberal universal norms can paradoxically become the source of
particular pride in itself. “We” believe in higher ethical standards than “they” do; “our” behavior
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is rooted in universal norms, unlike “theirs.” This tendency of nationalism to use liberalism
instrumentally should be troubling to anyone who takes the prospects for diminishing human
suffering seriously. Liberal ideals and the very foundations of international law itself can become
tools in the service of domination and oppression—a worrisome phenomenon Nicola Perugini
and Neve Gordon have called “the human right to dominate.”409
Invisible or obscure violence committed by an unrepresentative authoritarian regime is
one thing; openly embracing violence committed by a state perceived to be acting in the interests
of a nation devoted to an idealistic potpourri of causes (human rights, democracy, justice,
freedom) is another entirely. The latter case is likely to accommodate forms of violence that
might otherwise be condemned by a public more inclined to critically assess the moral content of
state actions. Hence liberal-nationalism may actually allow the state greater freedom of action
when it comes to waging violence. Weizmann argues this is especially so when a case can be
made that violence is in fact exercised with humanitarian intent using methods perceived as
humane and adhering to what he calls the “humanitarian minimum.”410 One obvious moral
dilemma raised by the perception of war as humanitarian and humane is a higher threshold of
tolerance for state violence. Relating the matter more directly to democratic states, Weizmann
claims that it is only a perception of violence as humanitarian that explains how “societies that
see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization.”411
Putting the matter differently, Laleh Khalili warns that “if policy makers think war can be waged
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more humanely, they may choose to wage war more often.”412 To the enthusiasm of policy
makers, I would add that a public inured to forms of violence that appear benevolent in intent is a
public unwilling or perhaps afraid of looking too deeply into the grisly details.
Martha Nussbaum points out that the values on which Americans pride themselves,
“respect for human dignity and the opportunity for each person to pursue happiness,” are empty
signifiers so long as they are not conceptualized in universal terms and instead apply to
Americans only.413 This is certainly true, but American national values are not limited to the
apparently benign liberal belief that “all human beings are created equal and endowed with
certain inalienable rights.”414 A deep-rooted, popular belief in American exceptionalism, in
democracy, and, more recently, human rights, complements the state’s enormous military and
economic influence.415
American nationalism accepts a position of global dominance in much the way earlier
world powers did: as a logical extension of historical necessity. American values are imagined to
be universal, the American government able to act in ways that benefit a universal humanity.
Democracy figures large in this scheme. The United States “is a state committed not only to
preserving the idea [of democracy] within America but extending it to the rest of the world.”416
Paradoxes inevitably arise from the purported desire to spread American values around
the world and the very real military and political hegemony the state enjoys. For example,
Americans believe they live in the greatest country on earth, an assumption that implies the
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inferiority of other societies. Nationalism is adept at balancing antagonistic and contradictory
beliefs, so this need not detain us. It is enough simply to observe that while nationalists may take
the state at its word, policy makers know very well that justification matters. No regime, not
even the most murderous, ever portrays its violence as morally unjustified; rather, violence is
typically portrayed as defensive in nature or else in the service of some grand ideological project.
For a nation characterized and defined by a liberal-democratic ethos to prosecute
violence with minimal controversy, it must be justified along liberal-democratic lines. As
Wallerstein notes, the American line since 1945 has been threefold:
America is the world’s greatest country (narrow nationalism); American is the leader of
the ‘free world’ (the nationalism of the wealthy, White countries); American is the
defender of the universal values of individual liberty and freedom of opportunity
(justified in terms of Kantian categorical imperatives).417
The idea that America has a special mission in the world has historically resulted in two
contradictory approaches on the international stage: 1) an isolationist reluctance to engage the
country in foreign entanglements and 2) a strong belief in the United States as “a city upon a
hill,” in which involvement overseas is occasionally necessary not only to preserve the American
Way of Life, but to protect global human dignity. This impulse, with its cosmopolitan,
universalist undertones was invoked in support of the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT)
launched by Bush administration.418 When violent means are believed to serve noble ends, it is
difficult to perceive violence as passing beyond a threshold of atrocity.
Clear moral vision is further hindered by the oversimplification of geopolitics. The Cold
War had suggested a very clear ideological demarcation, physically drawn along the frontiers of
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the iron curtain. Since the 9/11 terror attacks, the threat of Islamist terrorism has provided U.S.
policy makers with a similarly useful Manichean division between “us” and “them”—a struggle
between the forces of American values (good, liberal, universal) and the forces of terror (bad,
illiberal, particular).
Immediately following the attacks in 2001, erstwhile New York Senator Hillary Clinton
said that the United States should “make it clear that every nation has to either be with us or
against us.”419 President Bush made a similar statement only weeks later in a special address to
Congress: “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or
you are with the terrorists.”420 Bush later elaborated on the universalist impulse of this vision:
“Once again, this nation and our friends are all that stand between a world at peace, and a world
of chaos and constant alarm. Once again, we are called to defend the safety of our people and the
hopes of all mankind. And we accept this responsibility.”421 Such a perspective deliberately casts
the American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as humanitarian in nature and only
incidentally motivated by domestic security concerns. The United States “intervened”—never
the pejorative “invaded”—to overthrow the Taliban and to restore the rights of women; it
invaded Iraq to overthrow the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein and to establish democracy in
the Middle East. The GWOT itself was framed as a humanitarian effort to rid the world of an
evil scourge.
In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush made this almost comically
explicit with his designation of an “axis of evil,”422 a strange notion that evokes a threat of
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generic evil linked to a suspiciously Nazi-sounding “axis.” As we have seen in earlier chapters,
opposition to evil is not a position that can be easily rejected. When preparing to garner
multilateral support for military intervention in Iraq, Bush consistently cited Saddam Hussein’s
violations of human rights. “Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding,” he
asked, “or will it be irrelevant?”423 The overall thrust of this discourse reveals some very basic
assumptions at the highest levels about America’s global role and its self-styled responsibility for
setting international moral standards by projecting its own actions as universal norms. In 2000,
Condoleezza Rice stated the case decisively: “American values are universal.”424
The symbols, speeches, tropes, and totems of American nationalism frequently remind
Americans that the United States stands for freedom, democracy, human rights—enlightened
cosmopolitanism itself. This belief, however discordant with the facts, is a powerful source of
pride for those who take their national identity seriously. The Unites States is the “land of the
free,” a “city on a hill.” Moreover, a belief that the United States is widely admired by other
societies around the globe, its actions perceived as just, reinforces these myths. Some scholars
believe that American global hegemony is rendered palatable to the rest of the world mainly
because American values are widely accepted as synchronous with liberal values, that the
country’s actions are tolerated because the United States represents a vanguard of modernity
understood broadly as some combination of democratic politics and neoliberal markets. “The
United States ‘project,’” Ikenberry writes “is congruent with the deeper forces of
modernization”—or is at least thought to be.425 Whatever the merits of this argument in the
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immediate post-9/11 period, it is no longer objectively credible today when a plurality of the
planet’s population views the United States as the main threat to world peace and is torn on the
merits of American government.426
Americans widely believe their country to be the envy of other nations and despite the
misgivings just noted, the belief is not altogether inaccurate.427 Admittedly, when US
policymakers speak about “human rights,” “democracy,” and “freedom,” they might very well
do so out of personal conviction and earnest idealism. Yet because of the power of “human
rights,” “democracy,” and “freedom,” as signifiers of American nationalism, there is an element
of deception and self-deception involved. The deception involves the international projection,
however unwitting, of particularist conceits masquerading as universal norms; the self-deception
arises in objections originating from within. When liberal ideals are thought to be synchronous
with American values, American actions are assumed to be synchronous with liberal ideals. Yet
this is not the case. When objections to state actions do occasionally crop up internally, they
frequently adopt some variant of “we don’t do that sort of thing” or “that’s not what America
stands for,” thereby mentally distancing the actions from some assumed core of recognizably
American behavior. This is precisely how nationalism reduces liberal ideals to instruments of
power.
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Though it would seem to provide nationalist conceits with a veneer credibility, how the
United States is perceived abroad is much less important to the question of political
responsibility than how Americans themselves understand the relationship been state and
society. At a time when mainstream scholarship reports levels of economic inequality without
historical parallel and laments the consequences of this for democratic politics,428 polls indicate
that American have a remarkably clear-eyed sense of what is at stake.429 Polls are notoriously
ambiguous however, and while Americans universally decry the shortcomings of their political
system and express dismay at the obstacles limiting upward social mobility, they remain
stubbornly committed to the empirical validity of the American Dream.430 “Ideology isn’t false
consciousness,” Walter Davis writes. “It’s fantasmatic consciousness, the creation of illusions
and self-delusions.”431 The basic dogmas of American civil religion—a strand of what I have
been calling liberal-nationalism—assert their self-evidence even when they come crashing
against the sharp rocks of empirical disqualification. The American Dream is only the most
famous expression of this kind of ideological tenacity and if it dies, where will the nationalist
turn for succor? What future myths will stir the nationalist imagination?
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In much the same way, those who subscribe to liberal-nationalist assumptions that
American state violence is fundamentally benevolent will find it exceedingly difficult to reassess
their beliefs in the face of counterevidence. However strenuously mainstream American liberals
objected to the Presidency and policies of George W. Bush, very few would have thought to
question the altruism of his intentions. “When we go somewhere, we don’t go as conquerors. We
go as liberators.”432 Others invade, occupy, destroy; America liberates. Civilian deaths are
lamentable to be sure, but ultimately unintentional.
The goal of ideology is the production of a collective consciousness that leads ordinary
citizens to serve the system convinced in their heart of hearts that it is morally good …
Does not such a belief describe the consciousness of most Americans both in their
readiness to celebrate all the American platitudes and in their readiness to support the
domestic and international policies of their government?433
Even today, with revelations of President Obama’s “kill list” and the vague standards by which
his drone program selects targets for assassination, the mainstream debate revolves predictably
around questions of legality and consequences for American security.434 Rarely, if ever, does the
debate cast aspersions on American intentions, which lie beyond reproach.
Invisible Violence
There is a tradition in moral philosophy which insists that nationalism always and in all
its forms exerts a deleterious influence on morality. The very nature of nationalism, it is claimed,
“offends against the requirement of universality and impartiality of moral judgment.”435 Bernard
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Gert puts it rather more starkly: “[N]ationalism overwhelms morality, not only as the basis for
action, but also as the basis for judgment about moral matters.”436
Confusion about morality often allows nationalistic judgments to pass for moral ones, a
confusion often not only supported by the leaders of the country but often shared by
them. Sometimes, however, nationalism is explicitly put forward as superior to morality.
“My country, right or wrong” is a slogan that war makes respectable even in most
civilized societies. … Many persons are not only willing but anxious to sacrifice their
lives for their country, even when their country is engaged in an immoral war. During the
twentieth century the evil caused by immoral actions due to nationalism was greater than
the evil caused by the immoral actions due to religious reasons.437
While there is much in Gert’s assessment that resonates with my own—especially in his isolation
of war as an especially troubling subject for rationalization by the nationalist—it has not been
my intention to claim that nationalism precludes ethics. Nationalism hinders moral judgment
certainly, but it does not render the task impossible.
Nationalism exerts a tremendous normative pull, especially in the modern liberaldemocratic nation-state, where the constitutive elements of national identity are themselves
strongly associated with the state. Returning to the language of moral vision found in the work of
Murdoch, Weil, and Levinas, this kind of liberal-nationalism inserts itself at the moment a moral
agent is confronted with the state’s actions. Perhaps more than other filters to moral vision,
nationalism requires a determined effort at the “unselfing” process Murdoch regards as essential
to clearheaded moral agency. This is because nationalism makes it that much harder to assess the
moral content of one’s actions, or one’s vicarious actions carried out by the nation-state. Indeed,
of all the filters to moral judgment Murdoch describes, nationalism must certainly count among
the most powerful.
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In this final sub-section, I turn to the moral philosophy of Adam Smith, whose work
might help us begin to remove our nationalist goggles. The key, Smith argues, is looking to a
hypothetically impartial spectator, his contribution to the ideal observer tradition. While the
ethical system Smith outlines in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is grounded in sympathy (not
impartiality), his deference to an uninvolved outside observer resonates strongly with the notion
of moral attention discussed by Murdoch and Weil. Admittedly, the impartiality Smith describes
is unconvincing, but the figure nevertheless provides a useful aspirational ideal for evaluating
moral dilemmas. As an ideal and not a literal moral agent, the impartial spectator is
hypothetically stripped of the filters, ideologies, and other obstacles to moral vision in much the
same way one practicing perfect moral attention might be. It is worth noting that in Murdoch and
Weil’s conception, the importance of moral attention lies not in its ultimate attainability, but in
its insertion of a moral pause, a moment of questioning one’s assumptions.
When Adam Smith invokes the figure of the impartial spectator, he describes to a great
extent what in earlier chapters I have termed minimally comprehensive moral knowledge, i.e.
knowledge that places an act in a context beyond the simple phenomenological experience of the
act itself. Just as this hypothetical spectator is unlikely to arrive at a reasonable moral judgment
with the clouds of ideology and personal proximity lingering over the relevant interpretive
faculties, likewise one must have access to some knowledge about the state of affairs in question.
Simply witnessing an episode of violence is not enough. A basic notion of vision must be
expanded to incorporate minimally comprehensive knowledge of the actors’ motivations and the
range of morally compelling factors at stake. In short, Adam Smith’s impartial spectator brings
us back to the face to face encounter of Levinas and the moral attention of Murdoch and Weil by
arguing for an expanded notion of vision as a component central to moral choice.
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In his own time, Smith’s moral philosophy was overshadowed by his economic writing
and by his friend David Hume’s similar, albeit more coherent, sentimentalist ethics. In our own
time, a different twist on the ideal observer concept has proved enormously fruitful for moral and
political philosophers of the late twentieth century, namely the veil of ignorance heuristic
proposed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice. While Rawls attempts to develop the contours of
a decent society through his innovative use of the original position, I believe Smith’s approach is
actually far more open to universal extrapolation. Whatever his aspirations, Rawls remains tied
to a hypothetical community with relatively recognizable boundaries—a point that becomes
quite clear upon considering the shortcomings of his attempt to apply the model on an
international scale.
Though cloaked behind a veil of ignorance as to their place in the schema, Rawls
nevertheless relies on the deliberation of the same members of the community he wishes to
assess. By contrast, Smith argues that we can never independently know the moral content of our
actions.
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any judgment
concerning them, unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own natural station
and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us. But we can do this in no
other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other
people are likely to view them. … We endeavor to examine our own conduct as we
imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it.438
Smith then offers some explanation for the moral blindness of nationalism in general as well as
the readiness to accept “custom” as morally neutral or desirable. His solution to both dilemmas is
to propose the idea of an “impartial spectator,” predicating moral judgment on separation from
immediate circumstances with a strong visual metaphor.
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Amartya Sen argues that the use of the spectator device moves Smith toward an idea of
“open impartiality” contra the “closed impartiality” of the Rawlsian contract tradition439 but the
impartiality of Smith’s spectator is less interesting or convincing than the openness it implies.
Opening moral conduct to scrutiny by “other people,” as Smith argues, potentially allows us to
consider our actions from another perspective through sheer force of imagination. While ethical
self-transformation is initiated for social reasons, Smith thinks it is ultimately achieved
independently. The spectator obviously begins as a product of society and socialization but when
taken seriously as tool for moral judgment, it can provide a position from which an individual is
able to evaluate and criticize her society.
Rawls’s version of the ideal observer enables us to imagine a base level of tolerable
structural violence that might fall within a threshold of atrocity, i.e. it establishes minimally
acceptable levels of violence.440 Under such a rubric, as I suggested in the second chapter,
individuals are likely to tolerate much less violence than is currently the case. However, there are
also important shortcomings of a Rawlsian approach, which stem from its moral chronology.
The original position and the norms it produces usually precede the proliferation of any
real-world phenomena that demand moral attention. Rawls sets the moral framework within
which real-world actions may later be interpreted and reinterpreted. If moral views require
revision, he proposes the concept of reflective equilibrium, which allows for moral beliefs to be
“tested” and altered as necessary. “It is an equilibrium,” Rawls writes, “because at last our
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principles and judgments coincide; and it is reflective since we know to what principles our
judgments conform and the premises of their derivation.”441
Rawls insists upon continuing reflection, always bringing our principles and moral
judgments into equilibrium as new morally compelling information becomes available.
At the moment everything is in order. But this equilibrium is not necessarily stable. It is
liable to be upset by further examination of the conditions which should be imposed on
the contractual situation and by particular cases which may lead us to revise our
judgments.442
Though Rawls himself eschewed the term, this has been called an intuitionist account of moral
judgment—as opposed to a deontological or consequentialist approach. Intuitions, via reflective
equilibrium, may be refined and improved.
While reflective equilibrium is a compelling notion for emphasizing an ongoing process
of moral refinement, it remains vulnerable to the unique challenges posed by violence. It simply
cannot address the colossally difficult task of achieving measured and impassioned judgment
from actors involved in violence on one side or the other. Violence enters into Rawls’s
framework only peripherally. He accepts a traditional state monopoly of violence as a “nonideal”
means for “curbing the liberties of the intolerant and of restraining the violence of contending
sects,”443 provided it violates neither his Liberty Principle nor his Difference Principle. It is
rather difficult, however, to imagine any act of violence that would not trespass on the victim’s
liberties.
More to the point, Rawls discusses state violence mainly under the broad category of
war, assuming formal initiation and just conduct. He points out that “Even in a just war certain
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forms of violence are strictly inadmissible; and where a country’s right to war is questionable
and uncertain, the constraints on the means it can use are all the more severe.”444 In one of the
only passages where Rawls directly addresses the question of atrocity, albeit without using the
term, he declares “The aim of war is a just peace.”
[T]herefore the means employed must not destroy the possibility of peace or encourage a
contempt for human life that puts the safety of ourselves and of mankind in jeopardy. The
conduct of war is to be constrained and adjusted to this end.445
Reflective equilibrium provides a useful method for considering particular value judgments in
light of one’s abstract value judgments. It requires a moral agent to strike a balance between
competing value judgments without privileging one over the other. Given the formal institutional
setting Rawls envisions in his discussion, reflective equilibrium seems a reasonable expectation.
It is unreasonable, however, to expect individual moral agents, actively engaged in acts of
violence as perpetrators or victims, to derive much use from a method aimed more properly at
the “representatives of states.”446 In part, this has to do with the kinds of moral distancing and
dispersion of responsibility state bureaucracy implies, but it also stems from Rawls’s own
normative intentions. His project is aimed at encouraging the development of a just community
of states, each adhering to basic standards of human rights he calls the Law of Peoples. To this
end, he seems to impute all instances of atrocity and violations of human rights generally to
“oppressive and expansionist regimes.”447 An application to individual ethics is unclear.
Rawls famously applies reflective equilibrium to a hypothetical original position.
Adapting the original position to a theory of atrocity, participants are asked to determine
minimally acceptable levels of violence by imagining what it would be like to suffer as potential
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victims of this violence in the future. Behind the veil of ignorance, they have no way of knowing
if they will be born into an oppressed sub-national culture or a to a wealthy family in
Westchester County. As in Rawls’s formulation, it is reasonable that rational self-interested
moral agents will tolerate much less violence than we currently experience. Certainly, structural
violence will have been considerably diminished in a Rawlsian society through the development
of just institutions predicated on the Difference Principle. Though violence is never explicitly
factored into his account, justice as fairness does envision a much less structurally violent
society.448 So how can Rawls help us at the crucial moment brute physical violence actually
occurs? Does reflective equilibrium provide the tools for moral reflection in such cases?
Rawls is primarily interested in theorizing the foundations of decent institutions. In this
way, the practice of reflective equilibrium implies dedicated consideration and time; it is not
intended to offer real-time tools of judgment to individual agents in the midst of moral conflict.
While it might offer a useful practical method for considering and reconsidering a particular
policy or course of action, it is virtually powerless when taken by surprise. Violence explodes
both the tidy normative framework established by the veil of ignorance and the method of moral
assessment offered by reflective equilibrium. In such cases, it cannot offer a reliable path to
moral judgment if only for the basic fact that a death-struggle does not resemble the kind of
reasoned moral consideration Rawls envisions.
So while reflective equilibrium seems to offer a way of assessing a moral dilemma in the
past tense (i.e. of using past experience to inform future moral judgment), it is less clear that it
offers very much in the present, as a moral dilemma unfolds before our eyes. It is all too easy to
imagine scenarios about which reflective equilibrium has little to say because there is no history
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to draw from. To some extent, every moral dilemma presents a unique moral crisis.
Extrapolating from past experience is not always possible or even desirable. It is all very well to
say that killing is wrong and should not be tolerated, but raising the maxim to a deontological
dogmatism risks perpetuating injustices for which violence may pose a viable, if regrettable,
countermeasure. If this is true, then strict pacifism is morally untenable.
Whatever minimal violence might be tolerated by members of a decent society, there
remains the question of counter-hegemonic violence that must be judged along quite different
moral criteria. A theory of atrocity then treat anti-colonial violence as morally distinct from other
forms of violence. While reflective equilibrium may very well conclude that colonialism is
morally unacceptable, it can only do so after the baleful experiment has been “tested.” This can
hardly offer much confidence to the potential victims of such violent moral experimentation. To
be fair, a Rawlsian might object that the very threat colonialism poses to the Difference and
Liberty Principles precludes any rational agent advocating for such a system behind the veil of
ignorance. However, it remains plausible to imagine the basic structure of a Rawlsian society at
some point coming under threat in the course of conventional political struggle, a threat which
inevitably raises the possibility of injustice.
As with Plato’s warning of the eventual stagnation and decay of his ideal state, so it
would be with a Rawlsian society. There must be a means for addressing challenges to the
Difference and Liberty Principles when they arise, even if the political circumstances allowing
such challenges to arise would not have been a predictable outcome of the original position. In
short, reflective equilibrium’s inability to reassess norms when they are taken by surprise is
exacerbated by Rawls’s treatment of the phenomenon discussed in this chapter: nationalism.
Rawls’s liberal cosmopolitan project is often assumed to foreclose on the possibility of any
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widespread nationalist influence in his vision of a just society. While Rawls writes of “nations,”
“national communities,” “national power,” even “national glory,” nationalism is curiously absent
from his analysis. In the Law of Peoples, Rawls suggests that he understands nationalism as a
“pattern of cultural values”449 along lines described by John Stuart Mill:
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among
themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others—
which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire
to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves,
or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been
generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent.
Community of language, community of religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical
limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the
possession of national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective
pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past.
None of these circumstances, however, are necessarily sufficient by themselves.450
Whatever his views on nationalism, Rawls is unclear about what reflective equilibrium might
look like when applied on a global scale. He writes that a global system of justice is impossible
because the prerequisites of reflective equilibrium and overlapping consensus simply do not exist
on such a scale. Whereas individuals comprise the moral agents in the original position, no such
arrangement is possible internationally.451 Instead, the best we can expect are some basic rules of
coexistence between liberal and hierarchical societies.
Rawls famously posits cooperation between liberal societies and societies that fall short of his
ideal but can still be described as “decent.” Whether these non-ideal societies encompass broadly
nationalist ones is unclear and it is not my intention here to weigh in on the nationalismcosmopolitanism compatibility debate. However, I do think is fair to say that to the limited
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extent Rawls treats nationalism at all he encourages toleration—provided it does not pose a
threat to the Liberty or Difference Principles. On a state-institutional level, reflective equilibrium
offers a method for subjecting our views to critical analysis and reform. But on the international
scale, it seems something else is required to figuratively remove moral agents from the
encounter. An external spectator of the kind Smith postulates has the potential to expand the
possibilities for moral judgment Rawls offers via reflective equilibrium.

Rawls oddly places

Adam Smith’s moral philosophy in the utilitarian tradition, which his theory of justice and
fairness rejects on grounds that it is liable to produce outcomes incompatible with the Liberty
and Difference Principles. No one behind the veil of ignorance is likely to risk emerging as a
member of an oppressed minority, however much utility it brings society. However, it is not at
all clear that Smith’s ethics are consequentialist in the way Rawls claims they are. Rather, Smith
explicitly complains that philosophers have focused far too much on the consequences of actions
instead of their innate propriety and views his own contribution to moral philosophy as a
corrective to the trend.
Smith’s spectator addresses some of reflective equilibrium’s shortcomings by attempting
to step outside the self through an act of imagination—before, during, and after a moral
dilemma. Sen argues that the open quality of Smith’s approach avoids the parochialism of Rawls
by incorporating the relevance of other people’s interests as well as the moral weight of their
perspectives.452 It is helpful in this regard that Smith’s project is refreshingly devoid of the
standard racism so common among his contemporaries. Smith seems to have genuinely believed
that differences of class and race were products of society and not innate. Hence a theory of
atrocity benefits from both Rawls and Smith. Rawls helps us to imagine a basic threshold of
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atrocity and the limits to violence we might establish when ignorant of our place in the schema.
Furthermore, he lays the groundwork for later moral refinement, demanding the rigorous moral
self-critique reflective equilibrium implies. Smith, however, grants us the freedom to make more
nuanced moral judgments by expanding the subject and moral chronology of reflective
equilibrium. Because the strict Rawlsian account can only assess moral actions after the fact, its
solutions are always future-oriented. By contrast, Smith’s spectator raises the possibility of
reflective equilibrium in the present.
Anticipating the ideas of Murdoch and Levinas, Smith’s moral agent is fundamentally a
product of society and socialization. Moral judgment demands extraction from the deleterious
influence of “custom.” That is, Smith believes our moral sentiments, benevolent or malevolent,
obtain from the process of socialization. When assessing the moral content of a particular action,
Smith argues that we imagine how another person must feel and, by extension, how we would
feel if confronted with a similar predicament. In this way, imagination is absolutely central to
effective moral vision. The spectator is a product of our imagination insofar as we are the ones
who pose the very questions such a figure might ask. As such, the act of imagining can be
hijacked and rerouted through an unreflective reliance on social convention. Our moral concerns,
Smith argues, derive from an experience of sympathy with fellow human beings, but because
there is a strong cultural component to standards of acceptable conduct, they often vary wildly
from group to group according to differences of “custom.”
To illustrate the tremendous power of custom, Smith points to the practice of infanticide
by the Greeks:
[T]he murder of new-born infants was a practice allowed of in almost all the states of
Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians; and whenever the circumstances
of the parent rendered it inconvenient to bring up the child, to abandon it to hunger, or to
wild beasts, was regarded without blame or censure. … Uninterrupted custom had by this
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time so thoroughly authorized the practice, that not only the loose maxims of the world
tolerated this barbarous prerogative, but even the doctrine of philosophers, which ought
to have been more just and accurate, was led away by the established custom, and upon
this, as upon many other occasions, instead of censuring, supported the horrible abuse, by
far-fetched considerations of public utility. Aristotle talks of it as of what the magistrates
ought upon many occasions to encourage. The humane Plato is of the same opinion, and,
with all that love of mankind which seems to animate all his writings, no where marks
this practice with disapprobation.453
Smith was deeply troubled at the apparent power of custom to so easily warp our latent capacity
for sympathy. Whatever the terms, it is quite clear that Smith may as well have been writing
about the widespread and unreflective use of nationalism as a guide for morals. His solution was
to solicit “the eyes of the world” to help step outside the limiting confines of our behavior and
consider what an impartial spectator would think.
This last point is absolutely essential to Smith’s argument and the argument presented in
this study: distance, literal and figurative, matters. The victims of violence feel it more strongly
than the perpetrators of violence, who generally deny their actions are morally abhorrent. Yet
both are as close a proximity to the act as possible. The immediate local cultural context in
which violence occurs all too often provides a customary justification for suppressing sympathy,
for rendering the violence excusable or invisible. There is a strong case here against ideologies
like liberal-nationalism that demonstrate great resistance to external critique.
For the committed nationalist, foreign views that contradict their own have little value.
To the Israeli nationalist who supports the seemingly interminable occupation and colonization
of Palestinian land, it surely makes little difference that much of the rest of the world
unanimously opposes their government’s policies. To the Chinese nationalist who opposes
Tibetan independence, we might expect similar resistance to external criticism. To the American
nationalist who regards military interventions as a just and benign use of martial power, it comes
453
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as a surprise and no small amount of irritation that others frequently see it differently. In each
case, it is difficult to imagine nationalist dogmas crumbling away simply by inserting a healthy
dose of the external spectator’s purported wisdom. Likewise, those who remain detached and
distant from the violence in question are often unaware of its severity and lack the minimally
comprehensible knowledge required for moral judgment.
The role of moral philosophy, Murdoch argues, is not to provide comprehensive logical
justification for a given course of action. “Philosophers,” she writes, “have always been trying to
picture the human soul, and since morality needs such pictures and as science is … in no position
to coerce morality, there seems no reason why philosophers should not go on attempting to fill in
a systematic explanatory background to our ordinary moral life.”454 Moral philosophy should
actually help us to become better. Murdoch’s solution to moral progress (i.e. attention) takes
great effort and practice, but potentially rewards us with a method of making moral progress.
Similarly, forcing ourselves to imagine Smith’s spectator enhances our ability to detect what
might otherwise pass unnoticed, as if invisible. Like Murdoch, Smith prioritizes practical
application above philosophical rigor. Pointing out the connections between Murdoch and Smith,
Fleischacker argues that it “need not be the sole function of moral philosophers to provide a
groundwork for the metaphysics of morality.”455
Displaying, clarifying, and showing the internal connections in a way of thinking is also a
philosophical task, even if one sets aside the question of whether the way of thinking is
justified. … [Smith’s] astute and nuanced analysis of what goes into moral approval — of
what sorts of factors the impartial spectator considers, of how it can deceive itself or
otherwise go wrong, of how it develops and how it judges different virtues in different
ways — is accomplishment enough for one philosopher, regardless of whether he
adequately justifies the fact that we engage in such approval at all.456
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“Smith,” Fleischacker writes, “was a moral phenomenologist.”457 While the spectator’s
impartiality is a false dream, the effort to imagine what might constitute the moral horizon of an
uninvolved outsider—an “unselfed” moral agent in Murdoch’s terms—might push us in the
direction of Murdoch’s own ethical phenomenology: moral attention.
Smith does not claim that an external spectator is infallible for that would imply a status
independent of our own imagination from which it ultimately springs. Rather, Smith’s challenge
insists that, difficulties notwithstanding, moral judgment simply cannot take place with any
degree of certitude before at least attempting to step outside our narrow experience and consider
a spectator. Individuals cannot judge the moral content of their actions; nor can groups. By at
least stopping to imagine what an external spectator might think, we are forced to reflect on our
own moral assumptions—our own limitations. As with Murdoch’s attention, the act of imagining
a hypothetical spectator is intended to force reflection on one’s own obscure motives and
prejudices. It is also a deceptively simple task and, alas, lies beyond the capacities of the best of
us.

Conclusion
Liberal-nationalism is likely to remain with us for the foreseeable future and by the time
it finally passes into memory, another filter to moral vision will have already taken its place. The
question is not how to escape ideology, as some strands are more resistant to self-criticism than
others, but rather how to escape the kind of derivative moral insularity that would excuse the
inexcusable. I have attempted to describe in a small way how liberal ideals have been reduced to
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signifiers of national identity and how American identity is tethered to the institutions of state
power and its secular shrines to lofty yet elusive values.
Crucially, I argue that this phenomenon is not unique to the United States (though it may
be more advanced) and that as the trend continues in other parts of the world, we should expect
state violence to increasingly adopt the language of liberal universalism and human rights.458 As
always, moral clarity requires vigilance, especially when it is so thoroughly clouded by the pomp
and self-congratulations of liberal-nationalist discourse. Smith offers one way to pause for a
moment and to reconsider our assumptions before arriving at a definitive moral judgment. If the
unstated line that separates acceptable violence from unacceptable atrocity is to be reimagined
and redrawn, then such a pause is surely necessary, if only to hear the cries of the suffering more
clearly.
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